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This dissertation challenges the widely held view that there is something 
morbidly distinctive about violence in the Balkans.  It subjects this notion to scrutiny 
by examining how inhabitants of the embattled region of Macedonia endured a 
particularly violent set of events: the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the First World 
War.  Making use of a variety of sources including archives located in the three 
countries that today share the region of Macedonia, the study reveals that members of 
this majority-Orthodox Christian civilian population were not inclined to perpetrate 
wartime violence against one another.  Though they often identified with rival 
national camps, inhabitants of Macedonia were typically willing neither to kill their 
neighbors nor to die over those differences.  They pr ferred to pursue priorities they 
considered more important, including economic advancement, education, and security 
of their properties, all of which were likely to beundermined by internecine violence. 
National armies from Balkan countries then adjacent to geographic 
Macedonia (Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia) and their associated paramilitary forces 
  
were instead the perpetrators of violence against cvilians.  In these violent activities 
they were joined by armies from Western and Central Europe during the First World 
War.  Contrary to existing military and diplomatic histories that emphasize 
continuities between the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the First World War, this 
primarily social history reveals that the nature of abuses committed against civilians 
changed rapidly during this six-year period.  During the Balkan Wars and the opening 
campaigns of the First World War, armed forces often used tactics of terror against 
civilians perceived to be unfriendly, including spontaneous decisions to burn houses, 
murder, and rape.  As the First World War settled into a long war of attrition, armed 
forces introduced concentration camps and other kinds of bureaucratically organized 
violence against civilians that came increasingly to mark broader European violence 
of the twentieth century.  In all of these activities, the study reveals, Balkan armies 
and paramilitary forces were little different in their behavior from armed forces of the 
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… My dear cousin, here we are burning villages and killing Bulgarians, women and 
children.  Let me tell you, too, that cousin G. Kiritzis has a slight wound in his foot 
and that all the rest of us, friends and relations are very well…1 
 
The local population is divided into as many fragmentary parts as it contains 
nationalities, and these fight together, each being desirous to substitute itself for the 
others.  This is why these wars are so sanguinary…. The populations mutually 
slaughtered and pursued with a ferocity heightened by mutual knowledge and the old 
hatreds and resentments they cherished.2 
 
Compare the casual admission of cruelty in a Greek soldier’s letter from the frontlines 
of the Second Balkan War with the judgement below it cited from the international 
community of the day.  The authors of the Carnegie Report, from which both 
quotations are taken, implicated the “local population” that lived between the 
frequently shifting front lines at least as much as they blamed the soldiers of 
advancing and retreating national armies in their effort to account for such apparently 
wanton wartime violence against defenseless civilians.  The events that gave rise to 
this grim report shocked international opinion and left a deep and lasting mark on the 
world’s understanding of the peoples of the Balkans,  region whose very name came 
to carry pejorative connotations.3   
                                                
1 English translation of a letter from Anastasios Ath. Patros to Areistidis Thanasias in Kamniati, 
Thessaly, Jul. 27, 1913, printed in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Report of the 
International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washington, 
D.C.: 1914), 311. The Greek handwritten original is printed in Nouvelle série de lettres écrites à 
Mehomia, Nevrocope et d’autres localités du Razlog, par des soldats grecs du 19me régiment, VII-ème 
division, dont le courrier a été intercepté 14/27 juillet 1913.  Témoignages des citoyens paisibles de 
Serrès, victimes des atrocités grecques et sauvés par miracle (Sofia, 1913), 8-9. 
2 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, R port of the International Commission, 148. 
3 See Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).  Charges 
and countercharges of Balkan Wars and World War I atrocities were published also in Atrocités 
bulgares en Macedoine. (Faits et Documents). Exposé de la Commission d’enquête de l’Association 
Macedonienne rendue sure les lieux (Athens, 1913); Commission Interalliée, Rapports et enquêtes de 




This dissertation challenges the widely held view that there is something 
morbidly distinctive about violence in the Balkans.  It subjects this notion to scrutiny 
by examining how inhabitants of the embattled former Ottoman region of Macedonia 
endured a particularly violent period: the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the First 
World War.  My research reveals instead that members of this “local population,” 
although ethnically divided, were not inclined to per etrate wartime violence against 
one another.  Though they often identified with rival national camps, inhabitants of 
Macedonia were typically willing neither to kill their neighbors nor to die over those 
differences.  They preferred to pursue priorities they considered more important, 
including economic advancement, education, and security of their properties, all of 
which were likely to be undermined by internecine violence.  National armies from 
Balkan countries adjacent to geographic Macedonia ad their associated paramilitary 
forces were instead the perpetrators of violence against civilians.  And in this, it will 
be argued, they were little different from armed forces of the era throughout the 
Western world.   
Beginning almost exactly 100 years ago, the Balkan W rs of 1912-1913 were, 
after all, the only major conflict to have occurred in Europe within the recent memory 
of Europeans who were yet to face the outbreak in 1914 of continental, eventually 
global, war.  The Balkan Wars and the First World War together proved decisive for 
the political fate of the Balkan peoples, over 6 million of whom remained under 
                                                                                                                                 
les arméеs Bulgares (Paris, 1919); L. Miletitch, Documents relatifs aux actions antibulgares des 




Ottoman rule until 1912.4  The postwar consequences for the nation-states that 
inherited this large population have been long and well explored.  Yet scholarship 
focusing on the wars themselves within the region has been curiously narrow in 
scope.  Publication outside the Balkans since the 1930s has focused almost 
exclusively on the wars’ military and diplomatic dimensions.5  Little has been written 
outside the region that explores in any depth how this set of wars in the Balkans 
affected local societies.  It was, however, precisely the disturbing ways in which war 
and society were presumed to interact in the Balkans during the second decade of the 
twentieth century that subsequently shaped the enduring image of the region as a nest 
of overpowering ethnic hatreds and of a particularly savage brand of violence.  
Moreover, divergent understandings within the successor Balkan states of how the 
wars affected people who lived in the territories contested between 1912 and 1918 are 
at the heart of starkly contradictory national narratives.   
As the first sustained English-language study to focus primarily on the social 
dimensions of the war years of 1912-1918, this dissertation aims to refocus these 
received images of local violence.  It does so by examining how the majority 
Orthodox Christian population in geographic Macedonia responded to the 
                                                
4 This number accords with figures given both in Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic 
Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922 (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995), 135 and in Carnegie 
Endowment, Report of the International Commission, 418. 
5 Ernst Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1938); Alan Palmer, The Gardeners of Salonika (London: Deutsch, 1965); Alexandre 
S. Mitrakos, France in Greece during World War I: A Study in thePolitics of Power (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982); George B. Leon, Greece and the First World War: From Neutrality 
to Intervention, 1917-1918 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1990); David Dutton, The Politics of 
Diplomacy: Britain and France in the Balkans in the First World War (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998); 
E.J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913 (London: Praeger 
Publishers, 2003); and finally the series of works by Richard Hall, Bulgaria’s Road to the First World 
War (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1996); The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the First 
World War, (London: Routledge, 2000); and Balkan Breakthrough: The Battle of Dobro Pole 1918 




extraordinary situation of living between a rapidly shifting set of military lines and 
national borders.  Their experience offers a unique vantage point that sheds new light, 
not only on the nature and causes of violence in the Balkans, but on the evolution of 
twentieth-century wartime violence in general. 
 
The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the First World War, and Geographic Macedonia 
The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the First World War m rked the 
transformation of Macedonia from a longstanding dominion of the Ottoman Empire 
into a borderland uneasily divided between Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia (integrated 
into the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes soon after World War I.)  The 
wars also concluded a decades-long competition between these relatively young 
Balkan nation-states over Ottoman Macedonia, a natio list competition that occurred 
as the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire was widely perceived to be in decline and losing 
its grip on its remaining European territories.  At stake for the Empire’s Balkan 
neighbors during the late imperial period were the loyalties of Orthodox Christian 
Ottoman subjects in the contested region.  Funding and volunteers poured into 
Ottoman Macedonia from private organizations and from governmental institutions in 
Bulgaria and Greece, and to a lesser extent from Serbia.  They supported schools, 
churches, cultural institutions, and even irregular armed bands.  All of these efforts 
were primarily aimed at convincing the linguistically heterogeneous Orthodox 
Christian population of Ottoman Macedonia to consider themselves, by persuasion or 
by force, either as Bulgarians, or Greeks, or Serbs. The competition over Macedonia 




heightened Ottoman vulnerabilities in 1912 encouraged the governments of Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro to set aside their mutual distrust and form an 
aggressive military alliance against the Ottoman Empire. 
Claiming to liberate the Ottoman Christians of Europe from increasing 
maltreatment, in October 1912 the armies of the Balkan Alliance invaded the 
Ottoman Empire’s European territories, Macedonia included.  Their joint invasion 
launched what became known as the First Balkan War. The Balkan Alliance stunned 
observers with the rapid military success it achieved against the Ottoman army.  
Already by the beginning of December 1912, the Balkan states’ armies pushed 
Ottoman forces out of almost all of the Empire’s vat remaining European territory.  
This included all of geographic Macedonia, comprised of its Aegean, Vardar, and 
Pirin regions.  But the Balkan states’ rapid victories over the Ottoman Empire did 
nothing to resolve the longstanding disputes between Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, 
each of which now occupied a portion of geographic Macedonia.  Indeed, the tensions 
between them resurfaced with a new urgency once their national armies faced each 
other directly in the contested region.  The Second Balkan War, which began at the 
end of June 1913, was thus a war centered in Macedonia over the spoils of the Balkan 
states’ victory.  Greece and Serbia, aided by Montenegro and eventually also by 
Romania and the Ottoman Empire itself, all fought against and quickly defeated 
Bulgaria’s effort to take all of Vardar Macedonia from Serbia and most of Aegean 
Macedonia from Greece.  Bulgaria now lost much of the Aegean and Vardar territory 
it had initially gained in the First Balkan War.  Its government saw the geopolitical 




rectify what Bulgarians called the “national catastrophe” they had suffered in 1913.  
Initially weighing offers of territorial rewards from both the Central Powers and the 
Entente, Bulgaria joined with Germany and Austria-Hungary for the third campaign 
against Serbia launched in September 1915.  Bulgaria concentrated its advance 
against Serbia and subsequent occupation in the Vardar Macedonian territory it felt it 
had unfairly lost in 1913.  In addition, Bulgarian forces soon occupied the eastern part 
and for a time a western salient of neutral Greece’s n wly won Aegean Macedonian 
territory.  There they faced off against primarily French, British, and Serbian Entente 
forces who occupied the central and western parts.  Greece ended its neutrality and 
officially joined the Entente in July 1917 to fight against Bulgaria and its Austro-
German allies.  Beyond the involvement of Western and Central European forces, 
then, the First World War can also be seen in local political terms as a third 
installment of the Balkan Wars.  Bulgaria again tried and ultimately failed to gain 
from Greece and Serbia the Macedonian territory it felt that it deserved.  Existing 
scholarship has long noted the geopolitical significance of the Balkan Wars of 1912-
1913 in contributing to the tensions that brought about the First World War, whose 
cost in military casualties was far greater.6 
But the historical significance of these conflicts al o comes from the costs 
they exacted from the civilian populations.  They weighed heavily on the Balkan 
peoples inhabiting geographic Macedonia, the only territory to have been the site of 
frontlines in all three conflicts – the two Balkan Wars and the First World War.  
Available figures indicating the extent of Balkan military losses are staggering in 
                                                
6 See Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (New York: 





their own right.  Up to 18 percent of men mobilized in Bulgaria’s army lost their lives 
to combat or disease during the two Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, while the First World 
War claimed around 20 percent of mobilized Bulgarian and 40 percent of mobilized 
Serbian soldiers’ lives.7  In the First Balkan War alone, combat and disease took the 
lives of up to 125,000 Ottoman soldiers, comprising over 40 percent of Ottoman 
forces deployed then in the Balkans.8 
Yet those military figures say nothing directly about the toll taken by the wars 
on civilians between these shifting front lines.  Their experiences constitute the focus 
of this dissertation.  Contemporary and retrospectiv  accounts give qualitative 
evidence that noncombatant men, women, and children in Macedonia were the 
victims of murder, torture, arson, plunder, rape, deportation, and forced labor on a 
large scale.  Existing estimates, however incomplete, give us some indication of the 
scale of suffering endured by civilians in the Balkans and in Macedonia in particular 
between 1912 and 1918.  Civilian deaths in World War I from famine, disease, and 
violence appear to have run into the hundreds of thousands for each country holding 
Macedonian territory at the start of the war.  The losses comprised 10-14 percent of 
Serbia’s population, 2-6 percent of Bulgaria’s population, and over 3 percent of 
Greece’s population.9  For Serbia and especially Bulgaria, many of those deaths 
                                                
7 Calculations based on Bulgarian military deaths and total forces mobilized in the Balkan Wars given 
in Hall, Balkan Wars 1912-1913, 16, 108, 135; for Bulgaria in World War I, Hall, Balkan 
Breakthrough, 41, 174; for Serbia in World War I, Liebmann Hersch, “La mortalité causée par la 
guerre mondiale,” Metron: International Journal of Statistics 5, no.1 (1925): 14-20. 
8 Erickson, Defeat in Detail, 52, 329. 
9 The calculations of percentages use the population figures reported after the Second Balkan War in 
Carnegie Endowment, Report of the International Commission, 418.  On civilians deaths in Serbia, see 
Liebmann Hersch, “La mortalité causée par la guerre mondiale,” Metron: International Journal of 
Statistics 7, no.1 (1927): 65-76 for the lower figure; Michael Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: 
A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000, 2nd ed. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 




would have occurred among civilians from parts of the country other than Macedonia, 
but it appears that most of Greece’s civilian losses in World War I were over 130,000 
people from the Greek part of Macedonia.  Thus, while civilian deaths accounted for 
around 3 percent of Greece’s total population, theyseem to have accounted for over 7 
percent of the population in the Macedonian territory annexed in 1913.10 
Although overall figures for civilian deaths in geographic Macedonia are not 
available for the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the profusi n of descriptive accounts 
suggests that they too were significant.  More information is available about the 
waves of refugees created by these initial conflicts.  Taken together, between 5 and 15 
percent of Christians originally living in the Ottoman vilayets of Manastır, Selanik, 
and Kosova (the vilayets encompassing the geographic region of Macedonia) 
abandoned their homes during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 alone.  Up to 300,000 
refugees from Macedonia resulting from both the Balkan Wars and the First World 
War may have ended up in Bulgaria and in Greece.11  Although not the focus of this 
dissertation, geographic Macedonia’s ethnically diverse Muslim inhabitants died and 
                                                                                                                                 
Progress Publishers, 1971), 268 for the lower figure; Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, 788 for 
the higher figure.  On Greece, see Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, 787 for a lower figure; 
Hersch, “La mortalité” (1927), 80-81 for a higher figure. 
10 The calculation of 7 percent civilian dead out of he population in Greek Macedonia relies on the 
figure given in Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile, 162, for the 1911 population of the former Ottoman 
area taken by Greece in 1913.  This figure by the tim of World War I would have changed – probably 
declined on net – due to death and in- and out-migration related to the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.  
This, as well as the fact that Epirus and the islands that Greece annexed in 1913 were not the site of 
these civilian World War I deaths, suggests that the true civilian death rate in Greek Macedonia during 
World War I may have been considerably higher than 7 percent. 
11 The calculation of percentages uses the total number of Greek and Bulgarian Orthodox living in the 
three vilayets in 1911 given in McCarthy, Death and Exile, 135.  For the range of estimates of 
Christian refugees fleeing to Bulgaria and Greece embodied in the calculations, see Dimitrije 
Djordjević, “Migrations during the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars and World War One,” in Migrations in 
Balkan History, ed. Ivan Ninić (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1989), 116; 
Carnegie Endowment, Report of the International Commission, 154; and Professeurs de l’Université de 
Sophia, Réponse à la brochure des professeurs des universités d’Athènes, “Atrocités bulgares en 




became refugees at least as often as their Christian counterparts, especially as a result 
of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.12  As the body of this dissertation will make clear, 
these refugees, whether Christian or Muslim, typically fled for their lives in quite 
justified terror of actions being committed against them by the armies and other state 
authorities of Greece, Serbia, or Bulgaria, and by paramilitary forces operating in 
tandem with one or another of those armies. 
 
Wartime Violence, Balkan and European 
The Balkan Wars were the first wars fought on European soil after the 
landmark Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.  The Hague Conventions were 
among the earliest agreed provisions to create a body of international law that among 
other things would set limits on how armies could trea  each other and the populations 
of enemy territories they occupied.  The articles of the Conventions bearing on 
military conduct toward enemy soldiers and civilians codified older informal ideals 
that had gained increasing acceptance as norms among European states since the 
sixteenth century.13  But, as Geoffrey Parker acknowledges, “those restrictions have 
been breached at regular intervals” over the same period and since.14  Indeed, it seems 
that the European military thinkers and practitioners who developed the conceptual 
distinction between soldier and civilian over several centuries, as well as those who 
invoked it to some extent in the 1899 and 1907 Conventions, did so less because of an 
                                                
12 See McCarthy, Death and Exile, 135-164. 
13 The essays in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds., The Laws of 
War: Constraints in Warfare in the Western World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994) 
make this point clearly.  
14 Geoffrey Parker, “Early Modern Europe,” in Howard, Andreopoulos, and Shulman, eds., The Laws 




overriding concern to protect civilians than for the purpose of spelling out a 
distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants.  Their primary goal was to 
specify how armies were entitled to protect themselves from unlawful combatants.15 
But the fact that protecting civilians was not the main impetus for the first 
codifications of the laws of war at the turn of thewentieth century did not discourage 
leaders of a burgeoning international peace movement from seeing their hopes 
advanced by the Hague Conventions.16  Hence the particular dismay of these leaders 
upon observing not only the outbreak of the first wars on the European Continent 
since the Conventions but also the many ways in which the belligerents violated the 
newly codified international legal restraints on their behavior in war.  Probably the 
single most influential expression of this dismay was the aforementioned publication 
in 1914 of a Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and 
Conduct of the Balkan Wars by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, n 
organization based in Washington, D.C., that had been founded only a few years 
before.17  The report, as its title suggests, was the collectiv  work of a commission of 
prominent European and American intellectuals and politicians of generally liberal 
inclination recruited on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment during the Second Balkan 
War in 1913.  They included a member of the French senate, Baron d’Estournelles de 
Constant, a member of France’s Chamber of Deputies, M. Justin Godart, two British 
journalists, Francis W. Hirst and Henry Noel Brailsford, a member of the Russian 
                                                
15 See Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 157-215, 
and Karma Nabulsi, Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), especially 80, 175-176. 
16 Best, Humanity in Warfare, 131-133. 
17 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, R port of the International Commission to Inquire 




Duma, Pavel Milyukov, a Professor of Education at Columbia University, Samuel T. 
Dutton, and professors of law from Austria and Germany.  Prompted by disturbing 
reports of atrocities committed during the First Balkan War and by hints that new 
atrocities were occurring during the second war, members of the commission traveled 
in August 1913 to Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire to try to assess 
in person what had happened.  Their detailed and coscientious investigation 
implicated all warring sides in failing first to do everything possible to prevent war 
and then in violating “[e]very clause in international law relative to war on land and 
to the treatment of the wounded.”18  The evidence they assembled and promptly 
published remains an important contemporary source on the treatment of civilians 
during the Balkan Wars.   
The report’s authors viewed their sobering findings in part as a salutary lesson 
about the destructiveness of war and hatred that was applicable to the entire world, 
and in particular to European countries engaged in arms races, not just to the Balkans.  
As Columbia University president Nicholas Murray Butler wrote in its preface, “[i]f 
the minds of men can be turned even for a short time away from passion, from race 
antagonism and from national aggrandizement to a contemplation of the individual 
and national losses due to war and to the shocking horrors which modern warfare 
entails, a step and by no means a short one, will have been taken toward the 
substitution of justice for force in the settlement of international differences.”19  
“[T]hat war suspended the restraints of civil life, inflamed the passions that slumber 
in time of peace, destroyed the natural kindliness between neighbors, and set in its 
                                                
18 Ibid., 13. 




place the will to injure,” the authors wrote elsewhre, “is everywhere the essence of 
war.”  But the authors also conveyed their sense that the horrors they recorded 
reflected a particular proclivity among the peoples of the Balkans toward “extreme 
barbarity” in warfare, which was “a local circumstance which has its root in Balkan 
history.”20  The authors also identified “the common feature which unites the Balkan 
nations” as a tendency for entire populations, not only soldiers, to engage in violence 
whose brutality was “heightened by mutual knowledge and the old hatreds and 
resentments they cherished.”21  
Such ideas about the violent propensities of the Balkan peoples, according to 
Maria Todorova, were central to a modern global discourse about the region that she 
has called balkanism.22  Todorova locates the beginnings of that discourse in the 
nineteenth century when Westerners began to write popular accounts of their travels 
in the Balkans.  But she identifies the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 as a formative 
moment in the development of balkanism, when “[t]he ‘civilized world’ … was first 
seriously upset with the Balkans.”23  The discourse of balkanism only became more 
entrenched over the twentieth century and produced generic terms such as 
“balkanization,” which suggested that the Balkans represented an archetype for 
seemingly inscrutable and unending fragmentation and co flict.24  Thus, by the 
1990s, international commentary on Balkan politics that tried to make sense of the 
                                                
20 Ibid, 108. 
21 Ibid., 148. 
22 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).  The influence 
of Edward Said’s term “Orientalism” is unmistakable in Todorova’s coinage of “balkanism,” but 
Todorova also emphasizes the significant differences between the two discourses and their historical 
contexts, including most importantly the Balkans’ con rete reality as a geographic region, the lack of a 
history of Western colonial rule in the Balkans, and the dominant image of the Balkans as a bridge 
between West and East rather than as the West’s ontological ‘other.’ Ibid., 11-20. 
23 Ibid., 3. 




wars raging in the former Yugoslavia could and did readily draw on widespread 
notions about peculiarly “Balkan” ancient hatreds and cultural predispositions toward 
brutal violence.25   
Subsequent scholarship has questioned Todorova’s notion that the nature of 
discourse in the modern period about the Balkans has been uniformly pejorative.26  
For example, Eugene Michail has shown that politica preferences could complicate 
British attitudes even towards the subject of violence in the Balkans.  Many Britons 
were willing to forgive violence on the part of Ottoman Christians against Muslims, 
especially before the Balkan Wars.  The inter-Christian violence that marked the 
Second Balkan War was unforgivable by comparison.  Serbs, allied to the British 
during the First World War, gained a heroic image, while Bulgarians fell out of 
favor.27  Nevertheless, all scholars who have studied the subject have agreed that, 
despite any variations over time and place and despite any counter-narratives, the 
dominant image of the Balkans for at least a century has been a negative one that in 
particular associates the region with atavistic violence.28 
                                                
25 Examples include Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1993); Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New 
haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 83; Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 4-6 criticizes George 
Kennan’s introductory essay to the republication of the Carnegie commission’s report on the Balkan 
Wars, The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect, (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment, 1993) for embodying this facile understanding as well. 
26 See Eugene Michail, The British and the Balkans: Forming Images of Foreign Lands, 1900-1950 
(London: Continuum, 2011) and Andrew Hammond, The Debated Lands: British and American 
Representations of the Balkans (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2007). 
27 Michail, The British and the Balkans, 79-102. 
28 Besides the works cited already, important works on this subject include Milica Bakic-Hayden, 
“Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia,” Slavic Review 54 (Winter 1995): 917-931; 
K.E. Fleming, “Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography,” The American Historical 
Review, 2000 105:(4), 1218-1233; Mary Neuberger, The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the 
Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).  Some of 
these authors explore how residents of the Balkans themselves have often selectively absorbed aspects 
of these negative stereotypes and directed them against people within the Balkans whom they perceive 




This dissertation, while informed by the recent scholarship that has criticized 
problematic discourse regarding the Balkans, goes a step further.  In its focused 
reassessment of the fateful events of 1912-1918, so influential in shaping the world’s 
views about violence in the Balkans, it provides a more historically grounded 
alternative to pejorative assumptions.  Inhabitants of local communities in 
Macedonia, as anywhere else, had their political riv lries and frictions, some of which 
were related to ethno-religious or national differenc s.  But the following chapters 
will argue that their behavior was far more complex and on the whole far less violent 
than would be concluded from the Carnegie Commission’  initially cited judgment 
that “the populations” of Macedonia “mutually slaughtered and pursued” each 
other.29  Instead, the authors of wartime abuses in geographic Macedonia were 
primarily the armies of the neighboring Balkan countries that invaded the former 
Ottoman region in 1912, joined during the First World War by their Western and 
Central European allies.  Members of paramilitary formations, themselves closely 
associated with the armies of the Balkan nation-state , also participated in the 
wartime abuses.  Whether the paramilitaries originated from Macedonia or, as was 
often the case, from neighboring countries, most inhabitants of geographic Macedonia 
resented and ostracized rather than embraced them.    
This dissertation is thus not an argument that peoples of the Balkans were 
inherently peaceful, much less that anyone outside of the Balkans was responsible for 
the violence that occurred there (except of course to the extent that they participated 
in it during the First World War.)  Nor is it an argument that in some way implicates 
pernicious, cynical political “elites” as against the innocent, ordinary “people.”  After 
                                                




all, most of the soldiers who generally carried out crimes against noncombatants in 
Macedonia were quite “ordinary” young men from the belligerent Balkan countries of 
Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia (as well as those fromWestern and Central European 
armies during the First World War.)  Instead, this study calls attention to a contrast in 
mentalities between most inhabitants of multi-ethnic imperial territories, on the one 
hand, and citizens of post-imperial countries founded on the principle of the ethnic 
nation-state, on the other.  Ethnic violence in the Balkans was a modern phenomenon 
that accompanied and followed the nineteenth-century rise of nation-states in the 
region.30  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, agents of nation-states 
had been socialized to understand ethnic violence as normal or even necessary.  
During the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the First World War, they came into 
increasing contact with the inhabitants of an imperial territory, Macedonia, who 
largely did not accept the justification of this type of violence. 
Continuities in international rivalries, most prominently Bulgaria’s 
frustrations over its losses to Greece and Serbia in 1913 and Austro-Serb tensions, 
have led scholars to treat the Macedonian front of the First World War as a 
straightforward sequel to the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.31  This historiographic 
emphasis on continuities between the Balkan Wars and the First World War follows 
from a focus on high-level military and diplomatic dimensions of the wars as they 
related to the Balkans and Macedonia in particular.  By shifting the focus from those 
                                                
30 This conclusion is now commonplace in scholarship on the Balkans, and is expressed with particular 
eloquence in the survey by Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History (New York: The Modern 
Library, 2000). 
31 Richard Hall’s series of publications cited above – The Balkan Wars which examines the wars of 
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dimensions to the ways in which war affected people who lived between the rapidly 
changing border lines and front lines, this dissertation will reveal sharp discontinuities 
in the nature of violence that civilians endured over that six-year period. 
Moreover, rather than constituting unique forms of “Balkan” violence, these 
changes in the nature of violence against civilians clo ely tracked changes occurring 
elsewhere in Europe during the same period.  Numerous cases of looting, arson, rape 
and executions of civilians had already occurred in wars throughout the nineteenth 
century, starting with Napoleonic campaigns in Italy nd the Dutch provinces and 
Russian counter-campaigns in France all the way through the Franco-Prussian War.  
Some such cases were given justification as reprisals imposed on civilians for 
resistance, but many occurred even without such a justification. 32  As historian of 
international law Adam Roberts sums up developments in nineteenth century Europe, 
“the idea that there was in the nineteenth century anything remotely like a golden age 
of the laws of war is historically untenable.... The laws of war had their value in the 
nineteenth century as they did later.  However, if there was any progress at all in their 
application, it was halting and unsteady; and their codification, including at The 
Hague in 1899 and 1907, left many problems unsolved.”33   
The unsolved problems did first appear in Europe during the Balkan Wars in 
1912-1913, but they resurfaced with similar crimes of executions, arson, pillage, and 
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though his article emphasizes the normative power that “customary law restraining conduct in war” 
held.  On the Franco-Prussian War, see also Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: the German 
Invasion of France, 1870-1871 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), 378-381, and Geoffrey 
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rape committed against civilians by German forces in Belgium and northern France 
and by Austro-Hungarian forces in Serbia during the op ning months of the First 
World War.34  In explaining Habsburg Army crimes during the invasion and 
occupation of Serbia, Jonathan Gumz’s recent study implicates a backward-looking 
desire by Habsburg officers to resurrect an idealizd “bureaucratic-absolutist” 
dominion.  Notions of mass politics and national mobilization, epitomized by Serbia 
according to these Habsburg officers, represented a dangerous threat to the European 
order that must be eradicated.35  In employing very much the same kinds of violence 
against civilians during the Balkan Wars, Balkan government and army leaders by 
contrast were motivated by the very modern ideologies that the Habsburg officers 
sought to prevent from taking hold in Europe.  They b lieved that a state legitimately 
embodied the common interests of its core nation.  Heterogeneous elements 
inherently posed a potential threat to the nation-state’s consolidation and seemed to 
present a perennial temptation for foreign countries to undermine its sovereignty by 
intervening in the name of protecting minorities.36  Tying together these diverse 
motivations of imperial and national elites was what Charles Maier calls the impulse 
                                                
34 The 1914 German actions in Belgium are documented extensively in John Horne and Alan Kramer, 
The German Atrocities of 1914: a History of Denial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).  
Jonathan E. Gumz, The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914-1918 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009) less extensively discusses such crimes by the 
Habsburgs in Serbia, though he does not mention whether or not rapes occurred. 
35 Gumz, Resurrection and Collapse of Empire, 1-3, 7-8, 10-15, 20-23. 
36 Mark Biondich, The Balkans: Revolution, War, and Political Violenc since 1878 (Oxford: Oxford 
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of “territoriality” among modern governments, the ambition to strengthen the state’s 
capacity to fully control all of its “space inside the frontier.”37 
Historians studying other fronts of the First World War have increasingly 
recognized this war as a watershed for the bureaucratization of violence against 
civilians and for demographic engineering in Europe, epitomized by forced migration 
and organized internments of civilians in camps.  These features, previously assumed 
to be largely a phenomenon in Europe from World War II, originated in significant 
degree during the First World War.38  The present study builds on this growing 
consensus to suggest a more precise specification for the causes and timing of this 
shift.  The change generally did not occur immediately at the outset of the First World 
War.  In Macedonia, it resulted instead from the evolution of the war from one of 
relatively rapid mobility (in this respect similar to the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913) to 
one characterized by trench warfare along the quite immobile Macedonian Front and 
general expectations of a long war of attrition.  Studying the First World War as it 
followed the Balkan Wars allows us to see more clearly how violence against 
civilians evolved during this period. 
 
                                                
37 Charles Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the 
Modern Era,” American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (June 2000): 819.  As applied to the Balkan 
context, see John R. Lampe, Balkans into Southeastern Europe: A Century of War and Transition 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 7-8. 
38 See Matthew Stibbe, “The Internment of Civilians by Belligerent States during the First World War 
and the Response of the International Committee of the Red Cross,” Journal of Contemporary History, 
41:1 (2006), 5-19; Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century 
Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian 
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National Identity, Indifference, and Other Priorities 
This dissertation also offers a new approach to the em rgence of modern 
nationalism, a major concern among historians of Eastern and Central Europe.  
Nationalism has elicited particularly keen interest among scholars who have focused 
on the region of Macedonia, perhaps because of the fa eful and sometimes bloody 
role that four contending national movements – Macedonian, Bulgarian, Greek, and 
Serbian – have played in its modern history.  Histor ans writing in local Balkan 
languages on the social aspects of the Balkans Warsof 1912-1913 and the First 
World War in Macedonia have long recognized the centrality of nationalism to the 
conflicts, but have themselves been divided according to the influence of the 
competing national narratives.  Most have until recently tended to highlight abuses 
committed by the other side, ignore or absolve their own side of the same sorts of 
deeds, or attempt to document the preponderance of one or another national group 
within Macedonia.39  This body of scholarship has nonetheless been valuable in 
bringing to light specific detail about the wartime experiences of local civilians in 
Macedonia, a feature that is almost completely lacking in studies published in the 
West that examine this set of wars in the region.40  It has also pointed to the use that 
                                                
39 Examples are Ivan Katardžiev, Istorija na Makedonskiot Narod: Makedonija Megju Balkanskite i 
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Borbi na Bûlgarite ot Makedoniia I Odrinska Trakiia Prez Balkanskata Voina (1912-1913) (Sofia: 
Izdatelstvo na Ministerstvoto na Otbranata “Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets”, 1994). 
40 There are several partial exceptions to the neglect of social history on the topic among Western 
publications. L.L. Farrar, “Aggression versus Apathy: The Limits of Nationalism During the Balkan 




could be made of the rich and relevant primary sources available in Balkan archives 
for such social history.  Yet few historians working i  local languages have taken into 
account recent social theory, which emphasizes the historically contingent and 
constructed nature of national communities, when studying the case of Macedonia 
during the Balkan Wars and the First World War.41   
Some recent scholarship has applied to the case of Macedonia a now large 
body of theory arguing that nations are primarily modern social constructs.42  Using 
those theoretical insights as well as empirical research in archives and in the field, 
                                                                                                                                 
Social Origins of Balkan Politics: Nationalism, Under evelopment, and the Nation-State in Greece, 
Serbia, and Bulgaria, 1880-1920” Mediterranean Quarterly, 11, no.3 (2000), 144-63; George B. Leon, 
The Greek Socialist Movement and the First World War: The Road to Unity (Boulder, CO: East 
European Monographs, 1976); Eyal Ginio, “Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation During the Balkan Wars 
(1912-1913): Awakening from the Ottoman Dream,” War in History, 12, no. 2 (2005), 156-177 all deal 
with aspects of home front societies in Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, or the Ottoman Empire (but not 
Macedonia itself).  Theodora Dragostinova, Between Two Motherlands: Nationality and Emigration 
among the Greeks of Bulgaria, 1900-1949 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011) and James 
Frusetta, “Bulgaria’s Macedonia: Nation-Building and State-Building, Centralization and Autonomy in 
Pirin Macedonia, 1903-1952” (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 2006) devote some illuminating 
but limited attention to the wartime period of 1912-1918 in Macedonia as part of larger studies 
covering much longer periods.  Finally, Katrin Boeckh, Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg: 
Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1996) 
focuses to a considerable extent on how Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian governments approached the 
diverse populations they incorporated during the first year following the Second Balkan War with 
similar goals of national homogenization and on the oft n harsh policies that resulted from this 
mindset. 
41 This is not to say that they have failed to take into account such theoretical insights when dealing 
with other historical periods.  Historians writing in local Balkan languages and dealing with the 
broader sweep of the history of the region or with periods other than the extremely sensitive conflicts 
of 1912-1918 have indeed increasingly been challenging the strictures of their respective national 
narratives.  A rare example of social history of the wartime period of 1912-1922 itself that tries both to 
undermine the nationalist narrative of the author’s wn country and to highlight cases where his 
country’s forces committed atrocities against civilians of other ethnicities is by Greek author Tasos 
Kostopoulos, Polemos kai ethnokatharsi:i xechasmeni plevra mias dekaetous ethnikis exormisis (1912-
1922) (Athens: Vivliorama, 2007). 
42 The potentially relevant body of theory is too large to cite here, but among the theoretical works that 
have been most influential in Balkan studies are Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised ed. (New York: Verso, 1991); Rogers 
Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004); Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 
1986); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Eric 
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these scholars have argued that the modern concept of identification with a national 
community had made only limited inroads into the largely rural population of 
Ottoman Macedonia in the years before the First Balkan War in 1912.  In other 
words, the sometimes violently competing efforts over the preceding decades by pro-
Greek, pro-Bulgarian, pro-Serbian, and Macedonian autonomist activists to get 
Orthodox Christian residents of Ottoman Macedonia to identify themselves with a 
national collectivity are seen to have met with little success for any of the parties.  
This more recent scholarship has argued that before the Balkan Wars most inhabitants 
of the region still identified themselves primarily according to traditional categories 
such as religion, social or occupational status, or even immediate locality.43  
According to Vassilis Gounaris, those were the key axes of local tensions in the 
region, and it would be more fruitful to think of national labels during this time period 
(e.g. “Greek”, “Bulgarian”, “Serbian”) as names forconstantly shifting political-
economic “parties” or interest groups, rather than as broad and firmly held 
“identities.”   
Several studies have extended their timeframe up to the present, charting the 
decades-long and divergent processes of national accu turation that inhabitants of 
geographic Macedonia experienced after the First World War, when the region was 
split between Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.44  Intimidation, education systems, 
                                                
43 For the pre-1912 era alone, see Duncan Perry, The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian 
Revolutionary Movements, 1893-1912 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), and Vassilis Gounaris, 
“Social Cleavages and National ‘Awakening’ in Ottoman Macedonia,” East European Quarterly, 1995 
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state holidays, intermarriage, and patronage opportunities acted on locals, most of 
whom eventually began to identify themselves nationlly as Greeks, Macedonians or 
Bulgarians.  Loring Danforth, Keith Brown, and Anastasia Karakasidou in particular 
have found that for some people from the region natio l identity can still be a fluid 
category even today.  Their work forms part of a broader trend of scholarly literature 
on Eastern and Central Europe that has emphasized how recent and tenuous has been 
the grip of national identities in the region and with what difficulty they supplanted 
older forms of communal identification.45  
Implicit within much of this scholarship, however, is a dichotomy that sees 
populations’ embrace of nationalism as a necessary component of their 
modernization, on the one hand, and the many cases of failure to do so well into the 
twentieth century as the persistence of pre-modern me talities, on the other.  Dimitris 
Livanios, for example, suggests that “[v]iolence and  campaign of terror of a 
distinctive kind … proved to be the only effective way to determine the peasants’ 
choice” of national affiliation.46  This view suggests that nationalities were simply 
forced on peasants, whose pre-national mentalities had not comprehended new 
political realities and who thus did not themselves participate meaningfully as 
political actors.  But Orthodox Christians in Macedonia had generally been exposed 
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to decades of propaganda, education, and violent prssu e by rival national 
movements before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1912.  It is therefore doubtful 
that instances of the rural population identifying themselves as simply peasants or 
Orthodox establish that no national ideology had “yet” penetrated into their 
presumably pre-modern consciousness.  Such anational assertions on the part of rural 
inhabitants fall instead within a broader spectrum of modern behaviors.  These 
include also often-cited examples of residents of Macedonia who easily switched 
back and forth between national sides as well as some residents who exhibited 
passionate and consistent commitment to a single national cause.   
A more recent wave of scholarship on Central and Eastern Europe has 
usefully suggested that “national indifference” ought itself to become the object of 
study as an active and modern response to the proliferation of national ideologies, 
rather than as a passive residue of pre-modern cultural inertia.47  This modification 
points to a more realistic way to understand developments in Macedonia during the 
Balkan Wars and First World War.  In a thoughtful synthesis of this newer literature 
on national indifference of which her own work is a part, Tara Zahra warns that “it is 
ultimately too easy to substitute one reductionist view of loyalty for another.  In 
exploring national indifference, we should not seek to replace the nation with 
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something else, assuming that other modes of collective identification were more 
authentic, real, compelling, or genuine than nationlity.”48   
This dissertation suggests that the most effective way to avoid such a pitfall 
would be to shift the set of research questions away from a central focus on people’s 
identity or even on the degree of their national indifference, and towards a broader 
examination of people’s life goals and balance of priorities.  In simple terms, then, 
rather than ask who Orthodox Christian inhabitants of Macedonia thought they were, 
this study focuses on exploring what they wanted as they lived through the set of 
destructive conflicts that most fatefully shaped their future.  By more fully elucidating 
the fabric of people’s lives through the analysis of their balance of priorities, this 
approach, it can be hoped, puts in broader perspective the role that the phenomena of 
nationalism and national indifference played in the ov rall social and political 
developments of the period.  As the following chapters will suggest, this population 
typically put their economic interests, education, access to political representation, 
and the ability to remain in their homes ahead of appe ls to national sentiment even 
during a set of wars that were famously fueled by Balkan and wider European 
national rivalries.   
Although this dissertation focuses on a common civilian experience with 
violence of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the First World War, it also examines 
important differences between the roles of women and men.  Existing literature on 
women’s experience during the First World War is large, but little of it has paid 
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attention to Southeastern Europe.49  Moreover, the “home front” has constituted the 
typical spatial context in studies of women and wartime, to the comparative neglect of 
female civilians who lived in the vicinity of the frontlines of war for an extended 
period of time as occurred in wartime Macedonia.  The present study explores the 
degree to which women shouldered important social roles and to some extent public 
responsibilities.  Their scope, as in the West and in the more extensively studied 
mobilization of the home front, increased during the social disruptions occasioned by 
war.  Here the similarities with situations more familiar in the literature on Western 
home fronts seem to end, less because of undoubtedly existing differences in gender 
roles between the Balkans and the West and more becaus  of the unique situation of 
civilians living between the shifting front lines being explored in this study.  By 
focusing on a region traversed by invading and occupying armed forces, this study 
explores how the discursive exclusion of women as potential political actors and their 
simultaneous elevation as symbols of communal honor increased their chances of 
becoming targets of rape but also reduced the extent to which they were targeted for 
other abuses such as internment in concentration camps.50 
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University Press, 2000); on the Lebanese Civil War, Michael Johnson, All Honourable Men: The 
Social Origins of War in Lebanon (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001).  Although not about rape, 




Scope, Sources, and Approach 
 The Balkan territory contested between 1912 and 1918 was not limited to the 
region of Macedonia (defined in this study as the area encompassing the former 
Ottoman vilayets of Manastır and Selanik and the southeastern third of the Kosova 
vilayet and divided since the First World War into Aegean, Vardar, and Pirin 
regions.)  It also encompassed the former Ottoman regions of Thrace, Kosovo (in 
other words, the central and northwestern two thirds of the Kosova vilayet), Epirus 
and much of Albania, as well as much of the pre-1912 territories of Serbia, Romania, 
and Bulgaria.  Macedonia is nonetheless a more appropriate place to start exploring 
the social history of the war years of 1912-1918 for two important reasons.  First, it is 
the only region that experienced fighting during both the First and Second Balkan 
Wars and during the First World War.  Second, Macedonia had long been the most 
intensely contested region between three major Balkan countries (Bulgaria, Greece, 
and Serbia) by the time of the wars.  Muslims’ experiences in Macedonia during this 
period undoubtedly deserve further detailed study in their own right.  This study 
nonetheless makes frequent reference to the experienc s of Muslims primarily as they 
help to illuminate the story of the majority Orthodox Christian populations, whom the 
successor states of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia specifically targeted for 
incorporation into their respective national bodies. 
The study also focuses most closely on episodes that involved at some level 
the activity of Bulgarian or Greek government authorities during the period.  This was 
                                                                                                                                 
discourse in Serbia connected women’s sexuality with national honor during the First World War.  
İrvin Cemil Schick, “Christian Maidens, Turkish Ravishers: The Sexualization of National Conflict in 
the Late Ottoman Period,” in Women in the Ottoman Balkans: Gender, Culture, and History, ed. Amila 
Buturović and İrvin Cemil Schick (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 273-305 shows clearly that Western 




undoubtedly the national rivalry among Balkan states over Macedonia that attracted 
by far the most emotional investment among nationalsts.  Serbian pretensions in 
Macedonia were serious and longstanding as well, but were decidedly of secondary 
importance for Serb nationalists in comparison to their preoccupations with Kosovo 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina.51 
The argument relies first and foremost on archival and other materials 
originating from all three of the countries that today share the geographic region of 
Macedonia: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Republic of Macedonia.  This is not done to 
achieve some illusory balance or reconciliation betwe n opposed national narratives.  
Rather, this approach recognizes that varying politica  conditions and historical 
contingencies allowed different sorts of relevant materials to end up in different state, 
private, and regional archives and libraries.  It also recognizes the fragmented nature 
of contemporary administrative sources resulting from fluctuating, discontinuous, and 
often short-lived national sovereignties over different parts of geographic Macedonia 
over the years 1912-1918.  Many of the people who constitute the focus of this study 
would have been illiterate at the time.  Insight into their behavior, attitudes, and 
mentalities involves the critical reading of sources with varying agendas that 
indirectly shed light on the situation of ordinary people in the region of Macedonia 
between 1912 and 1918.  In order to understand the si uation of civilians who lived 
during the wars not strictly “behind” the lines as part of any home front, but in a sense 
between them, the researcher must also read sources “between the lines.”  Even when 
reading the ostensible words of a a petition from a possibly illiterate peasant 
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commenting upon his situation to authorities, one must take into account the incentive 
for both the peasant and a hired writer to tailor the words of the petition to what they 
think will achieve the intended effect with their government interlocutor.  The words 
on the page are then a refraction, not an unmediated expression, of whatever that 
peasant might “really” think. 
Such documents created and deposited in different political environments, 
during different time periods, and following different discursive conventions can be 
instructively read against each other to reveal comm n threads and also gaps in 
understanding between different parties.  The sources used for this study were sifted 
with this goal in mind.  They come, as mentioned earlier, mainly from three different 
countries.  They include accounts of events more or l ss as they happened as well as 
retrospective accounts.  They come from a variety of governmental and private 
institutions including diplomatic consulates, government ministries, army units, 
gendarmerie, schools, and cultural associations.  They also come from individual men 
and women of a variety of social backgrounds. 
Among these sources, I draw on a number that have not to date been used by 
Western scholars.  These include the vast materials of Bulgaria’s Central Military 
Archive in the town of Veliko Tûrnovo, which have ben useful in shedding light on 
Bulgarian military and paramilitary abuses of civilians, including mass internments 
during the First World War, and the motivations behind them.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
the military archive’s holdings also offer unique access to the perspectives and 
initiatives taken by local civilians in Macedonia through records of correspondence 




unconsulted previously are the thousands of memoirs fr m men and women of 
different walks of life that have been recorded in Bulgaria between the 1940s and the 
1980s and deposited in the Central State Archive in Sofia or the regional State 
Archive in the Bulgarian Macedonian provincial town of Blagoevgrad.  Some of 
these were recorded privately and then later made their way into archives, while 
others appear to have been solicited and recorded by mployees of the archives.  
Many of them therefore undoubtedly bear the mark of attempts by citizens to prove 
their longstanding progressive-revolutionary credentials and national patriotism to the 
communist regime.52  But scrutinized with these ideological motives in mind, they 
nonetheless offer extremely rich details that recall much about the fabric of ordinary 
people’s wartime lives during the second decade of the twentieth century.   
In addition, a large set of recently discovered First World War letters sent 
back and forth between soldiers drafted into the Serbian and Bulgarian armies and 
their families in Vardar Macedonia has been published with some commentary by 
Macedonian historians but otherwise not yet incorporated into larger historical 
scholarship.53  The letters justifiably attracted considerable att ntion and formed the 
centerpiece of a museum exhibition in Skopje in the Republic of Macedonia when 
they were discovered, as they offer an unparalleled win ow into the everyday 
wartime concerns of both men and women.   
                                                
52 Keith Brown, The Past in Question provides an instructive discussion of the ways in which the 
Yugoslav Macedonian republic encouraged the institutionalization of a common national narrative by 
soliciting the submission of this type of memoir from citizens as a requirement for the receipt of 
special government pensions. 
53 Jasmina Najdovska, ed., Otpretani svedoštva: Vojnički pisma od golemata vojna: 1914-1918 




The most important Greek archival sources used here ar  the records of the 
General Administration of Macedonia housed in the Historical Archive of Macedonia 
in Thessaloniki and personal papers of prominent Greeks involved in Macedonia 
housed in the Gennadius Library in Athens.  Previous scholars have made greater use 
of these sources, though not with a focus on the war ye rs of 1912-1918 and rarely 
with any comparisons drawn to archival sources in neighboring states. 
The chronologically organized chapters that follow reveal not only turbulent 
changes in the lives of civilians who lived amid shifting front lines and political 
boundaries, but also remarkable continuities.  Chapter 1 describes how the 
linguistically heterogeneous Orthodox Christian populations of Ottoman Macedonia 
came to be the objects of competing Bulgarian, Greek, and Serb nationalist and 
Macedonian autonomist interpretations of their “true” identity between the 
establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 and the eve of the Ottoman 
constitutional revolution in 1908.  It argues that most people’s typical eschewal of 
violence and their prioritization of economic advancement and education over active 
cultivation of ethnic identity reflected well-considered responses to modern 
developments rather than pre-modern mentalities.   
Chapter 2 argues that, in the wake of the Ottoman (Young Turk) constitutional 
revolution of 1908, ordinary Orthodox Christian resid nts of Macedonia understood 
their first introduction to modern (and historically Western-derived) political 
principles such as liberty and equality as primarily an indigenous Ottoman 
development.  But their optimism faded as the new Ottoman regime’s promises 




invading armies of the Balkan Alliance, whose governments promised to deliver 
those same modern political ideals.   
Chapter 3 examines the short but eventful period frm December 1912, after 
hostilities of the First Balkan War had ended in Macedonia, through to the conclusion 
of the Second Balkan War in August 1913.  It explores the local reaction to the First 
and Second Balkan Wars, which were characterized by rapidly changing front lines 
and by brutal, unruly violence against civilians perceived by oncoming armies and 
paramilitary forces as ethnic enemies.  Having seen how this kind of violence was 
directed against their Muslim counterparts during the First Balkan War, Orthodox 
Christians in former Ottoman Macedonia exhibited little enthusiasm upon the 
outbreak of the Second Balkan War as they realized th y were now likely to become 
victims of it themselves.   
Chapter 4 treats the short and troubled period of peace between the end of the 
Balkan Wars and the onset of the First World War in Macedonia in September 1915.  
The nation-states’ new citizens, even ethnic minorities, overwhelmingly showed their 
willingness to conform with harsh assimilative measure  rather than challenge state 
authority or sovereignty.  Their overriding priority was to continue to survive and 
prosper if possible in the homes where they had always lived.  Nationally-minded 
authorities fundamentally misjudged their new ethnic m nority citizens’ intentions, 
tending to see incipient disloyalty at every turn, a d began to experiment with 
bureaucratically planned expulsions of ethnic minorities whom they deemed 




Chapter 5, in charting geographic Macedonia’s step-by-step involvement in 
the First World War, explores how the stabilization of the front in Macedonia, as in 
Western Europe, created the conditions for a Europe-wid  shift towards new coercive 
methods of dealing with untrusted populations.  Military authorities now saw civilians 
in the vicinity of the front lines not only as poten ial sources of danger due to their 
status as ethnic minorities, but as potentially strategic sources of labor and war 
production in a long war of attrition.  These authorities (not only Balkan in origin but 
also French and German) began to use their bureaucratic apparatus to intern civilians 
on a mass scale and with often fatal consequences. 
In focusing on these six most fateful and violent years in geographic 
Macedonia’s modern history, this study considers the c allenges encountered by its 
civilians as they were defined by life in the vicinity of a military front, not simply in 
an ethnic borderland as scholars have until now usually construed the social 
dimensions of what is known as the Macedonian Question.  Viewing civilian life 
defined by proximity to a military front will allow the reader to consider how, in line 
with changes occurring across Europe, people of the region faced forms of violence 
during the First World War that differed radically from those of the Balkan Wars of 
1912-1913 that had occurred so shortly before.  Butit will also suggest that their 
behavior throughout reflected local priorities that remained constant despite these 






Chapter 1: Political Violence and National Identity in Late 
Ottoman Macedonia 
 
British journalist and travel writer Henry Noel Brailsford describes an 
encounter he had in 1903 with “some boys from a remot  mountain village near 
Ochrida” in the western part of Ottoman Macedonia: 
I took them up to the ruins of the Bulgarian Tsar’s fortress which dominates the lake 
and the plane from the summit of an abrupt and curiously rounded hill.  “Who built 
this place?” I asked them.  The answer was significant – “The Free Men.”  “And who 
were they?”  “Our grandfathers.”  “Yes, but were thy Serbs or Bulgarians or Greeks 
or Turks?”  “They weren’t Turks, they were Christians.”  And this seemed to be 
about the measure of their knowledge.1 
 
Historians have cited this anecdote in order to underscore the scant penetration by the 
start of the twentieth century of any kind of national identity among the Orthodox 
Christian rural peasantry that constituted the majority f Ottoman Macedonia’s 
inhabitants.2  But the conclusion apparently warranted by Brailsford’s encounter with 
the rural boys would appear to sit awkwardly with a pervasive feature of Macedonia’s 
social history at the beginning of the twentieth century: ethnic violence.   
In fact, Brailsford’s travels in the region occurred directly after the Ottoman 
suppression of a failed large-scale revolt there by roughly 25,000 Christian guerillas 
against Muslim Ottoman authorities, an insurgency waged in the name of autonomy 
                                                
1 H.N. Brailsford, Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future (London: Methuen & Co., 1906), 99-100. 
2 See Duncan Perry, The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Liberation Movements, 1893-1903 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), 22-23; Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History 
(New York: The Modern Library, 2000), 40; Basil G. ounaris, “Social Cleavages and National 
‘Awakening’ in Ottoman Macedonia,” East European Quarterly 29 (Winter 1995): 421; Dimitris 
Livanios, “'Conquering the Souls’: Nationalism and Greek Guerilla Warfare in Ottoman Macedonia, 




for the Macedonian population.3  The revolt, known as the Ilinden Uprising, did not
primarily reflect Christian-Muslim religious tensions.  Among the Orthodox 
Christians who took active part in the events, those who supported the Greek national 
cause typically joined the Ottoman authorities in helping to suppress the revolt.  But 
those who favored the Bulgarian cause or those who considered the Macedonians to 
be a distinct people joined the insurgent group, the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization (known in abbreviated form as VMRO).  Non-
combatants constituted a majority of the casualties on both sides.  In other words, the 
insurgents disregarded to a significant extent the VMRO pledge not to attack Muslim 
civilians, while Ottoman authorities and allied irregular armed bands targeted large 
numbers of Christian civilians in reprisals.4  A picture of mass violence and atrocity 
based on ethnic animosity has emerged from events like this.  Both of the seemingly 
contradictory images of early twentieth century Macedonia introduced above – that of 
a rural population with a non-national identity and that of a region plagued by 
nationalist violence – contain some measure of accur y.  But as this chapter will 
show, both images are also misleading in important ways.   
 
                                                
3 Estimates of militant participation in the revolt vary, but the number is almost certainly in the tens of 
thousands. I arrive at the approximation above by excluding the smaller number of participants in an 
almost simultaneous action in Ottoman Thrace in the figures given by Perry, The Politics of Terror, 
139.  
4 Perry, The Politics of Terror, 139-140.  Upwards of 2,000 Macedonian Christian cvilians are 
estimated to have been killed in the revolt’s suppression.  Though figures for Muslim noncombatant 
victims of insurgent attacks are not available, anecdotal evidence suggests they were commonly 




Ottoman Macedonia at the Turn of the Century: Ferment in a Reforming Empire 
 By the turn of the twentieth century, the term “Macedonia” had come into 
widespread use as a geographic designation for the Ottoman vilayets (provinces) of 
Manastır and Selanik and southern districts of the vilayet of Kosova.5  The region so 
defined faces the Aegean Sea to the southeast.  Otherwise, it is landlocked – bounded 
by the Mesta/Nestos river to the east, by lakes Ohrid and Prespa and the Grammos 
and Pindus mountain ranges to the west and southwest, and by the towns of Kriva 
Palanka and Kumanovo and the Šar mountains to the north and northwest.  Ottoman 
Macedonia was among the most urbanized regions in both the Ottoman-held Balkans 
and Balkan successor-states at the turn of the century, with over a quarter of its 
population living in settlements of more than 2,000 inhabitants during the 1890s.6  
Salonika was both the largest city, with 130,000 inhabitants in 1910, and the region’s 
chief port and hub of long-distance trade. 7  The only other port with any trading 
importance in the region was the town of Kavalla,8 also on the Aegean.  Other urban 
                                                
5 İpek Yosmaoğlu-Turner, “The Priest’s Robe and the Rebel’s Rifle: Communal Conflict and the 
Construction of National Identity in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878-1908” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton 
University, 2005), 30, suggests that the delineation of a modern region with the name ‘Macedonia,’ 
which was never an official Ottoman territorial designation, came about during the nineteenth century 
as a process of cultural invention or re-invention among both European travelers and local 
intellectuals. 
6 See the table in Michael Palairet, The Balkan Economies c. 1800-1914: Evolution withou 
Development (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 26-27. 
7 The population figure for Salonika is taken from Nikolaos K. Moutsopoulos, Thessaloniki, 1900-
1917 (Thessaloniki: M. Molho, 1981), 23.  Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to 
the First World War (London: Routledge, 2000), gives a figure of 120,00  in 1912. 
8 Kavala in its Bulgarian spelling, the town has been internationally recognized since the First World 





centers, the most important among them Bitola/Manastır, Skopje, and Serres,9 
functioned as market towns, administrative centers, and military garrisons.     
Nevertheless, Macedonia’s population and especially its productive base were 
predominantly rural, despite the modest amount of light industry that existed in cities 
and towns whose economic role was primarily commercial.  Cultivation in 
Macedonia’s river valleys and plains by the turn of the century was marked by share-
cropping farms called çiftliks, sometimes consisting of entire villages or groups of 
villages, whose mostly Muslim (Albanian or Turkish) absentee owners resided in 
towns and cities.10  Çiftliks increasingly specialized in producing cash crops that
found international markets, as their owners took advantage of newly built railroad 
lines and investments in agricultural machinery.11  Chief among these cash crops was 
tobacco, but cotton, opium, rice, sesame, and silk cocoons were also important.12  The 
less productive farms of smallholders also produced staples such as wheat and other 
crops that were consumed and traded locally.13  Increasingly burdensome crop 
exactions on çiftliks as well as physical insecurity spurred many peasants during the 
second half of the nineteenth century to abandon their smallholdings and tenancies in 
lowland areas for cities, foreign countries, or highland villages.  Inhabitants of some 
                                                
9 Seres or Ser in its Bulgarian spelling, the town has been internationally recognized since the First 
World War as part of Greece and for simplicity will henceforward be consistently rendered by its 
Greek spelling, Serres. 
10 Palairet, Balkan Economies, 342; John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 
1550-1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1982), 283. 
11 Palairet, Balkan Economies, 343.  On the positive, yet modest, effect of railro ds, see also Basil C. 
Gounaris, Steam Over Macedonia, 1870-1912: Socio-Economic Change nd the Railway Factor (New 
York: East European Monographs, Boulder, 1993) and Lampe and Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 
301-303. 
12 Palairet, Balkan Economies, 343-344; Lampe and Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 282. 
13 According to Lampe and Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 280, 282, wheat far outstripped all 





of those upland settlements in the several mountainous regions of Macedonia now 
engaged profitably in small-scale textile manufacture and craft production, in addition 
to the longstanding highland specialization in transhumant stockbreeding 
supplemented by small-scale agriculture.14  They also traveled long distances as 
merchants and seasonal laborers.   
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the export of cash crops, the 
penetration of railroads, the expansion of banking a d credit, and emigrants’ 
remittances had done much to transform Macedonia’s population into participants in 
a cash economy linked to wider markets and into consumers of imported 
manufactured goods.15  Indeed, as Michael Palairet has argued, the productivity and 
export orientation of çiftliks, proto-industrial activity in upland areas, and the larger 
internal market offered to economic output within the Ottoman Empire put Ottoman 
Macedonia’s per capita economic production ahead of that of the neighboring 
Ottoman successor nation-states of Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria.  The latter 
countries’ peasants had relied more on inefficient subsistence smallholding since the 
first decades of their independence.16  Yet, it should be stressed, better per capita 
production may not have translated to more comfortable living standards for the 
typical inhabitant of Ottoman Macedonia in comparison with his counterparts in 
neighboring Balkan countries.  Indeed, as Palairet suggests, precisely those more 
exploitative land tenure arrangements – çiftlik estates – and their side-effects such as 
the cheap labor of peasants who fled from them to cities and upland settlements were 
responsible for the greater production.  As will be se n below, such conditions 
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contributed to discontent especially among Christian inhabitants of Ottoman 
Macedonia. 
According to the last Ottoman census taken of the region from 1906-1907, 
Muslims of diverse ethnic backgrounds constituted a substantial minority of over 40 
percent of the roughly 2-2½ million inhabitants of Ottoman Macedonia during the 
first decade of the twentieth century.17  In the historically Muslim-led Ottoman 
Empire, the vast majority of soldiers, gendarmes, civil servants, and large landowners 
in the Macedonian vilayets were still Muslim at the turn of the twentieth century, 
despite nineteenth century reforms that legally opened these positions up to non-
Muslims.  Nevertheless, the majority of Muslims in Macedonia were, like the 
majority of Christians, peasants, craftsmen, or laborers of modest or humble means.   
Muslims in the region were far from ethnically homogeneous.  Among 
Muslims, Albanian-speakers predominated west of the Vardar River.  Further east 
were Pomaks, speaking a Slavic language close to Bulgarian, and Turkish-speakers.  
The proportion of Muslims in the remaining European provinces of the Ottoman 
                                                
17 The total population estimate of 2.4 million cited in Table 9.1 of Lampe and Jackson, Balkan 
Economic History, 281 falls within the range of prominent turn-of-the-century estimates by a 
Bulgarian (roughly 2.26 million) and by a Serb (roughly 2.87 million) quoted in Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and 
Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washington, D.C.: 1914), 28, 30.  The Ottoman 1906/7 census figures 
reproduced in table I.16.A in Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830-1914: Demographic and 
Social Characteristics (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 166-167 suggest that the 
population figures of around 2½ million include all of the Kosova vilayet, much of which fell outside 
of Ottoman Macedonia.  Including only the southernmost district, Prizren, from the Kosova ilayet 
from the census figures gives a total of roughly 1.84 million, surely to some extent an undercount as in 
a few districts females were not counted, and, as Karpat, Ottoman Population, 9, notes, Ottoman 
censuses tended generally to undercount.  The lower verall number is closer, however, to a prominent 
contemporary Greek estimate of the total population of Ottoman Macedonia of 1.73 million that 
excludes the Kosova vilayet from the definition, quoted in Carnegie Endowment, Report of the 
International Commission, 30.  The 1906/7 census figures imply that 43% of the population of 
Manastır and Selanik vilayets were Muslims; the figure rises to 45% if the entire Kosova vilayet is 




Empire actually increased during the last decades of the nineteenth century.18  
Territories with more pronounced Christian majorities had formed newly independent 
states of Greece, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria.  The formation of those successor 
states plus Russian imperial expansion in former Ottoman and other predominantly 
Muslim territories sent large waves of Muslim refugees fleeing violence and 
dispossession.19  Many of these refugees (muhacirs) of Bosniak, Circassian, Turkish, 
and Tatar origins, settled in Ottoman Macedonia, where they helped to boost the 
proportion of Muslims in the general population.  Despite the linguistic heterogeneity 
of Muslims in Ottoman Macedonia, such distinctions generally did not reflect distinct 
political groupings.  Politically speaking, Muslims of different ethnic backgrounds 
were aware of their membership in the historically dominant religious group of the 
Empire, and the state in turn made no official distinctions between Muslim subjects of 
different ethnic backgrounds.  Elite or politically active Muslims by the late 
nineteenth century generally showed a keen interest in preserving and strengthening 
the Ottoman state as well as the leading role of Muslims within it, even if, as will be 
seen in Chapter 2, they sometimes disagreed about the specific meaning of such goals 
and about how best to achieve them.  Non-Ottoman contemporary sources generally 
referred to Ottoman Muslims in the Balkans as “Turks,” even if they were in fact not 
Turkish speakers.  Indeed, the term “Turk” had long carried a pejorative connotation 
even among Ottoman Muslims, although elites involved in the Young Turk 
movement had more recently begun to embrace the designation.  Because Muslims of 
diverse ethnic backgrounds usually viewed their comm n religious background as 
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more important to their political identity than their thnicity, and because references 
to Muslims as “Turks” in many of the sources used in th s study are often in any case 
inaccurate, they will usually be referred to here as “Muslims” unless they identified 
themselves or can otherwise clearly be identified by a more specific ethnic term. 
Nor did ethnic distinctions primarily define non-Muslim populations 
politically in Ottoman Macedonia for most of the Empire’s history.  Increasing claims 
among European powers to protect non-Muslim Ottoman religious communities from 
the eighteenth century as well as the Ottoman drive to centralize authority and 
rationalize administration during the nineteenth century helped to institutionalize a 
system whereby non-Muslim subjects were classified on an empire-wide level by 
their membership in a confessional community, called a millet.20  By the mid-
nineteenth century Eastern Orthodox Christians, whether living in the Balkans, 
Anatolia, or the Ottoman Arab lands and whatever langu ges they spoke, belonged to 
the Orthodox Christian millet, whose leader (millet başı) was the Orthodox Christian 
Patriarch of Constantinople.  Followers of the Armenian Apostolic Church and other 
monophysite Christians within the Empire, whether Armenian-speaking or not, 
belonged to the Armenian millet whose Patriarch was also based in Constantinople.  
Jews throughout the empire belonged to the Jewish m llet with a nominal Chief Rabbi 
(Haham Başı) in Constantinople, although the millet’s leadership in practice remained 
                                                
20 The basic work on Ottoman millets, which revised the understanding of their historic igins, is 
Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functio  
of a Plural Society, Volume I: The Central Lands (New York: Homes & Meier Publishers, 1982).  See 
especially the essay by Benjamin Braude, “Foundation Myths of the Millet System,” 69-88.  For more 
recent works describing in greater detail the origins of a millet system and the processes by which 
religious and even sectarian affiliation increasingly came to structure the modern political identities of 
Ottoman subjects during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Bruce Masters, Christians and 
Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004) and Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History andViolence in 




decentralized in comparison with the other millets.  The organizing principle of the 
millet, or large communities defined by confessional associati n, continued in 
important ways to shape notions of political belonging in the Balkans through the end 
of the Ottoman Empire’s existence and even beyond, despite the rise during that 
period of contending ideas of secular citizenship and nationalism.21   
This was certainly the case for Ottoman Jews, who made up just over 3 
percent of Ottoman Macedonia’s total population according to the Ottoman census of 
1906-1907.22  Despite their small overall numbers, the mostly Sephardic Ladino-
speaking Jews in Ottoman Macedonia had a greater social visibility than their 
proportion of the population might suggest because they tended to live in towns and 
cities.  In Salonika, they constituted a slight majority.  Ottoman Jews, including those 
in the Macedonian vilayets, were typically considered enthusiastic and consistent 
supporters of the Ottoman Empire.23  There was some truth to this perception.24  As 
non-Muslims their rights had historically been circumscribed in some ways and at 
times they faced hostility and attacks (usually from Christians rather than from 
Muslims).  Still, Ottoman Jews typically compared their situation favorably with that 
of their co-religionists elsewhere in Europe including neighboring Ottoman successor 
states.  Ottoman Macedonia’s Jews thus saw their int rests aligned more with 
Muslims than with Christians and they feared the consequences of the Ottoman 
state’s further loss of power and disintegration.  They recognized nationalism as a 
                                                
21 Kemal H. Karpat, “Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the 
Post-Ottoman Era,” in Braude and Lewis, eds., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, Vol. I, 
141-170. 
22 The percentage is calculated from figures given for the Vilayets of Manastir and Selanik and the 
Sanjak of Prezrin in table I.16.A in Karpat, Ottoman Population, 166-167. 
23 Esther Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue, The Jews of the Balkans: The Judeo-Spanish Community, 15th 
to 20th Centuries (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1995), 104. 




cause of these threats to the Ottoman state, and were thus usually unreceptive to ideas 
about nationalism, including Zionism, as they relatd to their own community.25 
Although national identities did begin to take hold among groups of Orthodox 
Christians during the nineteenth and early twentieth c nturies, the legacy of the millet 
structure nevertheless exerted a profound influence o  understandings of nationhood 
in the Balkans.  As Victor Roudometof has observed, what became known as the 
Greek War of Independence during the 1820s was “conceived of as a revolution of 
the Orthodox millet against the Ottoman authority structure.”  For example, many of 
the organizing members of the group that coordinated th  revolt, Philiki Etairia, were 
Orthodox ethnic Bulgarians, not Greeks, based in the Danubian Principalities, Russia, 
Constantinople, and Bessarabia.  One of these organizers actually enlisted 14,000 
Bulgarians to fight.26  The new Greek state recognized by international tre ty in 1830, 
however, only encompassed a part of the area in which revolts against Ottoman 
authority occurred.  Politicians from all factions soon began to articulate variations of 
an irredentist vision, known as the Megali Idea (Great Idea), of incorporating all areas 
where Greeks were said to live eventually into an enlarged state or federation.  
Greece’s first prime minister, Ioannis Kolettis, deliv red a characteristic statement of 
this irredentist ideology in an 1844 speech to parliament: 
But the Greek kingdom is not the whole of Greece, but a part of it, the smallest and 
poorest part of Greece.  Autocthon [indigenous] then is not only an inhabitant of the 
kingdom, but also one from Jannina, Thessaly, Serres, Adrianople, Constantinople, 
Trebizond, Crete,… in general every inhabitant of land which is Greek historically 
and ethnically. 27 
                                                
25 Mark Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430-1950 (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 264-267. 
26 Victor Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic 
Conflict in the Balkans (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2001), 64. 
27 Quoted in Gerasimos Augustinos, Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society 





Inspired by but also reacting to the establishment of the Greek state in the 
1830s and its growing irredentism afterwards, many Macedonian or Bulgarian-
speaking Ottoman subjects chafed under often heavy-h nded Greek cultural and 
administrative dominance within the Ottoman Orthodox Christian millet.28  Most of 
the top ranks of the church hierarchy were chosen from among the elite, Greek-
speaking families originating from Constantinople, where the Orthodox Patriarchate 
was itself based.  Bishops and even priests assigned to Bulgarian and Macedonian-
speaking communities often understood little of the local languages.  Clergy and lay 
people raising those grievances eventually convinced th  Porte in 1870 to grant the 
establishment of a separate Bulgarian Church (Exarchate) whose members would 
constitute a new Bulgarian millet within the Ottoman Empire.  The Exarchate’s 
jurisdiction initially covered the northernmost ares of present-day Bulgaria, but it 
was also allowed to operate bishoprics in other areas where two thirds of the 
Orthodox Christian population expressed the desire to join it.  Through this allowance 
Exarchate bishoprics soon came into existence alongside those of the Patriarchate in 
many parts of Ottoman Macedonia.  In 1872 the Ecumenical Patriarch pronounced 
the Exarchate schismatic on the grounds that it committed the heresy of “filetismos,” 
dividing the church according to ethnic or racial criteria.   
A struggle ensued between “exarchists,” followers of the Exarchate, and 
“patriarchists,” followers of the Patriarchate, typically cast in ethno-national 
Bulgarian and Greek terms.  Nevertheless, the very fact that the newly established 
ecclesiastical structure, the Exarchate, stood as the preeminent Bulgarian “national” 
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institution within the Ottoman Empire testifies to the continued importance of the 
millet structure and of the unifying principle of the religious community during the 
age of nationalism in the Balkans.  Furthermore, although Bulgarian nationalist 
supporters of the Exarchate considered the Slavic lnguage spoken by the majority of 
Christians in Ottoman Macedonia to be Bulgarian and believed that this bolstered 
their claim of the essentially Bulgarian character of Macedonia, the behavior of many 
inhabitants did not seem to support the nationalists’ assumptions.  Instead, a large 
portion of Ottoman Macedonia’s Orthodox Christians who spoke a Slavic language 
(Bulgarian or Macedonian) chose to remain under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate, 
even if that entailed continuing to attend church services in Greek.  Subsequent 
supporters of Bulgarian and Macedonian national movements often referred to people 
who spoke their language but adhered to the Patriarchate or even supported the Greek 
cause as grûkomani/grkomani, or Grecomans, in other words “Greek maniacs.”29  The 
term pejoratively implied that denying one’s supposedly natural national orientation 
by choosing to belong to a Greek institution required a dose of fanaticism or 
irrationality.  The phenomenon of the Bulgarian-speaker who supported the 
Patriarchate or the Greek cause was often also repres nted, even by observers from 
outside the region, as a lonely exception, an oddity.30  In fact, Grecomans were a 
mass phenomenon in Ottoman Macedonia, not an exceptional one, as attested by 
almost daily and often rather unassuming references to them in Bulgarian consular 
reporting on the region before the Balkan Wars.  The continued adherence of so many 
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Bulgarian or Macedonian-speaking Christians in Ottoman Macedonia to the 
Patriarchate or even their support of the Greek cause should appear as no mystery, 
however.  It reflects the continued importance of the inherited religious community 
structure, the millet.  
A more radical generation of Bulgarian activists during the 1870s began to 
work underground not only for the release of Bulgarians from Greek cultural 
dominance but for the overthrow of Ottoman authority in Bulgarian lands in favor of 
the establishment of an independent Bulgarian state.31  They took advantage of the 
disorder created by the 1875 rebellion in Bosnia by organizing their own rebellion in 
1876, known as the April Uprising.  Ottoman reprisals carried out during the 
suppression of the uprising triggered the intervention of Russia in 1877 in favor of the 
insurgents.  The resulting Russo-Turkish War ended in the Ottoman Empire’s 
decisive defeat.  Among the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano that Russia imposed 
on the Ottoman Empire in March 1878 was the creation of a large Bulgarian state that 
included most of Ottoman Macedonia among other former Ottoman territories.  But 
other European Great Powers, uneasy at the prospect of such a large new state in the 
Balkans that they believed would be a client of Russia, called a congress later that 
year in Berlin with the aim of modifying the San Stefano settlement.  At Berlin the 
Powers pressured Russia to accept a Bulgarian state drastically reduced in size.  This 
shrunken Bulgaria did not include any part of Macedonia, which was returned to 
Ottoman rule.  The Berlin settlement greatly disappointed Bulgarian nationalists, who 
felt their goals had been attained with the earlier San Stefano treaty.  Subsequently, 
                                                




the idea of “San Stefano Bulgaria” stood for Bulgarian irredentism as the counterpart 
to Greece’s Megali Idea.   
Nevertheless, Greek and Serbian nationalists were disturbed by the ambitions 
and success of Bulgaria, which by 1885 almost doubled its territory by adding Eastern 
Rumelia (roughly northeast of Ottoman Macedonia).  Bulgaria’s defeat of Serbia in a 
short war in 1885 confirmed its recent territorial acquisition.32  To Greek nationalists 
in particular, the expansionism of the Slavic nations into former Ottoman territory 
began to look like a more immediate threat to Hellenism (Greeks and Greek cultural 
presence) than Ottoman rule was.  Among nationalists in Greece, this disquiet was 
expressed prominently by the scion of an old Greek political family with roots in 
Macedonia, Ion Dragoumis.  Dragoumis passionately argued that Greeks should focus 
their energies on preserving and strengthening Hellenism wherever it existed rather 
than expanding incrementally the borders of the small, weak Greek state if that would 
result in the abandonment of Greeks outside the stat ’  borders.33  A Greek struggle 
to defend Hellenism in Macedonia, in particular, against the Slavic threat would also 
serve to revitalize what he saw as the moribund coniti  of the Greek nation itself. 
 Such a struggle between Balkan nation-states over Ottoman Macedonia was 
well under way by the time Dragoumis wrote in the first decade of the twentieth 
century.  Greece began already during the 1870s to lend support to the Patriarchate in 
its struggle with the Exarchate, hoping it could head off the advance of Bulgarian 
                                                
32 Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1977), 152-155, 165- 7, 189.  On Greece’s reaction specifically, see 
Evangelos Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis 1875-1878 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan 
Studies, 1975). 
33 For a discussion of Dragoumis’ views as exemplary of the outlook of Greek nationalists of his 




nationalism in Ottoman Macedonia.34  Serious Serbian interest in claiming Ottoman 
Macedonia came relatively late, as it had initially focused on Bosnia-Hercegovina as 
an Ottoman territory in which Serbs were a plurality.  But when Austria-Hungary 
occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, Serbian interes s turned south toward Ottoman 
Macedonia.  There they encountered rival claimants in Bulgaria and Greece.35 
 Competing irredentist organizations with close ties r spectively to the Greek, 
Bulgarian, and Serbian governments formed with the aim of advancing the competing 
national causes in Ottoman Macedonia.  Serbian activity was primarily focused on the 
funding of Serbian schools in Ottoman Macedonia through the establishment in 
Belgrade of the Society of St. Sava in 1886.  However, some armed bands also began 
to infiltrate from Serbia into northern Ottoman Macedonia during the first decade of 
the twentieth century where they tangled with pro-Bulgarian bands.36  In the wake of 
the Russo-Turkish war, highly placed Greek government officials in Athens 
organized a Macedonian Committee in January 1878.  The Macedonian Committee 
used government funds and arms and worked clandestiely with the Greek consulate 
in Salonika to infiltrate armed bands into Ottoman Macedonia.  The Committee 
attempted, but largely failed, to organize a pro-Greek insurrection in Ottoman 
Macedonia.37  In 1894 a group of influential journalists, professors, former 
politicians, and military officers in Athens formed the Ethniki Etairia (National 
Association), which aimed to advance Greece’s irredentist goals.  It sent armed bands 
into Ottoman Macedonia beginning in 1896, some of which took part in a losing war 
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against the Ottoman Empire in 1897.  Yet another Macedonian Committee was 
formed with similar aims in Athens in 1902 and led by a major newspaper publisher 
and a parliamentary deputy.38   
 Outside of the close relationship between the Bulgarian state and the 
ecclesiastical organization of the Exarchate within Ottoman Macedonia, other 
organizations based in Bulgaria or with vital support from within Bulgaria also 
attempted to influence the political fate of Macedonia.  Not all of these called for 
Bulgaria’s annexation of Macedonia.  In 1893, men livi g in Salonika, but who had 
common origins in rural Ottoman Macedonia and education in Bulgaria, founded an 
organization that eventually came to be best known as the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization (Vûtreshna Makedonska Revoliutsionna Organizatsiia) 
or VMRO.39  VMRO advocated the establishment of an independent or autonomous 
Macedonia, and believed this goal should be brought about primarily through a 
struggle waged by the inhabitants of Macedonia, themselves.  Over the years, VMRO, 
which stressed its nature as organized “internally” within Macedonia rather than 
outside it, operated through regional “committees” based in different parts of 
Macedonia.   
Despite its organization internally within Macedonia, members and factions of 
VMRO often differed as to whether and how closely to cooperate with Bulgaria and 
with the Exarchate in achieving their goal of Macedonian autonomy.  This 
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disagreement in part stemmed from ideological differences.  A leftist faction emerged 
around the Serres region, led by Jane Sandanski.  Sandanski’s Serres faction often 
expressed opposition to cooperation with Bulgaria because it was led by a monarch 
and thus represented further imperial tyranny – what the organization was ostensibly 
fighting to overthrow in Ottoman-ruled Macedonia.  Other VMRO activists, who also 
sometimes distrusted the Bulgarian government’s intentions and worried in particular 
that Bulgaria would be willing to divide Macedonia with neighboring Balkan 
countries rather than keep it whole, were nonetheless more inclined to accept 
Bulgarian government assistance in their struggle.   
In 1895, émigrés from Ottoman Macedonia based in Sofia f rmed another 
organization called the Supreme Committee.  Althoug the Supremists advocated the 
establishment of an autonomous Macedonia as VMRO did, they believed that only 
the Bulgarian state and military could successfully lead such an effort and their 
leaders tended to view VMRO’s more populist strategy with condescension.  The 
differences in outlook between VMRO and the Supremists led to bitter rivalry and 
even occasionally armed clashes between them.  Neverth less, VMRO also relied 
crucially on arms and funding from Bulgaria and at times even on support from 
members of the Supreme Committee organization.40  Observing the links to Bulgaria, 
pro-Greek and pro-Serb activists tended to view both VMRO and the Supreme 
Committee as ultimately representing Bulgarian interests.  They believed the 
advocacy of autonomy for Macedonia masked eventual B lgarian aims to annex 
Macedonia, as Bulgaria had annexed Eastern Rumelia in 1885 after an initial period 
of Ottoman autonomy for that province. 
                                                




Lending further complexity to the competition between Greece, Bulgaria, and 
Serbia in Macedonia was the presence of smaller ethnic and linguistic groups among 
the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman region.  Although most Albanian-speakers 
were Muslims, some of them were Orthodox Christians.  Another group spoke the 
Vlach language, a Romance language similar to Romanian.  Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, 
and the Macedonian autonomist movement tried to woo these smaller groups to their 
cause.  Romania also attempted to exert influence o the Vlachs, mainly through 
supporting Romanian schools and churches in Ottoman Macedonia.  Although the 
Romanian government made little headway and did not in any case expect to be able 
ever to annex the territory (Macedonia was not contiguous to Romania) it viewed its 
activities as a bargaining chip against Bulgarian expansion, which it considered to be 
threatening.41 
The rival national movements from Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia competed 
more peacefully though no less intensely to influence the loyalties of inhabitants of 
Ottoman Macedonia through the funding of schools in the region.  Bulgarian and 
Greek schools each amounted to several hundred and enrolled tens of thousands of 
students at a time.  Serbian schools were considerably smaller in number and 
primarily concentrated in the northern part of the Vardar region.42  Where schooling 
in Ottoman Macedonia had earlier been controlled by religious institutions, namely 
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the Patriarchate and eventually the Exarchate in the case of Bulgarian schools, by the 
beginning of the twentieth century sources of education l funding and teachers were 
increasingly dominated by the Greek and Bulgarian governments and secular 
benevolent organizations in those states and in Ottoman urban centers.  Funds were 
often channeled through the Greek and Bulgarian consulates in Ottoman 
Macedonia.43  These investments, Greek and Bulgarian nationalists hoped 
respectively, would work to cement the commitment of the younger generations in 
Ottoman Macedonia to the Greek or Bulgarian national cause.  As will be shown 
below, although local parents typically welcomed the support provided for the 
education of their children, the results of this education in terms of consolidating 
national commitments among inhabitants often fell far short of the nationalists’ goals. 
School teaching was the one important avenue throug which Orthodox 
Christian women in the Balkans made publically recognized contributions during the 
early twentieth century to the competing national causes, both within the independent 
Balkan nation-states and when sent from the independent states to serve in schools in 
Ottoman Macedonia.44  Nationalists and national governments championed girls’
education in part because, as future mothers, women were presumed to exert the most 
formative influence on their children, both male and female, and they must be 
educated in order to transmit proper national values to their children.  By extension, 
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women’s “motherly” qualities were seen as useful in nurturing schoolchildren, and 
educated daughters of middle and upper class families as young as fifteen were often 
sent long distances away from home, including to Ott man Macedonia, to serve as 
teachers for their nations’ schools.45  Women’s distinctive role in public education 
aside, however, political elites throughout the Balkans during the early twentieth 
century overwhelmingly construed women’s proper role as inhabiting the domestic 
sphere, and thus excluded the possibility or desirability of their participation in public 
as political actors.46  On the other hand, this cultural expectation created some 
opportunities for the armed nationalist organizations perating in Ottoman Macedonia 
to use women in their clandestine activities, precis ly because they would be less 
likely to come under suspicion as women.  Zlata Serafimova, a girl during the late 
Ottoman period, recalls in her memoir that women and children in her village served 
as lookouts and reported the whereabouts of Ottoman authorities to VMRO militants 
who mostly hailed from outside her village.  Serafimova even reports that VMRO 
members were training two young women from her village in the use of guns and 
swords, although this kind of role for women was deci dly exceptional.47 
The Balkan conditions fostering the proliferation of armed bands representing 
political causes in Ottoman Macedonia, whether infiltrated from outside or organized 
internally, long predated the formation of groups like VMRO, the Supreme 
Committee, or the Ethniki Etairia and the introduction of ethnically-motivated 
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violence in the region.  The decentralized nature of the Ottoman state in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries created con itions in the Empire’s Balkan 
provinces that allowed local notables and even brigands to form their own armed 
organizations that challenged the central state’s monopoly over the use of force.  To 
some extent these forces supplanted the official state’  function of maintaining social 
order in areas where they held sway.  They also supported themselves or 
supplemented their compensation through plunder and extortion of local inhabitants.  
The state even called on such forces periodically when it needed extra men for a 
military campaign or to suppress major internal unrest.48  The phenomenon of 
irregular armed bands persisted in the Balkan states hat succeeded the Ottoman 
Empire, as the new governments also faced difficulties in consolidating legitimate 
armed force in official institutions such as the army and gendarmerie.49  Such 
unofficial organizations, which straddled the boundary between brigandage and 
paramilitary activity in the service of political causes, played crucial roles in the 
nineteenth-century struggles against Ottoman rule that brought the successor states 
into being.  Nationalist intellectuals in the newly formed Balkan states thus 
retrospectively romanticized members of such irregular armed groups (when they 
served their own national cause), while politicians t times called on their services in 
subsequent irredentist struggles.50  Thus, as the irredentist struggle between Bulgaria, 
Greece, and Serbia over Ottoman Macedonia developed during the last two decades 
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of the nineteenth century, patriotic societies in each country recruited irregular armed 
bands to infiltrate into the contested territory where they alternately fought Ottoman 
forces and each other.   
 
Patterns of Political Violence in Late Ottoman Macedonia 
 The Ilinden insurrection of 1903 mentioned at the beginning of this chapter 
remained by far the most prominent episode of politica  violence to occur in Ottoman 
Macedonia during the decades preceding the Balkan Wrs of 1912-1913.  The 
respective national traditions of the Republic of Macedonia and of Bulgaria have long 
commemorated it as a genuine popular uprising for (Macedonian or Bulgarian) 
national liberation.  Yet despite its impressive scale, involving 25,000 Orthodox 
Christian militants who fought for an autonomous Macedonia, this violent revolt 
cannot be considered the result of popular sentimens of aroused national 
consciousness among the Orthodox masses of Ottoman Macedonia.  As Duncan Perry 
has argued, those ordinary local Christian men who did participate in the armed 
struggle were motivated by a mix of armed pressure to participate on the part of 
VMRO leaders, threatened Ottoman repression, and increasing impoverishment.  A 
smaller 1902 attack on Ottoman authorities and local Muslims by Supreme 
Committee bands that had infiltrated into Ottoman Macedonia from Bulgaria had 
resulted in widespread and continuing Ottoman reprisals against Christian residents of 
Macedonia who by and large had not taken part in the a tack.  The local revolutionary 
organization, VMRO, despite opposing the 1902 attack, became the target of 




organization was now under threat of decimation, decided to plan for the 1903 Ilinden 
revolt before the Ottoman crackdown could weaken thm irreparably.  The seasoned 
paramilitary members of VMRO fanned out into the Macedonian countryside to 
augment their forces by recruiting Christian peasants, often using threats.  They 
correctly warned villagers that they should expect heavy Ottoman reprisals (including 
massacres and destruction of villages) as a result of the revolt.  A good number of 
peasant men concluded, based on their experience from the 1902 events, that they 
would face the reprisals whether they participated or not.  They decided to throw their 
lot in with VMRO in order at least to give the insurrection the best chance of victory 
and thus avoid the reprisals.51   
Yet, it must be emphasized that an even greater number of Christian villagers 
in Macedonia avoided participating in the armed struggle, despite the pressure from 
the armed Christian paramilitary bands and despite the hardships they already 
endured over the past year from reprisals at the hands of Ottoman authorities.  
Between 40,000 and 60,000 locals, for example, simply fled their villages, unarmed, 
to hide in the mountains and wait out the conflict.52  All in all, using population 
figures from 1900 and VMRO’s own account published in 1904, Perry estimates that 
less than one percent of Ottoman Macedonia’s Slavic and Vlach-speaking inhabitants 
participated in the Ilinden insurrection.53  The highest rate of participation occurred in 
the vilayet of Manastır, where 19,850 people joined the revolt (around 5 percent out 
of a total of 379,856 members of the Bulgarian Exarch te church there).  In other 
Macedonian provinces, the proportion of Bulgarian Exarchate members participating 
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was a tiny fraction of a percent.  These numbers, and the context within which many 
participants joined the revolt, do not bespeak a popular uprising in the cause of 
national liberation.  The considerable ethnic diversity among those who did join in the 
Ilinden revolt further complicates any straightforward nationalist interpretation of it, 
whether Macedonian or Bulgarian.  One of the most important centers of the uprising, 
the town of Krushevo in Vardar Macedonia, provides a prominent illustration.  There, 
ethnic Vlachs, rather than simply Macedonians or Bulgarians, were instrumental in 
leading the revolt.54 
 Though reluctant to intervene militarily against Ot oman forces during the 
Ilinden uprising as the insurgents had hoped, the European Great Powers pressed the 
Ottoman government later in 1903 to accept a package of reforms.  Known as the 
Mürzsteg Program, the reforms proceeded on the theory that the underlying problem 
in Macedonia had been the Ottoman state’s general failure to ensure security for the 
region’s inhabitants, coupled with the inequitable treatment of the Empire’s Christian 
subjects in the Macedonian provinces.  The centerpiece of the reforms was a 
reorganization of the gendarmerie in Macedonia.  Christians were to be recruited to 
serve in Christian-majority districts, and European (non-Ottoman) officers would lead 
the gendarmerie and be paid out of the Ottoman treasu y.   
The Mürzsteg reforms unintentionally encouraged an upsurge in day-to-day 
political violence in Ottoman Macedonia versus the period before the 1903 Ilinden 
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insurrection.55  The intensive involvement of foreign consuls and military officers in 
Ottoman internal security policy whetted the appetites of hopeful Christian 
revolutionaries.  More unrest might invite more foreign intervention, further 
weakening Ottoman sovereignty in Macedonia, and perhaps ultimately ending 
Ottoman rule there.  Article III of the Mürzsteg Prog am appeared to lend credence to 
such hopes.  It suggested that administrative district  in Ottoman Macedonia would 
be reshaped along ethnic lines.  An Ottoman census carried out between 1903 and 
1905 registered religious denomination (typically seen by political activists in 
Macedonia as a marker of nationality) as the principal means of differentiation among 
the Christian population, while also recording information about inhabitants’ 
ethnicity.  During the run-up to the census and afterwards, paramilitary groups who 
supported the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian causes used whatever means they could, 
including violent intimidation, to convince Christian inhabitants of Macedonia to 
switch to their respective national churches or schools.  Each side aimed to convince 
the Ottoman administration, and ultimately the European Great Powers, of the 
predominance of its respective national element in Macedonia.  The Great Powers 
would presumably consider the perceived ethnic composition of Macedonia in 
deciding how much of its territory to award to Bulgaria, Greece, or Serbia, or to a 
single, separate Macedonian entity if at some point in the future the region were to be 
detached from Ottoman rule.   
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Thus, despite or in part because of the introduction of reforms in 1903 meant 
to curb violence in Ottoman Macedonia, ethnically motivated violence increased from 
1904 through 1908, when the Young Turk revolution introduced a new regime in the 
Ottoman Empire.  But who, in Ottoman Macedonia, wasactually promoting such 
violence?  Were ordinary residents violently attacking their neighbors because of 
deep-seated and pervasive ethnic hatreds, conforming to the stereotype of Balkan 
violence?  Such violence between neighbors was not completely absent, but it was an 
exception to the rule.  Members of irregular armed bands supported from Bulgaria, 
Greece, or Serbia, and Ottoman armed forces, both of w m circulated across large 
distances within Ottoman Macedonia, were almost always the culprits.  Unarmed 
residents were often the victims.  Illustrating though perhaps exaggerating this pattern 
were statistical tables compiled by the Bulgarian Commercial Agency in Serres at the 
request of the Bulgarian foreign ministry reporting “killings and arson in the sanjaks 
of Serres and Drama in 1907.”56  According to the commercial agent’s figures, of 323 
killings that took place in the two sanjaks, all but seven were known to have been 
committed by the “Bulgarian Organization” (the agent’s shorthand for VMRO), 
“Greek armed bands and terrorists,” “Turkish armed bands,” or “Turkish soldiers.”  
Also of the 323 killed, only 53 were members of these armed bands (“chetnitsi”).  
The rest were unarmed residents. 
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Many of the men of Christian background peopling these armed bands (pro-
Greek, pro-Bulgarian, pro-Serbian, Macedonian autonomist) themselves hailed from 
outside of Macedonia or else had roots in the region but lived outside it as emigrants.  
This was overwhelmingly the case for the Sofia-based group known as the Supremists 
who staged the aforementioned Gorna Djumaia revolt of 1902 as well as other 
smaller-scale raids in the name of their stated goal of Macedonian autonomy.  Origins 
outside of Ottoman Macedonia were also common among the pro-Greek andartes.  
Out of a group of 385 andartes who died in the 1904-1908 “Macedonian Struggle,” 
136 came from the island of Crete alone, according to an official Greek military 
history.  The proportion of leaders of pro-Greek armed bands hailing from outside 
Ottoman Macedonia was even higher; out of 70 armed ban  commanders who died in 
the “Macedonian Struggle,” the Greek army recorded “places of origin” outside 
Ottoman Macedonia for 45 of them.57  “As is known to you,” the Bulgarian 
commercial agent in Serres remarked to his superior in the Bulgarian foreign ministry 
with some measure of scorn and perhaps exaggeration, “the majority of [the Greek] 
cheti have been recruited of people from Crete and Greece.”58  But proponents of the 
Greek cause in Macedonia would not have been ashamed to acknowledge the truth of 
that assertion.  Pavlos Melas was an officer in the Gr ek army who was killed shortly 
after he entered Macedonia under cover in the wake of the Ilinden revolt to organize 
Greek armed bands.  He quickly became known to the Gre k public as a “national 
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martyr” and the face of the Greek struggle.  The romantic image of his self-sacrifice 
inspired many more volunteers from Greece to enter O toman Macedonia as 
makedonomachoi (fighters for Macedonia).59  
These outsiders, especially, showed more concern about ultimate victory for 
their side in the larger national struggle over Macedonia than about individual lives or 
communities that might be damaged in the process.  Such casualties they viewed as 
inevitable and even necessary, if unfortunate.  Theaccount of a 1905 massacre at the 
village of Zagorichani by Germanos Karavaggelis, the Greek patriarchist bishop of 
the southwestern Macedonian town of Kastoria at the im  who was born on the 
Aegean island of Lesvos, vividly illustrates this mentality.  Vardas, a band leader 
from Crete who was close to Karavaggelis, informed the bishop that he had decided 
to punish the Bulgarian residents of Zagorichani colle tively because some of them 
had aided a Bulgarian armed band in the burning of a monastery.  Some of the 
attackers (it is not clear whether villagers of Zagorichani were among them) also 
murdered the monastery’s patriarchist abbot during the raid.  But Zagorichani was a 
mixed village, where exarchists and patriarchists had found a modus vivendi and 
regularly alternated conducting their respective liturgies in the church every other 
week.  This stable, practical arrangement within the local community did not seem to 
impress Karavaggelis, who worried that the minority “Greeks” (patriarchists) of the 
village were “starting to show cowardice” as villagers increasingly switched to the 
Exarchate.  Karavaggelis registered no objection to Vardas’ plan for a punitive 
expedition upon hearing it.  Quite the contrary, “I sent him the names of ours [i.e. the 
patriarchist villagers] so that he would not hurt them,” Karavaggelis recalls.  Vardas’ 
                                                




band invaded Zagorichani with guns and killed 79 exarchists, including several 
women.  But, as Karavaggelis explained, “[a]mid the hullabaloo it was not easy for 
anyone to distinguish the Greeks from the Bulgarians,” most probably because all of 
the villagers were in any case “Slavophones” and the members of the armed band did 
not have familiarity with the community.  Thus, “unfortunately some of our people, 
Slavophones yes, but valuable,” were also killed in the action in addition to the 79 
“Bulgarians.”   
Karavaggelis later told the Ottoman governor Hilmi Pasha that although he 
“disapproved” of this action of the Greek andartes, its “cause” was the burning of 
two monasteries, one of which Karavaggelis did not accuse Zagorichani villagers of 
taking any part in, and the killing of the abbot.  The massacre was only the “natural 
consequence” of previous Bulgarian crimes.  He ration lized the massacre at 
Zagorichani to the Patriarch of Constantinople as “revenge.”  Writing of what he 
considered to be Vardas’ “bravery and prudence” directly after recounting the grisly 
event at Zagorichani, Bishop Karavaggelis left no doubt in his memoir that he 
believed a collective punishment that massacred 79 people was broadly justified.  He 
regretted only the “unfortunate” additional deaths of patriarchists that he had tried to 
prevent by supplying a list in advance to the perpetrator.60 
Yet whether members of paramilitary groups hailed from inside or outside of 
Ottoman Macedonia, the region’s local residents typically perceived them as 
outsiders who preyed upon the local community and caused unwelcome trouble.  In 
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his study of nineteenth and early twentieth century G eece, John Koliopoulos 
identifies the fraught relationship between rural Christian peasants and brigands who 
doubled at times as guerilla protagonists in nineteenth and early twentieth century 
struggles for national independence from the Ottoman Empire.61  Extolled 
retrospectively in Balkan national traditions as freedom fighters and even Robin 
Hood-like characters, the brigands made their careers by extorting villagers, who 
typically feared them and viewed them as social outcasts.  Yet these nineteenth 
century brigands/guerillas usually sought out ultimate government patronage (from 
Ottoman or successor state governments).  Many brigands who through their superior 
military prowess could demonstrate their ability to control an area and keep 
competing outlaws at bay, or who distinguished themselves in a national struggle, 
eventually found more stable legal employment by the state as irregular gendarmes or 
rural guards. 
This close connection between extortion and freedom-fighting persisted in its 
broad outlines into early twentieth century Ottoman Macedonia, but with a difference.  
There appeared new sources of the guerillas’ alienation from the peasant majority: 
either their urban origins or professions, or their s condary education in a town or city 
away from the village of origin.  The “Macedonian problem” and in particular the 
proliferation of revolutionary bands was called “the fault of the Bulgarian schools” by 
an Ottoman administrator in Salonika.  As he explained to Noel Brailsford in 1904: 
In these nests of vice the sons of peasants are maintained for a number of years in 
idleness and luxury.  Indeed, they actually sleep on beds.  And then they go back to 
their villages.  There are no beds in their fathers’ cottages, and these young 
gentlemen are much too fine to sleep on the floor.  They try the life for a little, and 
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then they go off and join the revolutionary bands.  What they want is a nice fat 
Government appointment. 
 
For Christians in the Ottoman system, Brailsford elaborated, “Official careers are 
closed to them, and in the long run, finding themselves unfitted for their environment, 
the only course which remains to them is to alter th  environment itself.”62   
The Ottoman official’s observation of course cannot i  fact suffice to explain 
“the Macedonian problem,” however defined.  But his diagnosis of the membership 
of paramilitary groups such as VMRO parallels Koliopoulos’s analysis of the type of 
paramilitary activity that occurred several decades earlier.  In both cases, the 
paramilitary figures came to stand apart in some important way from the fabric of the 
peasant communities in which they carried out their violent activities.  And in both 
cases this social chasm fueled their ambitions to secure income and gain 
respectability through the patronage of a state (eiher the currently existing state or a 
new one that would presumably accommodate their ambitions).  Duncan Perry’s 
analysis of the social origins of the membership of VMRO also supports the 
conclusion that paramilitary organizations in early twentieth century Ottoman 
Macedonia were far from representative of the Christian population of the region at 
large.  Although peasants made up the large majority f the Christian population, a 
paltry 3 percent of the VMRO leadership and the rank d file were peasants.  
Around 20 percent, on the other hand, were teachers, whom Perry rightly considers 
“the backbone and moving force” of VMRO.  Other educated urban professionals and 
craftsmen were also better represented than peasants in the VMRO membership.63 
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 Yet the paramilitary formations committed their violence mostly in the rural 
communities where peasants lived.  Georgios Modis, a pro-Greek activist, was 
accurate in observing that “[o]ften the ‘voevods’ moved around from one province to 
another, like civil servants.”64  He referred specifically to VMRO chieftains, but the 
same point would have applied to any of the paramilitary organizations, nationalist or 
autonomist.  The peasants typically came to resent and fear them, whatever national 
liberation cause they might have stood for, especially after enduring the heavy 
consequences and destabilization of their communities caused by actions such as the 
Ilinden insurrection and the myriad smaller operations they carried out.  Evidence of 
this fear and resentment emerges only indirectly from memoirs, as the retrospective 
national glorification of these “revolutionary” paramilitary figures encouraged the 
witnesses to highlight their association with them and support of them.  Thus, Zlata 
Serafimova recounts the following anecdote, involving a rough similarity between the 
Bulgarian words meaning onion and rebels, of her acquaintance as a little girl with 
noted VMRO chieftain Jane Sandanski: 
And he, the chieftain [voivodata], seemed a scary man, but he was very good.  He 
often asked me “If the Turks ask you are there rebels [komiti] among you, what will 
you say?”  I answered, “I will say that there is no onion [kromid] among us,” that is 
how our mothers taught us.65 
 
But even this reminiscence of willing mass participation in a struggle suggests the 
“scariness” of guerillas such as Sandanski, who indeed went to great lengths to 
enforce the cooperation of villagers, including apprently even small children. 
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Whatever residents (or former residents) of Macedonia said about their 
interactions with guerillas retrospectively, accounts actually dating from the early 
twentieth century indicate that residents usually feared and resented such paramilitary 
figures, even when the guerrillas were from the same ethnic or linguistic group as 
they were.  Bulgarian or Macedonian-speaking villagers often complained to Ottoman 
authorities or to the Bulgarian consulate about violence and economic extortion from 
VMRO guerrillas, including those led by Jane Sandanski.  Several examples recorded 
just during the summer and autumn of 1908 by a Bulgarian consul with jurisdiction in 
eastern Macedonia illustrate the nature of these frequent complaints.  When Stefan 
Stoianov from the village of Spatovo was killed by members of Sandanski’s group, 
his fellow villagers charged that the murder had occurred as punishment for the 
victim’s bravery in speaking out against the forced ollection of contributions from 
the village by the group.66  Residents of the village of Latrovo sneaked into the 
nearby town of Demir Hisar67 where they sought the help of the Ottoman 
gendarmerie against one of Sandanski’s cheti (armed bands) that had arrived in their 
village and demanded contributions at gunpoint.68  When villagers pleaded to another 
Sandanski associate their inability to pay new contributions after having already been 
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made poor by previous contributions, the guerrilla simply threatened to kill them if 
they did not pay.69   
Greek-speakers also complained about the activities of pro-Greek bands.  
Early in 1909, a Greek from the Serres area went to the Ottoman authorities to 
complain that the representative of a Greek committee allegedly tied to the nearby 
Greek consulate had demanded a large amount of money from his wealthy father.70  
The young man’s individual complaint was one among a larger number lodged by 
wealthy Greeks from Serres.  Encouraged by the promise of reforms in the wake of 
the Young Turk revolution of 1908, these residents began to protest to Ottoman 
authorities and to the Greek government in Athens about the extortionate activities of 
Greek armed bands and their apparent connection to Greek consulates in Ottoman 
Macedonia.71 
In the rare cases when circumstances seemed to offer them the upper hand, 
residents dared to confront the paramilitaries directly.  A group of Greek-speaking 
shepherds known as Sarakatsanoi refused to pay ransom for a boy from their 
community who was kidnapped by an inexperienced Greek armed band that had just 
arrived from Crete.  Although it was clear that this band viewed the boy merely as a 
source of income and had nothing against his ethnic background, the Sarakatsanoi 
preferred to take the risk of liberating the boy rather than simply pay the ransom.  
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They succeeded and killed some members of the armed ban  in the process.72  The 
widespread optimism and expectation of reforms shortly after the proclamation of a 
constitutional regime in 1908 seemed to stiffen the resolve of villagers in eastern 
Macedonia to resist Bulgarian-born voivod Todor Panitsa when he made his rounds in 
their communities during that period.  Significantly, Panitsa was a prominent leader 
of the Serres-Drama faction of VMRO, the left-leaning faction typically regarded by 
historians as being more in touch with the sentiment of Christian masses in 
Macedonia.  Panitsa’s band had been sustained materially by the Christian villages in 
eastern Macedonia, but whatever moral support buttressed that sustenance had long 
since frayed.  The sustenance came from extortion.  His arrival in the village of 
Skrizhovo in December 1908 “was met with general indig ation, which was 
expressed in a protest by the whole village.”  The entire village attended an assembly, 
at which the elders sharply rebuked him:  
Panitsa, you are a murderer!  With the murders that you personally committed 
yourself, you raised a wall between our region and the other parts of the fatherland.  
As if that were not enough, you sowed in our own village internecine strife, which 
led us to kill one another.  As a result of all this the village has decided and we order 
you immediately to leave the village and never again to dare to appear in front of us! 
 
Panitsa objected, pointing out the elders’ own admission that murders in Skrizhovo 
were carried out by residents of the village.  But the killers themselves then stepped 
forward to answer him: “No – to the contrary, you ordered us!  Our error was only 
that we obeyed you.  The true murderer of our own is you!”  The residents, including 
small children, then reportedly followed Panitsa in the street with chants of “Down 
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with Panitsa!” all the way to the end of the village as he left in disgrace.73  The local 
killers who merely followed orders, so to speak, from Panitsa may be accused of 
hypocrisy in placing the blame for the former strife solely on him.  But the significant 
fact in this episode is that the entire village appeared to support them in this 
hypocrisy.  Elders the previous evening had verbally chided one of the killers for his 
“misguided” service to Panitsa’s organization, but had not banished him.  Panitsa was 
the outsider, the interloper who destroyed the moral fabric of the village community, 
and without his destabilizing actions, the village could presumably live in peace. 
 Residents of another village, Prosechen, had already xpressed their opinion 
of voivod Panitsa as an outsider more explicitly in an encouter that occurred two 
months earlier.  Panitsa appeared with his men in Prosechen and tried to force away a 
local teacher he did not favor, a native of the village named Karamanov.  Karamanov 
impetuously confronted Panitsa in the village café, saying that he neither knew nor 
wanted to know him.  The teacher continued: 
I am appointed by the local leadership, which has nothi g in common with you.  As 
long as that leadership wants me, I owe nothing to you nor take any account of you.  
Besides that, as you know, I am from here, while you are a foreign dog and only as a 
bandit are you able to sit here by force. 
 
Panitsa responded by smashing his chair over the teacher’s head, but he and his men 
were outnumbered by villagers who took the teacher’s side.  Another café patron at 
the same moment struck Panitsa’s own head with a chair.  Three more patrons 
grabbed hold of Panitsa and tackled him to the ground.  Panitsa’s subordinates fled.  
Fortunately, Panitsa was so flustered by the unanimous will of the villagers in the 
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café to confront him that he did not think to reach for his loaded revolver before he 
was disarmed.  Panitsa was forced to leave this village too, in haste and disgrace.74 
 The village teacher Karamanov and voivod Panitsa both conversed and 
understood each other in their common native language, Slavic rather than Greek.  It 
is therefore significant that Karamanov nonetheless chose to insult and discredit the 
bandit/revolutionary by branding him again as an outsider, a “foreign dog,” while 
emphasizing that he, himself, was “from here” and ha been appointed by the local 
leadership.  Other contemporary sources also reveal a typical – perhaps unconscious – 
categorical mental distinction between paramilitary band members (andartes, 
chetnitsi, and bashi-bazouks depending on the language and affiliation) and 
“villagers” (horikoi, seliani) or “inhabitants” (katikoi, naselenie) regardless of how 
local the origins of paramilitary members might have been.  For example, when the 
Bulgarian commercial agency in the town of Serres compiled a table of murders and 
arson committed in the Ottoman Macedonian Sanjaks of Serres and Drama in the year 
1907, it created the following categories of victims: Bulgarians, Greeks, Vlachs, 
Turks, Albanians, Gypsies, and chetnitsi.  The word chetnitsi meant members of 
armed bands.  The commercial agent split the category of victims who were chetnitsi 
into Greek and Bulgarian sections for further analysis.  In other words, according to 
the categories formulated by the Bulgarian commercial agent, “Bulgarian chetnitsi” 
did not overlap with the general category of “Bulgarians” in Ottoman Macedonia.  
“Greek chetnitsi” likewise did not form a part of the category, “Greeks.” 75  Certainly 
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at least a portion of the Greek and Bulgarian chetnitsi counted in these figures were in 
reality born in Ottoman Macedonia, but they were nonetheless presented as outside 
the Greek and Bulgarian communities of the region. 
 The violence-laden atmosphere created by paramilitry bands in Macedonia 
discussed above can be considered as more a conseque c  of a weak Ottoman state 
than of some kind of deep-rooted local culture thatengendered an unusual disposition 
to violence.  Indeed, as argued above, locals usually w nted little to do with 
paramilitaries of any stripe.  İpek Yosmaoğlu has called attention to the difficulties 
the Ottoman state had in controlling violence by paramilitaries during the last years 
that it ruled Macedonia, and indeed its unwitting contribution to the rise of such 
violence through misguided policies undertaken partly t the behest of Western 
powers.76  The men who stepped into the breach were, as discussed above, widely 
acknowledged by Macedonia’s rural residents, by authorities and consuls, and by 
Western observers to be in important ways socially alienated from the local 
communities that constituted society in Ottoman Macedonia.  Until the Ottoman 
Empire’s loss of Macedonia in 1912, and despite the gendarmerie reforms of the 
Mürzsteg Program, such men repeatedly succeeded in usurping part of the 
government’s control over the means of violence in the region. 
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The Limits of National Affiliation among Ottoman Macedonia’s Orthodox Christians 
 The observation that the vast majority of Orthodox Christian inhabitants of 
Ottoman Macedonia usually wanted nothing to do with the ethnic violence of the 
paramilitary groups should not, however, be taken to imply an absence of national 
consciousness or ethnic tensions in the region.  The speculations of Georgios Modis, 
an avowed enemy of the Bulgarian national cause, that VMRO paramilitaries had to 
resort to using an other-worldly voice from the newly invented gramophone in order 
to dupe peasants into thinking that “the voice of Gd” commanded them to join them, 
should not be taken at face value as strong “evidence to suggest that the majority of 
the Slav peasants found it extremely difficult to identify with national ideologies, 
which others tried to impose upon them,” as it is by Dimitris Livanios.77  The boys 
from a remote village who failed to comprehend Noel Brailsford’s question about 
whether they were “Serbs or Bulgarians or Greeks or Turks” in 1903 did not represent 
the norm at that time.  Indeed, historians who have cited that anecdote usually fail to 
note that Brailsford presented it as a curious exception to the pattern that he generally 
encountered, as a throwback to the past.  “One hundred years ago it would have been 
hard to find a central Macedonian who could have answered with any intelligence the 
question whether he were Servian or Bulgarian by race,” he wrote by way of 
introduction to the episode of his encounter with the boys.  He implied precisely that 
as of the time he wrote, most central Macedonians would have had a ready answer to 
that kind of question.78  As noted above, before the Ilinden uprising of 1903 Orthodox 
Christian inhabitants of Ottoman Macedonia had been subjected for at least a decade 
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to one or more competing national ideologies (Bulgarian, Greek, Serb, even 
Romanian), each of which staked claims over their id ntity.  Most of them had the 
chance to become familiar with such ideologies chiefly through contact with schools, 
churches, and the “propaganda” of the paramilitary bands.  It was quite common by 
the turn of the twentieth century for even small Christian villages to have a school 
oriented towards one of these national affiliations.  Virtually all Christian villages had 
at least one church, and indeed they often had both a Greek-oriented patriarchist 
church and a Bulgarian-oriented exarchist church, presenting a choice of worship 
with national connotations to the villagers.  Assuming that early twentieth century 
rural inhabitants of Macedonia were generally ignora t of national questions or had 
not developed informed opinions about their national identity is therefore unrealistic 
and underestimates their status as political subjects.   
 But acknowledging that by the early twentieth century most Christian 
residents of Ottoman Macedonia were quite conscious of issues of national identity 
and even perhaps affiliated with one national side or another still leaves open the 
question of how national identity actually functioned in people’s lives and in local 
politics.  Why, in particular, did most people who identified with one or another 
nation avoid participating in the ethnic violence carried out by the rival paramilitary 
groups?  National affiliations among Christians throughout the region rarely 
corresponded neatly to externally observable ethnic or linguistic characteristics.  It 
was common for a Bulgarian/Macedonian/Slavic-speaker to identify with the 
Bulgarian, the Greek, the Serbian, or the Macedonian autonomist cause.  A Vlach 




even the Romanian cause.  An Albanian-speaking Christian might support the Greek 
or the Albanian cause.  Furthermore, individuals and even entire communities 
frequently switched national allegiances.  To explain these phenomena, Vassilis 
Gounaris persuasively suggests that affiliation with a national group was essentially a 
political choice that was often influenced at least as much by local clan rivalries, 
social status, occupation, financial considerations, r fear of the actions of nearby 
paramilitary groups as by characteristics such as mother language.  It would be more 
accurate, Gounaris concludes, to characterize national groups in early twentieth-
century Ottoman Macedonia as “parties with national affiliations” (as they are in fact 
often characterized in contemporary primary sources), even as “political clubs,” than 
as the political expression of rival primordial ethnic groups.79   
Gounaris’ use of the term “parties” to characterize the divided national 
affiliations among Christians in early twentieth century Ottoman Macedonia offers 
insight into the question of why neighbors did not rmally kill neighbors over 
national disputes.  Members of a “party” or a “political club” with differing national 
ideologies would compete with their rivals for political influence, resources, or 
control of institutions such as churches or schools.  They would try to undermine the 
analogous efforts of rival parties.  But members of rival “parties,” forming part of the 
same political society, would not normally be expected to use violence against their 
opponents to attain their goals.  Indeed, in late Ot oman Macedonia they reluctantly 
                                                




came to arrangements such as alternating their use of th  local church when more 
than one was not available and one party could not dominate politically.80 
 The concept of a national collectivity functioned quite differently, by 
comparison, in the neighboring Balkan nation-states.  In these polities, schools had 
taught children for generations that the state exist d as the homeland of a core nation.  
Bulgaria was the state of the “Bulgarians,” Greece was the state of the “Greeks,” 
Serbia was the state of the “Serbs.”  Members of other national groups who lived 
within the state’s territory were not seen simply as indigenous neighbors who 
belonged to different national “parties.”  Rather, they were at best tolerated as ethnic 
minorities who were in some fundamental way culturaly foreign to the core nation, 
and always potentially disloyal.  To some extent, the minorities themselves often 
acknowledged and even promoted their distinctiveness from the majority, although 
they would not normally have accepted accusations of disloyalty. 
As a set of anti-Greek riots in Bulgaria during thesummer of 1906 showed, 
ordinary citizens in a nation-state could readily attack their ethnic minority neighbors 
in large numbers, a type of phenomenon that was not observed during the same 
period among Christians of different ethnic affiliat ons in Ottoman Macedonia.  These 
attacks escalated from popular protests, spearheaded especially by groups of refugees 
from Ottoman Macedonia, against the violence being v sited by Greek armed bands 
in Macedonia upon ethnic Bulgarians there.  Much of the Bulgarian public suspected 
ethnic Greeks living in Bulgaria of supporting the Greek armed bands in Macedonia, 
and some vented their frustrations on local Greek communities.  In the Black Sea 
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coast cities and towns of Varna, Burgas, Kavarna, ad Balchik, Bulgarian 
townspeople seized Greek churches and schools and destroyed and looted Greek 
properties, including businesses, homes, cultural institutions, and schools.  In the city 
of Plovdiv, around 10,000 Bulgarians participated in the attacks.  The attacks 
culminated in the almost complete destruction by fire of the predominantly Greek 
seaside town of Anchialo.  The instigators of the fir  in Anchialo appear not to have 
been local, but rather members of a Bulgarian patriotic organization, Bûlgarski 
rodoliubets, who had arrived from outside the town.  Bûlgarski rodoliubets indeed 
was often at the forefront of the anti-Greek attacks, but it is also clear that in many of 
the locations in which they occurred local townspeopl  or villagers participated in 
significant numbers.81  The kind of ethnic violence that occurred in a young Balkan 
nation-state, in which ordinary residents attacked their fellow townspeople or fellow 
villagers, thus stands in contrast to the pattern of violence in Ottoman Macedonia.  
There ethnic violence was almost always perpetrated by mobile armed bands or ruling 
authorities and people rarely attacked their neighbors over ethnic differences. 
Although the diverse Orthodox Christian residents of Ottoman Macedonia 
were conscious of national politics and even joined “parties” favoring one national 
cause or another, the other priorities of education and economic prospects trumped 
the national struggle.  Rural residents placed a high value on education as a means of 
escape from their humble existence.  Whether that education came from Bulgarian, 
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Greek, or Serbian sponsors was at best a secondary concern for them.  Dimitûr 
Bozhikov Biliukbashiev, who was born in a small Bulgarian-speaking village and 
eventually became headmaster of a Bulgarian school, recalled his genuine 
appreciation for the Greek-influenced education he rec ived as a boy.   
During the following school years, 1877-78 and 1878-79, our teacher was K. 
Ikonomov, from the village Levcha in the Nevrokop region.  From what I have told 
you so far, it is clear that the nature of our studies had been of the church, the 
monastery.  We had studied only church books.  Our new teacher pioneered for the 
first time the study of Greek language, grammar, reading, religion, arithmetic, etc.  
During his two years as a teacher in our village, he made great reforms in the 
monastic educational system that had been in place until then….  Obviously the 
teacher, K. Ikonomov, was very hard working.  And his work was indeed very 
difficult.  He replaced each Bulgarian word with a Greek one, so that we could grasp 
and understand more easily.  Our main job at school was to read, write, and think.  
Reading was always translated into Bulgarian. 
 
Although the pedagogical materials and training at the teacher’s disposal were Greek 
ones, this was beside the point for Biliukbashiev.  His memoir gives many examples 
of friendship and casual relations between himself, a self-identified Bulgarian, and 
people he identified as Greek.  For Biliukbashiev, the new teacher opened intellectual 
and practical horizons that had been unavailable to him in his previous education by 
clerics.  Biliukbashiev even recounts with pride how, when on a field trip to the town 
of Serres, he was able to stump some ethnic Greek pupils his age with his questions 
on the declensions of nouns and verbs.82 
Biliukbashiev received his primary education in the1870s, before the 
competition between Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia to influence education of Orthodox 
Christians in Ottoman Macedonia got seriously under way.  Yet after the national 
struggle intensified and pro-Greek, pro-Bulgarian, d pro-Serbian institutions 
increased their funding of schools in the region in order to win the Orthodox Christian 
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youth of Macedonia to their respective causes, residents remained opportunistic.  If 
offered free or heavily subsidized education, they typically welcomed it, regardless of 
sponsor.  Such opportunities could indeed influence residents’ national affiliations, as 
the sponsors intended.  But that influence might not last permanently, and education 
itself and the social and economic opportunities it promised remained the priority for 
the residents.  Residents of Bitolia who protested th  decision by the Bulgarian 
Exarchate in Constantinople to close the Bulgarian g rls’ school in their town did 
make ample reference in their petition to the importance of this school to the national 
cause.  “[I]t is in the interest of our national cuture to have not only semi-literate 
women, but educated housewives and mothers and conscientious Bulgarian women 
[bûlgarki] who will instill in their children active devotion to their nation,” they 
wrote, using an argument in favor of the education of girls that nationalists articulated 
frequently at that time.83  The members of the school community knew that the 
Exarchate (which was apparently closing the school as part of an effort to resolve 
financial difficulties), and also the Bulgarian government and its consuls in Ottoman 
Macedonia, would place great weight on an argument that cast education as a crucial 
national imperative.84   
But the other side of the petitioners’ appeal to the national cause was the 
threat that without the Bulgarian Exarchate’s support for schools in Bitolia, Bulgarian 
national cohesion there would suffer as at least some would seek to educate their 
children in schools funded by rival national groups.  Rival national “propaganda,” 
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they warned, “lies in wait for the smallest shaking of our sacred national structures to 
bring them down from the foundations” at a time when “national self-consciousness 
in a few of our still misguided brethren has not penetrated deeply enough to resist 
every temptation or force.”85  The Bulgarian consul in Bitolia forwarded the 
townspeople’s petition to the Bulgarian foreign ministry with alarm, taking the 
petitioners’ warning seriously and elaborating upon it.  For the consul, the ultimate 
purpose of Bulgarian schools in Macedonia was one of nation-building: “schools are 
the places for implanting in the youth the national spirit so needed here in 
Macedonia.”  For the past thirty years, he observed, the population in the area of 
Bitolia had been accustomed to receiving free education.  Thus, he wrote, “if the 
considerably heavy burden [of funding Bulgarian education] were now loaded onto 
the residents themselves, I am sure that the majority of them would refuse to accept it, 
especially here where all the other nationalities, thanks to the various bequests or 
subsidies from the governments of the kindred state, enjoy free education.”86   
Raising the stakes further was the apparent desire of so many families, 
“thanks to propaganda,” to have both a daughter and a son become teachers [da ima 
dûshteria uchitelka i uchitel sin].  The petitioners in fact not only demanded the 
reopening of the girls’ school, but its expansion into a “full gymnasium” that could 
train women teachers.  Teaching as a profession had come to carry great social 
prestige among the Christian population in Ottoman M cedonia.  So much so, the 
consul observed, that families were willing to be flexible on the matter of which 
                                                
85 TsDA, Fond 331k a.e. 329, 2, 5 (Petition of residents of Bitolia to Iosif, Bulgarian Exarch, in 
Constantinople, Sep. 28, 1911). 
86 TsDA, Fond 331k a.e. 329, 1,6 (Bulgarian consul in Bitolia to Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 




national curriculum their sons or daughters would be trained in, so long as they 
became teachers.  With the impending closing of the girls’ secondary school, the 
Bulgarian consul predicted, families “will be forced to knock on the doors of the 
Serbian and Protestant, and even the Greek gymnasia.  And these are waiting to 
accept them immediately.  With this we will not be deprived merely of some 20-30 
young women, but maybe between 100-160 who would otherwise be good citizens 
and patriots; or at the very least we will have a mass of them with an unclear idea of 
their origins, open to reworking into all sorts of shapes [godna za izrabotvane na 
razni figuri].” 87  The prospect of aspiring teachers’ defection to rival nations 
presented an especially ominous threat.  These teachers would go to work inculcating 
generations of future pupils in Macedonia with enemy national ideologies – or so the 
nationalist institutions sponsoring these future teachers in Ottoman Macedonia hoped.   
Those receiving training as teachers did not necessarily place their future 
service to the national cause first, much to the chagrin of their nationalist sponsors.  
Teachers-in-training at Bulgarian pedagogical gymnasiums located in Ottoman 
Macedonia, for example, chafed at a condition that t e Bulgarian Exarchate placed on 
their receiving tuition subsidies.  They were required to sign a pledge upon graduating 
that they would serve for a certain amount of years as teachers in Bulgarian schools 
within Ottoman Macedonia.  Such service would, of course, help to further “implant 
the national spirit so needed here in Macedonia,” to recall the words of the Bulgarian 
consul in Bitolia.  The Exarchate hoped with this policy to mitigate the trend of 
graduates leaving for Bulgaria, where they found much higher-paying teaching 
positions.  In 1911, teacher-trainees in Serres and in Skopje threatened a strike, 





demanding an end to the requirement of service in Ottoman Macedonia after 
graduation.  The Bulgarian consul in Serres himself lamented that the Exarchate’s 
requirement was futile and unenforceable.  Money made the difference.  The 
graduates would only be induced to stay and carry out their patriotic duty in Ottoman 
Macedonia if the Exarchate could offer them competitiv  salaries.88  Once again 
education itself, and the economic and social advancement that accrued from it, took 
priority for these students from Macedonia over anynational struggle. 
* * * 
But, as this chapter has argued, Ottoman Macedonia’s i habitants’ typical 
pursuit of priorities such as education and economic advancement over imperatives 
dictated by national identity was not the result of a pre-modern ignorance of national 
ideologies.  By the first decade of the twentieth century, people throughout 
Macedonia had typically received intensive exposure to competing national 
ideologies through the activity of schools, rival church organizations, and armed 
bands sponsored in large part by nationalists resident in Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia.  
Many likely identified to some extent with one or another national group.  Indeed, it 
is not implausible that even the village boys, who apparently misunderstood Henry 
Noel Brailsford’s query about whether they were “Serbs or Bulgarians or Greeks or 
Turks” in answering simply that they were “Christians,” in fact knew full well what 
he meant and decided to feign ignorance.  For, depending on what armed band lurked 
nearby, giving a clear answer to that kind of question might be tantamount to risking 
one’s life.  A small segment of the male population in Ottoman Macedonia indeed 
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participated in these armed bands, although a largeproportion of their membership 
and especially leadership came from outside the region.  Their activity culminated in 
the Ilinden insurrection of 1903, into which they managed to draw thousands of 
inhabitants as participants by persuasion and by coercion.  But such violence 
alienated the vast majority of locals, who typically evinced resentment of armed band 
members of whatever national or political stripe and spoke of them as unwelcome 
outsiders (even when they were from the region.)  As the next chapter will 
demonstrate, Orthodox Christian inhabitants of Ottoman Macedonia would prove 
receptive in 1908 to the promises of constitutional rule within the framework of a 
reformed Ottoman state, promises which among other things seemed for a time to put 






Chapter 2: From the Hürriyet to the First Balkan War, 1908-
1912 
 
This chapter assesses the extent to which there had developed a figurative 
“Balkan Alliance” among the majority Orthodox Christian populations in Macedonia 
that mirrored the one struck by Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro to launch 
the First Balkan War against the Ottoman Empire in 1912.  As residents of an old 
multi-ethnic empire in which religious distinctions played a larger administrative role 
than ethnic ones, Orthodox Christians in Macedonia had undergone less formal 
socialization under national ideologies than had their counterparts in the neighboring 
nation-states.  Evidence dating from the years immediat ly preceding the First Balkan 
War indicates increasing resentments, felt in common among various groups of local 
Orthodox Christians, against Ottoman governing authorities.  The proclamation of 
constitutional rule by the Young Turks in 1908 engend red widespread local acclaim 
and optimism for the prospect of a reformed Ottoman Empire.  But by 1911-12, such 
optimism was noticeably on the wane.  Political violence became more frequent and 
threatened peaceful inhabitants.  Moreover, violence committed by Muslim 
authorities and irregular bands against Christians had begun to outstrip violence 
between Christian factions, which, as described in the previous chapter, had 
predominated between 1904 and 1908.  Pessimism among local Christians that the 
Ottoman government could or would provide stability, let alone political equality or 




This shared frustration, however, did not translate into a conscious or 
organized movement of pan-Orthodox Christian solidarity.  No figurative “Balkan 
Alliance” developed among Orthodox Christians within Macedonia to complement 
the one struck by Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro to launch the First 
Balkan War against the Ottoman Empire in 1912.  Indeed, the numerical minority of 
Orthodox Christians who had actively participated in the ethnic struggles of the past 
decades (including members of revolutionary groups such as factions of the Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) continued to engage in intrigues and 
occasional violence against each other at least as often as they formed episodic 
coalitions.  Nonetheless, palpable and widespread pssimism among Macedonia’s 
Orthodox Christians of various backgrounds about their future under Ottoman rule 
contributed to their behavior during the First Balkan War in 1912.  At the start, most 
of them genuinely welcomed the arrival of the Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek armies 
in their successful campaign against Ottoman forces and aided the victorious armies 
in important ways.  Some of them were even moved to commit abuses against local 
Muslim civilians, whom they connected with the departing Ottoman rule. 
 
The “Hürriyet” Ottoman Constitution of 1908 and Macedonia 
 In July of 1908, Ottoman garrison towns in the Macedonian provinces, 
including Salonika, Manastır, and Resne, constituted th  nodes of a largely peaceful 
revolution, initially taking the form of an army mutiny, against the autocratic rule of 
the long-reigning Sultan, Abdulhamid II.  Known commonly today as the Young 




professionals, and political exiles informally called “Young Turks”) demanded the 
restoration of the Ottoman constitution first promulgated in 1876 but quickly 
suspended in 1878 by Abdulhamid.  Because of the popularity of the movement 
among the Ottoman officer corps, the Sultan had no means to suppress it.  He agreed 
only days after the start of the revolution to restore the constitution and announced 
elections for a parliament to take place two months later in September.  The days 
immediately following the revolution saw widespread public expressions of euphoria 
from almost all corners of the Ottoman Empire, including Macedonia.  Young Turk 
leaders gave outdoor speeches attended by massive crowds, liberally peppered with 
the rallying cries of liberty (hürriyet in Turkish), equality, justice, and fraternity.  Pro-
Greek, pro-Bulgarian, pro-Serbian, and Macedonian autonomist armed bands came 
out from hiding and descended into the cities, where they mingled freely at 
celebratory banquets with Young Turk leaders who offered them amnesty.  Men – 
even leaders – of different ethnic and religious groups made a point of embracing and 
kissing each other in public.1   
 The longstanding goal of the Young Turk movement, in broad terms, was the 
strengthening of the Ottoman state against both the in ernal and external threats that 
had plagued it for decades.  A key component of the Young Turk ideology was the 
concept of “Ottomanism,” the consolidation of a homogeneous Ottoman identity, 
patriotism, and citizenship that encompassed all of the Empire’s historic millets 
(religious communities).  A successful Ottomanism would counteract the separatist 
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nationalisms that portended the state’s dismemberment.  Young Turk factions 
differed in important ways, however, on the specific ideological content of 
Ottomanism.  To the Liberal Union, a Young Turk party that included a high 
proportion of non-Muslims in its membership, Ottomanism meant equality but also 
significant autonomy within a decentralized polity for the various religious and ethnic 
groups.  All groups would profess loyalty to the Ottoman fatherland as its citizens.   
But the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the Young Turk party that 
initially took power and held it for most of the rest of the Empire’s existence, pursued 
instead an aggressive centralization of the state’s uthority and the cultural 
homogenization of society.  Legal and customary distinctions that had in some ways 
discriminated against non-Muslim religious communities but also provided them a 
large measure of communal autonomy were to be abolished.  On the other hand, the 
CUP leadership wanted Ottomans of Muslim background to remain firmly in control 
of politics, as they fundamentally doubted the loyaty of many non-Muslim citizens.  
Furthermore, much of the leadership by 1908 had come t  believe that for the Empire 
to survive and flourish, the ethnic Turkish element, historically “the dominant 
element in the empire,” must lead and establish the cultural norms for all Ottoman 
citizens.2   
Even though the CUP appeared to sideline some of these specific elements of 
its agenda in the days following the 1908 revolution in favor of vaguer public slogans 
of liberty, equality, and fraternity, its members had already laid out its centralizing 
                                                





and Turkist platforms extensively in exile publicatons.3  The centralizing and Turkist 
elements of CUP ideology were hardly compatible with the aims of Christian activist 
groups in Ottoman Macedonia (pro-Greek, pro-Bulgarian, pro-Serb, or Macedonian 
autonomist).  Even the goals of activists who genuinely disavowed outright 
separatism clashed with the prospect of a culturally Turkish homogenization and 
centralization of the Ottoman Empire.   
Recognition of these contradictions, as well as a preoccupation with their 
respective nationalist goals, underlay the inward skepticism of Greek and Bulgarian 
state and high-ranking church officials involved in Macedonian affairs about the 
Young Turk revolution even as they publically praised it.  According to the Bulgarian 
consul in Serres, the public embraces and kisses between the Greek bishop and the 
head of the Serres region’s Bulgarian Exarchist community occurred at the urging of 
the local Ottoman official, who proclaimed that this act would show the public that 
the new constitutional era spelled the end of enmity be ween Bulgarians and Greeks.4  
But neither the consul, nor, it seems, the Greek or Bulgarian church hierarchs saw the 
situation so idealistically.  Although the Greek metropolitan held an evening 
reception in Serres’s Greek theatre to which he invited Ottoman officials, prominent 
townspeople, and foreign diplomats ostensibly to celebrate the proclamation of 
constitutional rule, he noticeably failed to invite the Bulgarian Exarchist leader whom 
he had kissed and embraced.  The Bulgarian consul nonetheless attended the festivity 
in his capacity as a foreign representative.  He later criticized the Greek consul’s 
speech at the event, which praised the Ottoman armyfor giving “the Greek people 
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their freedom.”  This the Bulgarian consul saw as a snub to those who were neither 
Greek nor Turkish.  When obliged to offer some words himself the consul retorted 
with a speech calculated to impress the Ottoman officials present and show his 
inclusiveness in contrast to the Greek consul: “I spoke most of all about 
‘brotherhood,’ which I emphasized must be the first stage in the path to freedom in a 
country where the population is of several nationalities.”5  But the Bulgarian consul 
ultimately viewed all such speeches in the wake of the Young Turk revolution, 
including his own about “brotherhood,” as so much political posturing.  “The 
theatrical kiss between the [Greek] bishop and the [Bulgarian Exarchate community] 
leader, the unceasing speeches about brotherhood and equality – these are all acts in 
which no one, neither Greek nor Bulgarian, places any value.”6   
But the Bulgarian consul does not appear to have been correct in his cynical 
assumption that “no one” among the Christian population harbored genuine hopes in 
the wake of the Young Turk revolution.  The skepticism present among the Greek and 
Bulgarian consuls and church hierarchs stands in contrast to the optimism with which 
much of the population, and even to some extent members of armed bands, viewed 
the developments.  The candidate from the Serres region who received the most votes 
from the ethnic “Bulgarian” delegates in the 1908 Ottoman parliamentary elections, 
Hristo Dalchev, was indeed too committed to the Young Turks’ vision of Ottomanism 
for the Bulgarian consul’s liking.7  In a private meeting with Dalchev, a lawyer and a 
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Sandanski supporter, the consul emphasized the importance of defending “our 
national culture and national unity” against impending Young Turk policies.  He also 
tried to remind Dalchev of “our national ideal, however distant,” of the union of all 
Bulgarians.  But Dalchev seemed uninterested in these priorities, to the consul’s 
frustration.  He looked poised to be “an extremely weak defender of our national 
cause in the Turkish parliament.”  Instead, the consul lamented, Dalchev “looks like 
he has already become an excellent Ottoman.”8   
Inhabitants’ memoirs commonly emphasized the genuine sense of optimism 
they and even apparently members of armed bands felt upon hearing about the 
declaration of constitutional rule.  “First to our village came the Greek cheta [armed 
band].  They entered the village firing their guns i  celebration.  ‘Freedom has been 
given to Macedonia,’ everyone shouted.  In the square everyone embraced each other 
without regard to nationality,” recalled Kiril Ivanov Shatarov from the village of 
Gorni Poroi near Demir Hisar.9  Dimitûr Ianev Dimitrov, then a member of an armed 
band, remembered feeling the same kind of optimism:  
A new life set in.  All the armed bands [cheti] came down from the mountains….  
The prisoners were let free, bells rang, musical instruments, drums, general 
merriment.  [W]e dressed ourselves in trousers and dedicated ourselves to culture and 
to Democratic Clubs, with an especially strong enthusiasm that our ideals had finally 
been realized.10 
 
It is telling that local inhabitants both at the time and retrospectively referred 
to the 1908 revolution in ways that highlighted its apparent character as a broadly 
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supported movement, indigenous to the Ottoman Empire, fo  liberation of society.  
Personal memoirs recorded in the Bulgarian or Macedonian languages almost always 
label the event and the era it seemed to usher in as hurietût/urietot, using the Turkish 
word for liberty in a form that translates into English as “the liberty.”11  For some 
Christians who heard the Turkish term hürriyet repeatedly proclaimed but did not 
know its precise meaning of liberty, it nonetheless clearly portended an auspicious 
development whose meaning they might fill in according to their own more specific 
aspirations.  Zlata Serafimova recalled that mothers in her village abruptly came in 
from the fields one day and “spoke cheerfully, tomorrow is the Huriet – autonomy.”12  
In any case by embracing the Turkish term, residents implicitly acknowledged a local, 
Ottoman origin to their potential liberation rather than an external liberator such as a 
neighboring Balkan state.  Shortly after the Balkan Wars, orphans in the village of 
Metaxa in southern Macedonia who submitted a letter to the Greek government 
referred simply to the Ottoman period after 1908 as “the Constitution” [to 
Syntagma].13  These terms suggest Christian residents of Ottoman Macedonia initially 
interpreted the events of 1908 as the proclamation of a kind of liberation, or 
autonomy, or constitution, or simply huriet – an indigenous accomplishment of 
Ottoman society.  By contrast, contemporary representatives of the Greek and 
Bulgarian states commonly employed the term “Young Turk” followed by revolution, 
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movement, or coup, when reporting on the event.  Rather than highlight ideals or 
aspirations, this terminology (still standard in English language references as well) 
called attention to the event as the action of a party, the Young Turks, engaged in a 
factional struggle.  
Ordinary residents of Macedonia thus received their first concrete introduction 
to liberal political principles such as liberty, equality, fraternity, and representative 
government while they lived as citizens of the Ottoman state.  Though brief, the 
constitutional period (especially its initial phase) rved as an original historical 
reference point for such principles to people who experienced further oscillations 
between political openness and repression over the course of the twentieth century.  
As a Bulgarian headmaster remembered the elections of 1908, “for the first time in 
Turkey elections occurred for popular [narodni] representatives in the parliament in 
Constantinople [Tsarigrad].  On this occasion there was quite a stir.  Bulgarians for 
the first time took part as voters and as candidates.”14  And, according to tabulations 
of delegates and votes cast received by the Bulgarian consul in Serres, Bulgarian 
delegates voluntarily voted at least to some degree for non-Bulgarian candidates.  
Likewise, instances occurred of Muslims voting voluntarily for non-Muslims, Greeks 
for non-Greeks.15  The consul remarked in amazement about the VMRO leader Jane 
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Sandanski, a candidate whom he considered to be ethnically Bulgarian, that “of the 
fifty votes which he received, more than 30 were given by Turks, 3-4 by Greeks, and 
only 12-15 by Bulgarians.”16  Sandanski had courted this diverse array of votes with 
the avowedly Ottomanist rhetoric he employed in the days following the 
proclamation of constitutional rule.  “Gentlemen! We fought each other for long 
years, but we accomplished nothing.  All of today’s success we owe to the Young 
Turk party.  Long live the Young Turk party!  Long live freedom!” Sandanski 
exclaimed to a crowd at the train station in Serres while en route from Melnik to 
Salonika.17  He also had members of his armed VMRO band distribute leaflets of a 
manifesto in Bulgarian, Turkish, and Greek to scores of villages.  Sandanski’s 
manifesto began by explicitly addressing “all of the nationalities of the empire,” in 
order to proclaim that freedom had arrived and that “our suffering fatherland is 
reborn.”  He then addressed his “Turkish compatriots” and his “Christian 
compatriots” in separate paragraphs, claiming to each that their past perceptions of 
the other group as their enemy had been shown to be false – instead their common 
enemy had been “tyranny” and “absolutism.”  Finally, Sandanski’s leaflets addressed 
his “co-nationals” [sûnarodnitsi], warning them not to “give [them]selves over to the 
criminal agitation which might be waged by the official authorities in Bulgaria 
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against your comradely struggle alongside the Turkish people.”  The Bulgarian consul 
in Serres was especially displeased with this part of the manifesto.18 
Nor was such Ottomanist rhetoric from Sandanski’s group merely intended as 
a public façade.  In a private conversation, the Bulgarian consul of Serres asked a 
militant of the local branch of Sandanski’s organiztion what they thought of the 
recent events.  The militant replied, in keeping with the radical anti-monarchist 
ideology of the left wing of VMRO, that his group saw the recent proclamation of 
constitutional rule as “a step along the struggle, a temporary situation.”  Ultimately 
their goal was the removal of the Sultan, and in Macedonia “popular [narodna] 
autonomy” and a “people’s parliament [arodno sûbranie] only for Macedonia or at 
most for Macedonia plus the vilayet of Adrianople.”  But what the militant – who 
referred to himself and his comrades as Bulgarians – did not indicate in his private 
message to the Bulgarian consul was any ultimate desire to unite with Bulgaria, 
although words to that effect would certainly have pl ased the consul.  His vision was 
a radically reformed and decentralized Ottoman state, perhaps with “another people’s 
parliament for [Turkey’s] Asian populations.”  “We take great pleasure in the fact that 
the struggle which we waged until now for the freedom of Macedonia will bring 
related benefits also for the populations of the other parts of the Turkish state,” he 
explained.  The VMRO militant insisted that his group’s struggle was waged in 
common with the Young Turks of his region, “who aresincere in their activity.”  He 
believed that the Young Turks had the support of “the great part of the local ordinary 
Turkish population, which no less than our Bulgarians is tired of the present 
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regime.”19  The frustrated consul wrote two days later that in his view Sandanski and 
his comrades had replaced the slogan “Macedonia for the Macedonians” with 
“Turkey for the Turks.”20  Sandanski’s partly successful efforts to steer students to 
leave the Bulgarian Exarchate’s pedagogical training academy to study instead at the 
Ottoman Idadie in Salonika only aggravated the consul’s annoyance at Sandanski’s 
commitment to the new Ottoman regime.21 
Other groups of Christian residents of Macedonia, not o ly Sandanski and his 
militant autonomist group, also showed more interest in ecuring the promise of 
stronger local political representation within the Ottoman state.  That now seemed 
more tangible than the uncertain prospect of uniting with a neighboring Balkan 
nation-state.  As discussed above, memoirs published or deposited subsequently in 
the Bulgarian state archives make clear that many residents embraced the 
constitutional regime of 1908 because of the local “autonomy” it seemed to promise 
and the chance to elect local representatives to anOttoman parliament.22  Teachers 
who had worked in schools of the Bulgarian Exarchate (which as an institution had 
close ties with the Bulgarian state) joined Sandanski’s group in demonstrations.  Not 
only did they call for easing the economic burden of peasants; they urged the transfer 
of control of Bulgarian schools from the Exarchate to the Ottoman state, supposedly 
according to the will of the “majority.”  Finally, they openly denounced the activities 
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of “agents of Bulgaria” in Macedonia.23  The Bulgarian “constitutional clubs” 
organized in Macedonia after the 1908 proclamation of the Ottoman constitution did 
not have such adversarial relations with the Bulgarian state.  Yet they also saw in the 
new regime an opportunity for increased local power and political representation 
within the Ottoman system rather than simple reliance on Bulgarian government 
leadership.  In their demonstrations they called not o ly for reforms in taxation that 
would help peasant farmers but for selecting half of the Ottoman civil servants in 
their area from the local majority Bulgarian population.24   
Meanwhile, the proclamation of the Ottoman constitution was driving a 
wedge between the large self-identified ethnic Greek community in the town of 
Serres and representatives and allies of the Greek state.  Wealthy Greek merchants 
went to Ottoman authorities to denounce the activities of the local Greek consulate 
and its ally, the Greek Orthodox metropolitan.  The m rchants reported that both 
before and after June 1908 these individuals had been responsible for organizing all 
of the terror and propaganda coming from the Greek side.  (In this they were largely 
correct.)  The Greeks in Serres lodged similar complaints about such destabilizing 
activity directly to Athens and to the Greek legation n Constantinople, calling for the 
replacement of the Greek consul.25   
Also, a vaguely socialist People’s Federative Party was formed with 
Sandanski’s backing and featured “Greek” and “Bulgarian” sections, each 
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proclaiming their alliance with the new Young Turk government.  The Greek section 
allied itself explicitly against the activities of the Greek consuls.  One of its members 
in Serres even apparently assassinated the Greek consulate’s dragoman, but according 
to the Bulgarian consul was dubiously acquitted of the murder by the Ottoman court.  
The Federativists hoped for a large measure of autonomy for the several nationalities 
within an Ottoman state, an outcome they saw as posible under the new 
constitutional regime.  The clear hostility of the Greek section of the People’s 
Federative Party to the activities of Greek consulates did not endear the People’s 
Federative Party to the Bulgarian consul of Serres, d pite his own rivalry with the 
Greek consuls.  The problem for him was the Federativists’ apparent commitment to 
the vision of a reformed Ottoman state.  The Bulgarian consul derided the 
Federativists’ platform as “some kind of Ottoman utopia” and believed it would only 
serve “to frustrate the process of national self-determination” in Macedonia, a process 
that he believed would redound to Bulgaria’s benefit.26  These preferences shown 
after July 1908 by politically active Christians in the Serres region of Macedonia for 
the prospect of greater autonomy within the Empire ov r integration with either the 
Bulgarian or Greek states coincide with James Frusetta’  findings in the Pirin region 
of Macedonia.27  Here however they apply to the Greek as well as the Bulgarian or 
Slav Macedonian-oriented population studied by Frusetta. 
But such desires for autonomy and stronger local political power would 
eventually come into conflict with the increasingly apparent ambition of the ruling 
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Committee of Union and Progress after 1908 to centralize Ottoman imperial authority 
and to consolidate standardized Ottoman institutions throughout the provinces of the 
Empire.  The central government in Constantinople had already made concerted 
efforts to increase the state’s reach during the nin teenth century Tanzimat reforms 
and subsequently Abdulhamid II’s “legitimation policies” and attempted “fine-
tuning” of the Empire’s subjects’ behavior.28  But the CUP’s activities after 1908 
represented a significant escalation within the Ottoman state of what Charles Maier 
has identified as a global trend of deepening “territoriality” that took place from the 
late nineteenth through the late twentieth century.29  For example, Young Turk 
officials declared their intention (in fact at least  goal of Tanzimat reformers since 
the mid-nineteenth century) to institute the regular conscription of Macedonia’s 
Christians.  Conscription would in part serve the goal of integrating young men of 
Christian background fully within a key Ottoman state institution, the military.  
Rather than be concentrated in homogeneous local units, the Christian conscripts 
from Macedonia would be spread out among units stationed throughout Asia Minor 
and the Arab provinces of the Empire.30  A group of Bulgarian and Greek Orthodox 
Christians in Serres were alarmed when a Muslim member of the local CUP branch 
informed them that by the end of September 1908 all of the Christian schools in the 
town above the elementary level would be closed.  In the nearby town of Drama, 
authorities had already assembled a committee to collect contributions toward the 
                                                
28 The terms are coined by Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the 
Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909 (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1998), 2, 
10. 
29 Charles Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the 
Modern Era,” The American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (June 2000): 807-831. 
30 TsDA, Fond 332k opis 1 a.e. 25, 102-114 (Bulgarian Co sul in Serres, Semenov, to Bulgarian 




building of a new “Ottoman” middle school to replace existing Christian secondary 
schools.31  But when local Greeks attempted to protest the reopening later that year of 
the Bulgarian school in the town, they were dismayed at being forbidden to hold up 
banners in Greek.  The authorities only permitted them to hold up protest banners in 
the Turkish language.32   
The CUP’s pressure for Turkification of Ottoman political culture once in 
power could even affect Muslims in Macedonia.  In 1912, an Albanian-Muslim halva 
(type of dessert) monger in the town of Radovish in Vardar Macedonia, Ali Chaush, 
objected when policemen roughed up some Bulgarian customers inside his store.  If 
the police must behave with such “arbitrariness,” Chaush chided, they should do so 
outside his store.  At that, the policemen let the Bulgarians go, and detained Chaush at 
the police station.  There Chaush was brutally beaten, under the accusation that he 
“and all Albanians from Skopje northwards” (Chaush originally hailed from Prizren 
in Kosovo) were traitors and infidels “in brotherhood” with the Bulgarians.  Chaush’s 
protests to the contrary were in vain and he was beten some more.33  
In the initial months of its rule, the CUP did not c mmonly feel the need to 
use such force to compel the population’s observance of Turkish cultural norms.  
Indeed, its efforts – as with those of Tanzimat reformers and Abdulhamid II before 
them – were successful in inducing the cooperation of a good portion of Ottoman 
Christians, who believed they could further their own local goals by working with the 
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CUP.34  Already mentioned were the efforts of Sandanski and his followers to steer 
Christian students away from the Bulgarian pedagogical school to the Ottoman Idadie 
as well as their dismissive attitudes toward the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Bulgarian 
state, which exasperated at least one of Bulgaria’s con uls.  And as the Committee of 
Union and Progress formed commissions to establish “Ottoman” schools that 
threatened to replace the “Greek” and “Bulgarian” schools, local Greeks and 
Bulgarians could be found to sit on those commissions.35  Even in the Bulgarian 
schools in Macedonia, the policy of requiring Turkish language instruction in all 
schools, originally introduced by Abdulhamid II, had produced partly unintended 
results.  Ethnic Bulgarians who had been trained as Turkish language teachers gave 
speeches after the 1908 revolution extolling the Ottoman fatherland, the Ottoman 
people, and the historic Bulgarian-Turkish common struggle for freedom (and 
implicitly against Abdulhamid’s autocracy).36   
Nevertheless, the Committee of Union and Progress leadership viewed its 
initiatives to expand the reach of the central state and to integrate citizenship around 
Turkish culture as bound up with the process of the s ate’s modernization and even 
civilization, not simply as elements of a Turkish nationalist project.  The same can be 
said for the objectives of the neighboring Balkan governments of Bulgaria and Greece 
in sponsoring rival national educational institutions in Ottoman Macedonia.  It was 
important for each side to demonstrate to the outside world its status, also honestly 
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believed, as the legitimate bearer of modern order and civilization.  This competitive 
dynamic came into clear view at elaborately staged school celebrations.  Western 
consuls attended respective celebrations marking the end of the 1907-1908 school 
year at the Greek and Bulgarian pedagogical academies in Serres.  The Bulgarian 
consul reported triumphantly how impressed the British and French representatives 
were with the Bulgarian celebrations, which featured a student choir and orchestra, as 
compared with the Greek ones.  “They expressed great wonder at how the Greeks – 
generally considered by everyone to be the more highly developed nation – do not 
have an orchestra, something that the Bulgarians have already succeeded in 
organizing.”37  The British and French representatives were likely especially 
impressed with the orchestra’s repertoire, which included not only Bulgarian folk 
music and an Ottoman military march, but several selections from Western classical 
music and opera.38 
 
The Resumption of Violence, Increasingly Muslim versus Christian 
A lull in the violence committed by paramilitary bands and by Ottoman 
authorities accompanied the broad optimism following the declaration of the 
constitutional regime in the summer of 1908.  But this promising period did not last 
long.  Residents of some villages, who believed the new constitutional regime would 
protect their freedom to choose their church affilition, began to declare their 
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intention to switch from the Patriarchate to the Exarchate.  This prompted pro-Greek 
armed bands to threaten villagers.  When they complained to Ottoman authorities, the 
villagers were counseled that they should not change their existing religious 
affiliation before the matter was discussed in general in the newly convened 
parliament.39  Armed bands – pro-Greek as well as those connected to Sandanski – 
generally resumed their activity, extorting villagers and occasionally committing 
murders.40 
But whereas political violence in Ottoman Macedonia after the 1903 uprising 
was dominated by rivalries between different groups of Christian background, 
violence between groups of Muslim background and groups of Christian background 
(state-sanctioned and irregular) became more prominent after 1908 than Christian-on-
Christian violence.  The failed attempt by opponents of the Committee of Union and 
Progress to overthrow the newly established regime in the spring of 1909 marked the 
turning point.  Proponents of the attempted coup, a newly formed group known as the 
Society of Muhammad, opposed among other things the ecular orientation of the 
Committee of Union and Progress leadership.  They feared that the CUP’s promise of 
equality to all religious groups would undermine thposition of Muslims in the 
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Ottoman state.41  This attitude translated into a series of threats and attacks on 
Christian residents of Macedonia by supporters of the coup.  In one incident, Muslim 
landowners sent a group of Muslim paramilitaries into the vicinity of the village of 
Mustratli near the town of Drama “whose mission was to kill all the opponents of 
Islam – Young Turks and Christian revolutionaries,” according to a report received 
by the nearby Bulgarian consul.42  When the Bulgarian consul along with his British 
counterpart decided to investigate the causes of the Muslim-initiated attacks on 
Bulgarian and Greek Orthodox Christians in their area, they learned about the recent 
formation of the Society of Muhammad.  The Bulgarian consul understood the 
Society as a “movement of reaction” whose intention was “to act against the long 
term survival of the constitutional regime.”  He and the British consul concluded that 
this movement was connected to the recent attacks.43  During the height of the coup 
attempt, the Bulgarian consul (who generally sympathized with Bulgarian but not 
Greek Christians) reported that “[t]he Christian population, without distinction, is 
afraid.”  He added, “[t]his evening the fear is inte sifying, because the town [Serres] 
is full of armed-to-the-teeth bashi-bazuks, who are out of control in the streets and the 
cafés.”44   
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Although supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress quickly 
defeated the coup attempt and sent Sultan Abdulhamid II into exile, violence between 
Christians in Macedonia and Muslims, including Ottoman authorities, continued to 
increase.  Militant Christian groups who had supported the revolution of July 1908 
were at best ambivalent about the increasingly prominent policy of centralization and 
cultural homogenization pushed by the Committee of Union and Progress leadership.  
The latter in turn had always harbored skepticism about the ultimate commitment of 
the Empire’s Christian population to their particular vision of Ottoman regeneration.45  
As early as November 1908, Young Turk authorities distributed arms to residents of 
predominantly Muslim villages in Macedonia following Bulgaria’s outright 
declaration of independence from the Empire, fearing that ethnic Bulgarians in 
Macedonia might act as a fifth column if war were to break out with Bulgaria.46  In 
the aftermath of the Society of Muhammad’s coup attempt, ethnic Greeks now came 
under suspicion by Committee of Union and Progress l aders.  They had apparently 
stood aside rather than join with the CUP-led army that defeated the coup.47  This 
tension, along with continuing turmoil in Ottoman Crete after ethnic Greek politicians 
there prematurely declared union with Greece, fed what the Bulgarian consul of 
Serres observed to be a clandestine arms race in eastern Macedonia and Western 
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Thrace.  Ottoman authorities distributed arms to local Muslims to face off against 
ethnic Greeks, who were receiving arms smuggled from Greece.48 
In 1911 and 1912, a new pattern emerged.  Christian m litants, though without 
much popular backing, committed high-profile crimes, successfully calculating that 
they would induce Ottoman authorities and Muslims to respond with large-scale and 
indiscriminate repression of Christians.  Ultimately, the goal was to destabilize the 
Ottoman government or to invite foreign interventio.  In October 1911, retired 
members of the Ottoman gendarmerie called for an exemplary massacre of 
Bulgarians in the village of Novo-selo, just outside the town of Shtip in northwestern 
Macedonia, because Bulgarians had unpatriotically ignored appeals to volunteer for 
the Ottoman army to fight in the Italo-Ottoman war that had just commenced.  The 
Ottoman governor of Shtip took energetic measures to protect the Bulgarian 
population, forestall the massacre, and arrest the plot leaders among the gendarmerie.  
Yet only days later, someone that the Bulgarian consul i  Skopje believed to be a 
member of the “Macedonian revolutionary organization” infiltrated the very same 
Ottoman governor’s residence in Shtip and planted a bomb there.  Although the bomb 
detonated too late to kill the governor, the Bulgarian consul concluded that the 
incident would only serve to increase the “fanaticism” of Ottoman authorities and 
local Muslims. 49  That a Christian militant had targeted this particular Ottoman 
governor – one who had acted conscientiously to protect the local Christian 
population – suggested that the attacker was trying to stir up an anti-Christian 
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reaction among Muslims and thus inflame the political situation.  Another potential 
terrorist act was averted in February 1912 when a dyn mite bomb being assembled in 
the house of a pro-Greek armed band member in the town of Kastoria exploded 
prematurely.50 
Ottoman authorities, sometimes joined by local Muslim , became increasingly 
indiscriminate in targeting Christian residents in the face of the provocations.  In 
1911-12 dynamite bombings orchestrated by the Bulgaria-based Central Committee 
of VMRO in two towns in northwestern Macedonia prompted large-scale massacres 
in reprisal.  In Shtip in December, 1911, a bomb exploded in a mosque and wounded 
several people.  Ottoman Muslims, led by soldiers and gendarmes, killed dozens of 
Christians and wounded over 150 in response.  On August 1, 1912, two bombs 
exploded within ten minutes of each other in two different parts of Kochani, killing at 
least three and wounding around a dozen.  Immediately ft r the evidently 
coordinated bombings, Ottoman soldiers, policemen, and paramilitary forces attacked 
Christian neighborhoods of Kochani, killing over 150 residents and wounding 
hundreds more.51  
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Such conditions, especially the increasing violence between Muslims led by 
Ottoman authorities and Christians, resulted in a general change from a mood of 
optimism in the months following the declaration of c nstitutional rule in 1908 to one 
of pessimism by 1912 among all sections of the Christian population of Ottoman 
Macedonia with regard to their future under Ottoman or Muslim rule.  Typical of an 
ordinary Christian villager’s perspective was Zlata Serafimova’s summation: “The 
period of freedom after the huriet was very short.  Again the Turks began to commit 
mischief, to oppress the Bulgarians.”52  Also indicative of this shift in sentiment was 
the general refusal mentioned earlier of Christians to volunteer for the Ottoman army 
at the start of the Italian-Ottoman conflict in 191.  Less than three years before in 
1909, Christians in significant numbers had joined or supported the so-called Action 
Army that marched from Macedonia to Constantinople.  In the name of protecting the 
Ottoman Constitution, this mixed force had defeated th  coup attempt by the Society 
of Muhammad.53 
Although, as we shall see, Christian political activis s in Macedonia remained 
sharply divided because of ethnic and other kinds of factional rivalries, they had 
generally begun to see themselves by the eve of the Balkan Wars as common targets 
of the Young Turk regime.  Instances of cooperation and acts of solidarity 
consequently increased, although they remained occasional.  In 1910, the majority of 
ethnic Bulgarian or Macedonian and ethnic Greek deputi s (as well as a slight 
majority of ethnic Arabs) in the Ottoman parliament vo ed as a bloc against the ruling 
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Committee of Union and Progress.54  In October 1911, the Greek metropolitan of 
Salonika met personally with the Bulgarian consul there, Atanas Shopov, to discuss 
the recent murder of Greek Metropolitan Emilianos of the town of Grevena in 
southwestern Macedonia.  Shopov’s summary of the meeting indicated his revulsion 
at the “heinous murder,” as well as his implicit agreement with the Greek 
metropolitan’s assessment that the murder had been th  work of “the local [Ottoman] 
authorities.”55  The very fact that a high-ranking Greek Orthodox Church official and 
a Bulgarian consul would have met privately to discuss such an event, let alone 
reinforced by the Bulgarian consul’s sympathetic attitude in his private government 
correspondence, would before then have been uncharacteristic of relations between 
such highly placed officials on opposite sides of the Greco-Bulgarian nationalist 
struggle.  The two figures were now drawn together by the perception that they faced 
a common foe, the aggressive officials of the newly constituted Ottoman regime.  
Members of formerly rival pro-Greek, pro-Bulgarian, d Macedonian autonomist 
paramilitary groups even began to cooperate in some attacks and bombings against 
Ottoman targets. 56  In the past, by contrast, they would have sooner cooperated 
opportunistically with Ottoman authorities in order to undermine the rival Christian 
movement. 
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Nonetheless, instances of cooperation between formerly rival Christian 
militant groups remained sporadic during the period immediately preceding the 
Balkan Wars.  They reflected the awareness of a growing common pessimism among 
Orthodox Christians in Ottoman Macedonia about the prospects for Christians of any 
ethnic or political background under Ottoman or Muslim rule after the initial euphoria 
of the Young Turk revolution had dissipated.  But this sentiment did not translate into 
any kind of united movement or group identity among Christians across Ottoman 
Macedonia.  Instead, divisions among Christians peristed in some cases right up to 
the eve of the Balkan Wars.  On August 25, 1912, just over a month before Bulgaria 
and Serbia began fighting as allies in the first Balkan War, the Metropolitan of 
Debûr-Kichevo of the Bulgarian Exarchate reported to the Bulgarian consulate in 
Bitolia in northwestern Ottoman Macedonia: 
At the start of this month the Serb armed bands under the chieftainship of Arso and 
Mihail threatened the villagers in the village of Dupiani in order that they become 
serbomans.  The Bulgarians in the village in question decided not to complain to the 
authorities out of fear that the armed bands would p nish them.  At 2 this afternoon 
the serboman priest Velko in the village of Iagol and his bodyguard Kamber forcibly 
coerced the Bulgarian exarchist Hristov, from that village, to declare himself as a 
serboman.57 
 
According to Georgios Modis, a pro-Greek activist in Macedonia during the early 
twentieth century, the declaration of a Balkan Alliance bringing Bulgaria and Greece 
together in October 1912 even provided the occasion for pro-Bulgarian paramilitaries 
to settle scores with their Greek counterparts: 
Much was said then about a regular Greco-Bulgarian alliance.  It was only natural for 
the komitatzides and the andartes to stop the war of extermination between them. 
They made “reconciliation”.  One day, however, a few days before the war of 1912, 
where Lazos Dougiamas and Athanasios Betsios of Karpi were going together, 
carefree and in brotherhood with the voivod Giouptse and other komitatzides to 
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Karpi, a murderous barrage of fire from the good comrades and fellow travelers cut 
them down.  The Bulgarians did not easily forget thir old craftiness. 58 
 
This account of course reflects the point of view of a Greek patriot who wanted to 
highlight what he saw as the incorrigible “craftiness” of the Bulgarians, but it paints 
an accurate picture of the tenuous nature of the newly announced Balkan alliance as it 
related to seasoned militants who had long fought for rival national causes. 
All the same, divisions within national camps continued to be even more 
prominent sources of disunity than those between th national camps.  Bulgarian 
consuls in Serres, Salonika, and Bitolia spent more tim  reporting on violence and 
intrigue between rival groups they considered to be Bulgarian than on tensions 
between pro-Bulgarian and pro-Greek activists.  Jane Sandanski’s leftist and anti-
clerical organization frequently clashed with representatives of the Bulgarian 
Orthodox Exarchate, with more centrist members of the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization who were more inclined to work with Bulgaria, and with 
remnants of the Supreme Committee.  The Bulgarian consul of Serres decried this 
“daily more terrible and more internecine strife” when reporting on the murder of a 
Bulgarian merchant, Mita Pliakov by a rival Bulgarian faction: “The Greeks did not 
succeed in killing him.  For the time had come for his own national brethren to kill 
him, those who most of all should have praised him for his beautiful and brave 
initiative of establishing Bulgarian commerce in Demir Hisar.”59  The same consul 
remarked on the “treachery” of a Greek armed band for murdering a Greek priest.60  
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When the Greek and Bulgarian sections of the People’s Federative Party were formed 
to contest elections on a platform of decentralized government within the Ottoman 
Empire, each section focused its strongest efforts on undermining political rivals of 
its own respective ethnic background.  The rivalries sulted in more instances of 
intra-Bulgarian and intra-Greek violence, such as when Greek Federativists 
assassinated the dragoman of the Greek consulate in D cember 1909.61   
Thus, the retrospective assessment of Konstantinos Ts pros, a law student in 
Salonika during the Young Turk era, that the Young Turks’ supposed aim “to thwart 
the autonomy of Macedonia actually accelerated the understanding among the 
Christian minorities, expressed … eventually by the alliance between Greece, Serbia, 
Bulgaria, and Montenegro,” seems an exaggeration.62  The constitutional regime 
brought by the Young Turks did not produce a unified movement or political identity 
among Ottoman Christians, even of those of purportedly the same ethnic background.  
But Tsopros was right that Christians felt increasingly dissatisfied with their position 
as non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire.  By 1912 they w re receptive to the notion 
that the neighboring Balkan states who declared war on the Ottoman Empire in the 
name of liberating the inhabitants of Macedonia from Ottoman tyranny might indeed 
offer them better political rights and more basic se urity.  The first government to 
make such explicit promises of ending tyranny to inhabitants of Macedonia was the 
Ottoman constitutional movement that took power in 1908.  These aspirations had led 
Christian inhabitants of Macedonia initially to show a genuine eagerness to embrace 
                                                
61 TsDA, Fond 332k opis 1 a.e. 24, 204 (Bulgarian Consul in Serres, Semenov, to Bulgarian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Religion, Dec. 21, 1909). 
62 Konstantinos Th. Tsopros, Anamniseis (Meleniko – Thessaloniki) (Thessaloniki: Idrima Meleton 




that new Ottoman leadership and even to distance themselves from the ambitions of 
neighboring Balkan governments.  The same aspirations, more than ethnic 
nationalism, were behind Christian inhabitants’ subsequent disillusionment with the 
Ottoman constitutional regime.  They turned for relief to the Balkan military alliance 
of 1912. 
 
The First Balkan War in Ottoman Macedonia 
 The national designs of the Balkan states of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia on 
Macedonia since the late nineteenth century generally faced two contradictory 
obstacles: Ottoman rule and each other.  For much of the period shown above, the 
three nation-states spent more energy in working to prevent their rivals from gaining 
the advantage in Macedonia than in directly opposing Ottoman rule over the territory.  
From 1908 onwards, this pattern began to change.  A series of international 
developments encouraged the independent Balkan states to ry to put aside their 
differences and finally form an alliance against the Ottoman Empire by the autumn of 
1912.  A brief review of this more familiar sequenc of international events follows 
before turning to their local impact. 
Serbia was initially motivated by Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in October 1908.  Although occupied and dministered by the Habsburg 
Monarchy since 1878, as noted in Chapter 1, Bosnia had until 1908 remained under 
nominal Ottoman sovereignty.  Neither the Ottoman nor Russian governments felt 
themselves to be in a position to be able to oppose the annexation with anything 




Bosnia-Herzegovina, with its ethnic Serb plurality, had long constituted the central 
goal of Serbian ambitions.  Austria-Hungary’s annexation dealt a severe setback to 
Serbian nationalist objectives.  The annexation also revealed Serbia’s apparent 
powerlessness and pushed the Serbian government to make serious efforts to seek an 
alliance with its neighbor Bulgaria against Austria-Hungary.63  Greece experienced a 
similar setback when its halting attempt after the 1908 Ottoman constitutional 
revolution to unify Ottoman Crete with Greece backfired.  The newly assertive 
Ottoman government revoked the autonomy that it had been forced by the Great 
Powers to grant the island in 1898.  This also promted Greece to try to seek support 
from its Balkan neighbors to the north.64   
Neither did new Ottoman vulnerabilities escape notice in Serbia, Bulgaria, 
Greece or Montenegro.  Ethnic Albanians in the westernmost Ottoman Balkan 
territories began an insurrection in 1910.  The insurgents were reacting against the 
aggressive centralization and tax policies of the Young Turk government in 
Constantinople.  They were also concerned about the perceived ineffectiveness of 
Ottoman authorities in protecting territories they lived in from the threat of 
irredentism from the surrounding Balkan states.65  Ottoman forces had difficulty 
suppressing the uprising.  Ironically with some Serbian assistance, it only intensified 
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throughout 1911 and was still not completely stamped out by the eve of the first 
Balkan War in 1912.  Not only did Balkan governments take note of the trouble the 
uprising was creating for Ottoman armed forces, which were now more vulnerable to 
any attack from outside.  The Serbian, Greek, Montenegrin, and Bulgarian 
governments also worried about the implications of a possible Albanian national 
movement for their own ambitions in the territories affected, including the Ottoman-
ruled areas of Kosovo, Shkoder, Manastir, and Epirus.66   
Reinforcing the military vulnerability of the Ottomans was the Italian invasion 
of Tripolitania (Libya) in September 1911.  The Empire was forced to divert 
significant numbers of troops away from its Balkan territories in its ultimately losing 
effort to retain Tripolitania.67  Balkan state leaders, starting with Serbia and Bulgaria, 
saw the opportunity to take advantage of this set of Ottoman weaknesses.  In October, 
1911, Prime Ministers Milan Milovanović of Serbia and Ivan Evstratiev Geshov of 
Bulgaria began negotiating an alliance directed against the Ottoman Empire, which 
they finally signed on March 7, 1912.  The agreement s cretly recognized Bulgaria’s 
claim to Ottoman Thrace and Serbia’s claim to Kosov and northern regions of 
present-day Albania.  Milovanović and Geshov did not fully settle their conflicting 
claims over Ottoman Macedonia, but their agreement appeared to make significant 
progress towards such a settlement.  In particular, in the event that an autonomous 
status for Macedonia could not be obtained, the two countries would partition the 
territory between them.  Bulgaria would acquire the southern and eastern parts of 
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Macedonia, including the important towns of Ohrid, Bitola, Prilep, Gevgeli, Veles, 
and Shtip.  In the event that Bulgaria and Serbia could not reach an agreement for the 
partitioning of the remaining north western part of Macedonia, they would agree to 
accept the mediation of the Russian Tsar.68  Bulgaria had also begun separate 
negotiations with Greece in the autumn of 1911.  In May 1912 Bulgaria and Greece 
signed an alliance treaty directed against the Ottoman Empire that, however, said 
nothing specific about how Macedonian territory might be apportioned.  Greece’s 
agreement with Serbia did not come until the late summer of 1912, and remained in 
oral rather than written form.  The ambiguous agreem nt between Serbia and 
Bulgaria regarding the future status of Macedonian territory, as well as the absence of 
any formal agreement between Greece and Bulgaria and between Greece and Serbia 
on the same issue, would prove to have an extremely destabilizing effect on the 
alliance almost from its inception.69 
 Montenegro’s agreements with Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece were the latest 
and generally least detailed of all.  But it was Montenegro, whose proud King Nikola 
hoped to outdo Serbia’s King Peter as leader of the pan-Serb national movement, 
which initiated hostilities against the Ottoman Empire on October 8, 1912.70  The 
Balkan Allies then lodged an ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire demanding 
acceptance of autonomy for the Empire’s European provinces.  The Porte ignored the 
ultimatum itself but, in desperation and in vain, anounced the intention to make 
                                                
68 Hall, Balkan Wars 1912-1913, 11; Stojanov, Makedonija vo vremeto, 31-36. 
69 Hall, Balkan Wars 1912-1913, 12-13; Helmreich, Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 36-89 still stands 
as the most detailed exposition of the development of the agreements between the Balkan states. 




reforms in Macedonia.  Bulgarian and Greek troops cro sed the Ottoman frontiers on 
October 18, Serbian troops on October 19.71   
The territorial disposition of each country’s military would largely dictate the 
victorious path of the military forces of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro 
during the First Balkan War.  Because Bulgaria was the easternmost of the Balkan 
Allies and because her army was the largest, her task w s mainly to invade and 
occupy Ottoman Thrace en route to Constantinople and thus hold off the expected 
effort by the Ottomans to reinforce their troops in the Empire’s European provinces 
by land from Asia Minor.  This military logic, reinforced by King Ferdinand of 
Bulgaria’s ambition to march into the historic imperial capital of Constantinople, 
meant that the main part of Bulgaria’s army would not be used to occupy what was 
perhaps Bulgaria’s most important national objective: Macedonia.  Only one 
Bulgarian division moved southwards into eastern Macedonia and towards Salonika.  
Located to the west, Serbia’s main military mission was to move south into the heart 
of Macedonia.  In the process, its forces occupied all of the area designated as a 
“disputed” zone in the secret Serbian-Bulgarian agreement as well as some of the area 
that had been designated outright as future Bulgarian territory.  Greece’s 
comparatively small army would push northwards intoO toman Epirus, Thessaly, and 
southern Macedonia.  But her main strategic mission was to use her navy to block the 
Ottomans from reinforcing their positions in Macedonia and Thrace by sea from 
Anatolia.  This combination of Greek naval and Bulgarian land forces would cut off 
the Ottoman troops located in the Empire’s European t rritories from supplies and 
                                                




reinforcements, leaving them outnumbered there by the combination of troops from 
the Balkan Alliance.72 
Accompanying the invading armies of the Balkan nation-states were high-
minded declarations from the leaders of those states proclaiming their common 
mission to liberate the Christians from longstanding Ottoman misrule.  “Our holy 
obligations to our dear country, to our enslaved brothers, and to humanity compel the 
State, after its failure of peaceful attempts to obtain and secure the human rights of 
Christians under the Turkish yoke, to bring about through force of arms an end to the 
misery they have suffered for so many centuries.  Greece, fully armed along with her 
allies who are inspired by the same feelings and conected by common obligations, 
undertakes the sacred struggle of justice and freedom for the oppressed peoples of the 
East,” proclaimed King George I of Greece upon Greece’s declaration of war in a 
statement accompanied by the signatures of Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and 
members of the Greek cabinet.73  King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, in a statement endorsed 
by Bulgaria’s prime minister and cabinet, similarly announced that “war for the 
human rights of the Christians in Turkey has been declared,” and that “[s]ide by side 
with us the armies of Bulgaria’s allies, the Balkan countries, will fight against the 
common enemy for the same purpose …. And in this struggle of the Cross against the 
Crescent, of freedom against tyranny, we will have the sympathy of all those who 
love justice and progress.”74  Much of this language, especially the references to 
freedom, justice, and liberation from tyranny, ironcally echoed the promises of the 
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Young Turks four years before.  The Balkan states now turned those slogans against 
the Ottoman constitutional regime, but combined them, as seen in the examples 
above, with the rhetoric of a crusade on behalf of fellow-Christians living under 
Muslim rule. 
Having endured renewed insecurity with seemingly no e d in sight after the 
initial promise of 1908, the Orthodox Christian population of Ottoman Macedonia 
now generally looked towards the invading majority Orthodox Christian neighboring 
countries with hope and anticipation.  Yet naturally the local Christian population 
also feared the consequences of war.  Biliukbashiev, th  headmaster in Demir Hisar, 
recalled “eagerly awaiting” the invasion when he heard rumors about its imminence a 
few days before the war started.  But after the war commenced, Biliukbashiev noticed 
a range of feelings amid the “great commotion” in his town: “[t]he news was greeted 
by one with joy, by another with terror – and a third a mixture of the one and the 
other.”  In Demir Hisar, nonetheless, Christian resid nts heeded warnings from 
Ottoman authorities not to invite suspicion of aiding the invaders, and thus “did not 
dare to go outside the town” where they might have act d as guides to the allied 
Balkan armies. 75  Such was probably the behavior of the majority of civilians, both 
Christian and Muslim, who, whatever their opinion of the war, would have wanted to 
steer clear of danger. 
Yet a significant number of Macedonia’s Christian residents did prove willing 
to aid the invading armies that were ostensibly fighting on their behalf.  Internal 
Bulgarian military reports from the campaign reveal th t ordinary civilians sometimes 
joined the fight and more often acted as scouts.  Residents gathered vital intelligence 
                                                




on the whereabouts of Ottoman forces, intelligence that frequently influenced the 
Bulgarian army’s operational decisions.  Typical was the report of a commander of a 
detachment of the 3rd Brigade of Bulgaria’s 7th Division advancing south into 
Macedonia: “By report of the inhabitants of the village Sushitsa, enemy forces are no 
longer in the village Krupnik; remaining is a small part of the Turkish population who 
are shooting from the houses and it is not possible to enter the village.”  A 
commander from a different detachment of the same brigade reported on the same 
day, “the inhabitants said that the enemy has halted t Kriva Livada.  Yesterday the 
enemy attempted to take Zheliaznichki Hill, but was repulsed by local militia.”76  The 
next day the same brigade’s 50th regiment registered an equally integral level of 
involvement of local Christian residents: 
The Commander of the 50th regiment … reports that, according to reports collected 
from local residents, the enemy has retreated towards K esna.  For this reason, he 
decided to advance forward and to occupy the heights around the village Oranovo, 
where the regiment is located at this moment.  From the same population, which 
participated actively with the armed band [cheta] of Tane Nikolov in the engagement 
with the Turks on the 6th of this month [19th according to the new calendar], reports 
were received that all Turkish units have retreated to the Kresna Gorge.77 
 
 Young Christian men who hailed originally from Ottoman Macedonia also 
volunteered in large numbers to participate on a more formal level in the military 
campaigns organized by the Balkan states.  The vast m jority of these young men 
were living as émigrés in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, and even in Western Europe 
or North America before the start of the Balkan Wars.  Bulgaria hosted the largest 
community of Macedonian émigrés, who exercised a significant influence on 
Bulgaria’s politics and some of whom even held top p sitions in the Bulgarian 
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military by 1912.  By far the largest contingent of v lunteers from Macedonia, 
consequently, was organized in Bulgaria.  The day after the start of Bulgaria’s general 
mobilization (September 18, 1912), Bulgarian army chief of staff Major-General Ivan 
Fichev formally ordered Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandûr Protogerov and Lieutenant 
Colonel Petûr Dûrvingov to recruit émigrés who had in the past taken part in armed 
band activity into new “partisan detachments” (partizanski otriadi).  The mission of 
the partisan detachments would be to proceed in small clandestine groups ahead of 
the regular army to collect intelligence and disrupt communications behind Ottoman 
lines.78  Protogerov and Dûrvingov both hailed from Macedonia themselves and had 
been leading members at different times of the Supreme Committee and the Central 
Committee of VMRO, based in Bulgaria.  According to Dûrvingov, over 2,000 men 
were included in these partisan units by the start of the war.79   
Other émigrés from Macedonia in Bulgaria, who had not yet been included in 
the regular Bulgarian army, meanwhile clamored to volunteer and organized large 
meetings in Sofia and other locations.  To channel their enthusiasm, Fichev 
authorized the creation of the Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Volunteer Corps on 
September 23.  In its command he placed General Nikola Genev, a non-Macedonian 
Bulgarian.  Protogerov became assistant commander a Dûrvingov chief of staff of 
the corps.80  Unlike the irregular partisan detachments, the Volunteer Corps 
constituted an extension of Bulgaria’s regular army structure, with three brigades led 
by Bulgarian army officers.  Upwards of 14,000 volunteers, mostly resident in 
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Bulgaria but also coming from as far as Western Europe and North America, joined 
the corps.  Over 10,000 of these volunteers had roots in Macedonia. 81  Tellingly, 
recent research into the social profile of the membrship of the Macedonian-
Adrianopolitan Volunteer Corps conforms to the pattern observed for the membership 
of armed bands operating in Ottoman Macedonia before 1912 described in Chapter 1.  
In other words, urban and educated men were disproporti nately represented among 
the militants.  Among those members of the Volunteer Corps for whom information 
about their vocation is available (9,091), fewer than 30 percent were peasant farmers 
or stockbreeders, rural occupations that engaged the large majority of Ottoman 
Macedonia’s Christian population.  The majority of the volunteers were craftsmen, 
merchants, entrepreneurs, teachers, intellectuals, and urban laborers.  Among those 
for whom educational background is known, 77 percent had at least some formal 
education.82  Despite the vast majority of its membership’s ancestry in Macedonia 
rather than in Adrianopolitan Thrace, the Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Volunteer 
Corps was sent to operate with the bulk of the Bulgarian army in the Thracian 
campaign instead of in Macedonia.  As will be seen in Chapter 3, the corps’ 
deployment away from the Macedonian theater, along with the later revelation that 
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Bulgaria and its ally Serbia in their pre-war negotiations had only paid lip service to 
the notion of Macedonian autonomy in favor of partition of the territory, eventually 
became the cause of bitterness among many of the corps’ members.  They would 
begin to desert in large numbers the following spring. 
Macedonian emigrants in Serbia and Greece also volunteered to serve in the 
war efforts of their respective host countries.  But the specially created units were 
considerably smaller than Bulgaria’s Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Volunteer Corps, 
most likely because of the much smaller overall size of the respective émigré 
communities.  Hundreds of men with origins in Macedonia enlisted in the irregular 
detachments formed by Serbia’s nationalist Narodna Odbrana organization on the 
eve of the First Balkan War.  But the units also included Serbs from Serbia and were 
led by Serbian army officers.83  In Greece, several hundred men originally from 
Macedonia were also organized into armed bands on the eve of the war.  They were 
also commanded by Greek officers, not all of whom ca e from Macedonia.84 
Christian residents of Macedonia generally greeted sol iers of whichever of 
the three Balkan armies arrived in their area at the end of 1912 (Serbian, Greek, or 
Bulgarian) as liberators.  They had become pessimistic about the possibility that the 
Ottoman constitutional regime of the Young Turks would realize their attractive 
promises of liberty, equality, and order.  All three Balkan governments now promised 
to bring the same principles of government to Macedonia, and did so specifically on 
behalf of the Christian population.  In the town of Kukush, Christian residents 
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expected the arrival of the Bulgarian army, and “all the houses … prepared as if for a 
holiday,” according to Maria Bozhkova, who was a girl at the time.  “[T]hey prepared 
the food, cleaned the houses, and put on new outfits.”  Bozhkova’s family sent her, 
holding flowers and wearing festive dress, to the town square where other children 
had been sent to greet the army.  When the army arrived, “[T]he people greeted them 
with kisses and embraces.  Everyone wanted to invite to heir houses a Bulgarian 
soldier, or two, or five, for lunch or dinner… All the women looked to outdo each 
other, they opened hope chests and gave gifts to the Bulgarian troops.”85  A similar 
scene played out in the town of Demir Hisar where, according to the headmaster 
Biliukbashiev, “[w]e embraced and kissed each other, while some even wept with 
joy.  The people immediately gave [the soldiers] food to eat and grain for the horses.”  
When in one instance an army unit cut off from its food supply ordered every family 
in the town to use their ovens to bake bread for the troops, the families “carried out 
such orders at first [v nachaloto] with great joy.”86 
The record of the joyous reception of the Balkan armies by Christians in 
Macedonia occurs not only in retrospective memoirs, but in contemporary military 
records as well.  On October 18, the journal of the 3rd infantry brigade of Bulgaria’s 
7th division recorded that in the countryside south of G rna Djumaia in Pirin 
Macedonia, “[t]he population with bread and salt came to greet the brigade 
commander and his staff.  The bells of the Bulgarian churches rang unceasingly.  The 
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people greeted and kissed every soldier that they encountered.”87  Christians generally 
welcomed incoming Balkan armies regardless of which nation they represented.  
Thus on October 30, a Bulgarian squadron commander reco ded that he “entered and 
was met with celebratory greetings by the population” of the mostly Greek-oriented 
town of Melnik.88  Greek army reserve lieutenant Dimitrios Daras wrote home to his 
family that his battalion “stopped in many villages, Greek and Bulgarian, where they 
treated us very kindly.”89  Ivan Tenchev Gelebeshev, then a student in Gevgeli but 
staying in his village of Machukovo during the outbreak of the war, recalls one final 
bitter experience with Ottoman authority as it was driven out of his region.  His 
teachers were arrested when the war commenced and his school occupied.  Finally, 
“[a]fter some days the Turks began to withdraw but during their withdrawal they 
killed whomever they met on their path,” including two brothers from his village who 
were unarmed.  It seems no wonder then that, according to Gelebeshev, when 
“afterwards the Serbian army, the Greek army, and lst of all the Bulgarian army 
arrived, all three armies were greeted by the population as liberators.”90 
Members of a large component of Ottoman Macedonia’s population, Muslims 
of Turkish, Albanian, Pomak, and muhacir background, were scarcely offered the 
opportunity to welcome the Bulgarian, Greek, or Serbian armies as liberators, even if 
they had been so inclined.  The allied armies and their associated irregular forces may 
in some areas have left Muslim noncombatants relativ ly unharmed and concentrated 
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on fighting the Ottoman army and irregular armed bands.  But in all too many cases, 
Greece’s, Serbia’s, and Bulgaria’s military and paramilitary forces murdered and 
plundered unarmed Muslim inhabitants and sent even more fleeing in terror.  
Although precise overall figures for Macedonia in the First Balkan War do not exist, 
it seems that noncombatant Muslim deaths from attacks nd from starvation and 
disease resulting from their dispossession reached at least into the tens of thousands, 
while hundreds of thousands more became refugees.91  American and Serbian consuls 
stationed in Salonika in the spring of 1914 both reco ded that around 240,000 Muslim 
refugees from the conquered territories had passed through the port city since 
November 1912 en route to Constantinople and other areas still belonging to the 
Ottoman Empire.92  The Muslim population of the part of Macedonia now controlled 
by Greece by this point had been reduced by as much as 25 percent from its level 
before the start of the Balkan Wars.93 
To find accounts of such crimes against Muslim noncombatants, one need not 
rely on Ottoman propaganda published at the time with the objective of influencing 
international opinion.94  Archives in Greece and Bulgaria contain ample, unpublicized 
examples of military and paramilitary personnel of Balkan armies casually 
incriminating themselves or their compatriots in acts against civilians.  Even 
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published memoirs sometimes contained such accounts.  A young Greek soldier, 
Stratis Stamatopoulos, wrote to his friend in 1912 while serving during the First 
Balkan War:  
We were following the Turks by foot …. We burned all of Kailaria, the Turkish 
villages that struck at our troops during their retea .  We beat Turks, we disarmed 
them, we laid waste…. On our island freedom, eh?  When I return (?) we will go 
together.95 
 
Stamatopoulos gained fame years later as Stratis Myrivilis, author of an impassioned 
antiwar novel.   
At least some Greek and Bulgarian soldiers were, however, appalled at the 
time by the actions of their armies against the Muslim civilian population.  About his 
short stay in the “Turkish” village of Pliassa, Greek army corporal Athanasios 
Velissarios wrote in his journal: 
Today I understood all the cruelty of war.  Turkish women [chanoumises] and 
children were crying.  Inhabitants were being shot as if they were turtledoves.  The 
houses from end to end were being burned.  Horror, hor or! 96 
 
Similarly disturbed was a Bulgarian teacher in the Ottoman Macedonian town 
of Melnik, Ivan Hristov Gramatikov.  Gramatikov was drafted into a militia at the 
start of the war by men of Sandanski’s Macedonian autonomist organization, which 
was now allied with the Bulgarian army.  “General ws the order to the groups 
[militia]: no Turk should be left alive, life should be reserved for the population 
suffering from the Turks, and the houses were to be burned,” Gramatikov recalls in an 
unpublished memoir preserved in Bulgaria’s state archives.97  Gramatikov does not 
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say whether or not his discovery of bodies of Bulgarians and Greeks massacred 
outside Melnik and his home village (including his family’s house) burned by 
departing Ottoman forces made it any easier to carry out this order.98  Most Muslim 
villagers fled, Gramatikov explains, but in the village of Petrovo they remained 
because of mutual promises between Christian and Muslim villagers to protect each 
other.  The Christians stayed safe there through the departure of Ottoman forces, but 
things did not go according to the local plan when Christian paramilitary forces 
arrived from elsewhere.  Instead, only five to six Muslim girls were left alive, and 
these, in Gramatikov’s euphemistic language, “had been taken and married to some 
captains” [gi biaha vzeli i gi ozheniha za niakoi voivodi].99  A voivod (leader of one of 
the Bulgarian partisan detachments) reported to the 3rd Brigade of the Bulgarian 
army’s 7th Rila Division a slightly different version of the same incident, the 
aftermath of which he beheld when he arrived at the scene.  After supposedly having 
been fired upon from within the village, Sandanski’s forces locked the village’s 
Muslim men (the voivod referred to them as “Turks” but they may well have be n 
Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks) in a café and most of the women and children in the 
mosque and set fire to both.  “As a result, almost every living Turkish thing in the 
village has been extinguished,” the voivod reported.  Surviving were “only a few 
Turkish women and children [who] had been arrested and taken into custody in a 
house in the village; some Bulgarian villagers are t king some of the children in order 
to look after as their own.”  Although the voivod was apparently not involved in this 
grisly crime about which he reported, he did not miss the opportunity also to inform 
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his commander about the quantities of various categori s of foodstuffs and livestock 
formerly belonging to those Muslims and now available “in case they might be useful 
for the needs of the army.”100 
 Balkan military leaders saw such actions to some ext nt as legitimate reprisals 
either for abuses of Christian civilians committed by the Ottoman army or for armed 
resistance on the part of members of the local Muslim population.  Crown Prince 
Constantine of Greece, who commanded his country’s a my in Macedonia, justified 
actions in this way in a November, 1912 letter to his paramour (an Italian actress who 
had married a German aristocrat) that was published aft r his death: 
The Turks, to avenge themselves for the defeats they are suffering, fire the Christian 
villages through which they pass, murder the men, ravish the women and carry them 
off. Our troops retaliate by setting fire to the Turkish villages, and as many of the 
peasants fire on us and kill a number of our men, we are obliged to shoot them down.  
On my arrival here, and seeing the horrors they have committed, I gave orders to 
burn a few of the Turkish villages through which we passed.  The whole of the plain 
is illuminated by the glare…101 
 
As will be shown in the next chapter, Constantine publically justified “reprisals” 
against Bulgarians during the Second Balkan War by similar reasoning.  But even the 
Crown Prince expressed some shock privately about the actions of troops under his 
command: “As the town which [the enemy] were defending had been taken by 
assault, you can imagine what followed, or rather, no, you cannot imagine it, neither 
will I describe it to you…. It is too horrible!”102  He gave no indication, however, of 
efforts on his part to restrain the acts he found too distasteful to describe to his lover. 
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 Those Muslims who fled ahead of the Balkan Christian armies and 
paramilitary forces gravitated towards large towns a d cities such as Edirne, Kavalla, 
and especially Salonika, while trying to make their way eventually to the relative 
safety of the Ottoman Empire.103  Between the 24th and 26th of October 1912 alone, 
roughly 16,000 (primarily women and children) arrived in Salonika from the direction 
of Skopje in the wake of the Serbian advance.  The almost 400 train cars that brought 
them were thoroughly packed with civilians occupying “the roofs, the running boards, 
and the coupling platforms between the cars.”104  Refugees fleeing the Greek and 
Bulgarian armies also converged in large numbers in Salonika.105  Because of its 
symbolic importance as a center of Byzantine heritage nd its commercial importance 
as the major seaport of Macedonia, Salonika figured as a crucial military objective of 
both the Greek and Bulgarian armies.  Greece and Bulgaria essentially engaged in a 
race against the other to reach the city during their Macedonian campaigns against 
Ottoman forces at the start of the First Balkan War.  Nonetheless, the Ottoman 
commander, Hasan Tahsin Pasha, accepted the coordinated plea from the city’s most 
prominent Jewish, Muslim, and Christian notables and from foreign consuls to 
surrender the city peacefully in order to avoid an urban bloodbath.106  Tahsin Pasha 
surrendered to the Greek army, but Bulgarian forces arriving only hours later insisted 
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on stationing troops in the city as well, leading to a joint Greek-Bulgarian military 
occupation of the city. 
 Salonika’s peaceful and orderly surrender, however, did not stop members of 
the Greek and Bulgarian armed forces from attacking and plundering both Muslim 
and Jewish residents of the city, especially during the initial days of the occupation.  
Jews became targets alongside Muslims, most likely b cause of their reputation as 
loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire.  In the wake of Greek complaints of an 
insufficiently warm Jewish reception upon the entrace of the Greek army, British 
journalist Crawfurd Price wrote, “[t]he Chief Rabbi put the Jewish case to me clearly 
and frankly when he explained that his people were Ottoman citizens, felt the 
keenness of the Turkish defeats as such, and it was but natural that they should appear 
more mournful than jubilant.”107  Attacks on Salonika’s Muslim and Jewish civilians 
began on the very day of the armies’ entry.  A Novemb r 12th letter from Joseph 
Hazan, a secretary of Salonika’s socialist organization Federation, to the Bureau 
Socialist International states that “[f]rom the next day [after the Greek army’s entry] 
horrible acts, worthy of the Middle Ages, began to be committed.” 108  Had Hazan 
written his letter a day later, he would likely have included the following incident in 
his inventory of “horrible acts.”  As Greek soldiers were marching in the marketplace 
on November 13th, “accidentally or otherwise a shot was fired from a nearby café.  
The Greek soldiers with fixed bayonets charged the café, killed 27 men (mostly 
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Israelites and Turks) and wounded about 20 more.”109  Greek Corporal Philippos 
Dragoumis, who belonged to a prominent Greek political family, casually 
acknowledged the involvement of the Greek army in plu dering valuables, and 
apparently saw a humorous side to it: “Even the inkpots were snatched for 
souvenirs!”110  The frequency of such violent incidents died down co siderably after 
the first week of occupation, but both Greek and Bulgarian soldiers continued to 
commit occasional abuses.111 
 Local Christian residents of Macedonia, on whose behalf the Balkan nation-
states claimed to fight and who generally welcomed an  even aided the arrival of the 
allied armies in 1912, also committed abuses against Mu lim residents at times during 
the First Balkan War, albeit far less commonly than did members of the allied armed 
forces and paramilitary formations.  Instances of vi lent attacks by local Christian 
residents on Muslims appear to have been exceptional, especially in contrast to 
physical violence committed by military and paramilitary forces, but they did occur.  
In December 1912, the British consul in Salonika repo ted a significant episode.  
“Bulgarians” living in Kosturino, a village near Strumitsa, killed up to 800 Muslim 
refugees who were passing through and attempting to return to their homes in 
Strumitsa and Radovişta.112  More frequent than such physical attacks on Muslims, 
though still not approaching the extent of analogous military and paramilitary looting, 
was the seizing of Muslims’ belongings by their Christian neighbors.  Instances 
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appear occasionally in the records of Bulgarian and Greek governing authorities and 
in memoirs.  Thus, the journal of operations of a Bulgarian battalion recorded on 
October 21, 1912 that “[t]he village of Simitlii (aTurkish village) was looted” by 
residents of neighboring villages.  The journal entry then discussed items reportedly 
left in the village, whose Muslim residents had apparently fled, that might be of use to 
the battalion.113  Meanwhile, in the midst of the Greek army’s campaign, Christian 
residents of the village Vlatsi in the Kailaria are of southwestern Macedonia wrote 
urgently to the nearby Cretan leader of an armed ban , Ioannis Karavitis, requesting 
protection against Muslims from other villages in Kailaria, who they claimed were 
threatening to attack them as Ottoman forces (only temporarily, it turned out) 
reoccupied the area.114  But Karavitis explains in his memoir that the Christian 
villagers’ fear stemmed from the fact that they hadjust finished looting Muslim 
property while the Greek army had been there: 
 [W]ith the passage of the [Greek] Division by Kailar a, taking advantage of the 
intimidation of the Turks, [the residents of Vlatsi] eized thousands of sheep, and this 
is why they wrote us to come so urgently; their feas, because of their own acts, were 
justified.115 
 
Biliukbashiev, the Bulgarian headmaster in Demir Hisar, even implicated himself in 
the looting that occurred there in his memoir: 
When we approached the building of the [Ottoman] district government, we saw that 
the desk of an influential Turkish lawyer had been ra sacked and his papers scattered 
on the street.  I stumbled upon a handsomely bound book, which turned out to be 
“The Koran,” and I took it as a souvenir.  During that transitional time, as the military 
were setting up posts, the population indulged in looting of abandoned Turkish 
houses and shops.  They came from surrounding villages to plunder.116 
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Biliukbashiev also recalls physical violence (killings) of Muslims that occurred in his 
town after the Ottoman army withdrew: 
In the first days, besides the looting there were also killings of Turks.  From the 
prison in the konak the Bulgarians who had been arrested were released; in there 
were also Turks, who were killed.  Entering the town ere also armed bands [cheti], 
who in the main committed these outrages and murders.117 
 
Exemplifying a larger distinction, then, residents of the town and surrounding 
villages engaged in plundering of valuables, but physical attacks on Muslims were 
generally carried out by military (or in this case paramilitary) formations.  To the 
extent that Christian residents of Macedonia took part in abuses of their Muslim 
counterparts during the First Balkan War, it seems that they were motivated by a 
combination of simple greed and triumphal vengefulness towards a population whom 
they viewed as local representatives of their former Ottoman rulers.  Christians’ 
sentiments had by then turned decisively against Ottoman rule, whether earlier under 
Sultan Abdulhamid II or more recently under the initially promising constitutional 
regime of the Young Turks.  It was now clear that Ottoman ruling power was 
vanquished for good in Macedonia.  Some Christians there took advantage of this fact 
in the days following the entry of Balkan Christian rmies, whose greater abuses of 
Muslim noncombatants only encouraged vengeful actions by locals. 
 What gave credence to the notion that Ottoman rule in Macedonia was now 
irrevocably banished was the tremendously rapid advances of the Serbian, Greek, and 
Bulgarian armies there.  Those armies invaded in the middle of October, 1912, and by 
the end of November they had completely ejected the Ottoman army from 
Macedonia.  Peace talks began in December between representatives of the Balkan 
                                                




Allies and the Ottoman Empire.  During these negotiati ns, the Ottoman 
representative contested the future disposition of other theatres of the war where 
Ottoman troops still faced troops of the Balkan Allies under an uneasy truce (Thrace, 
the Aegean islands, what became Albania, and Epirus).  But the question of the 
Ottoman Empire somehow regaining any part of Macedonia was simply not realistic, 
and Ottoman representatives did not raise it.118
 There remained, however, the question of what Macedonia’s territorial fate 
would be now that Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece had all taken a part in banishing 
Ottoman rule from it.  The March, 1912, agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia 
stipulated that the region’s northwestern corner would somehow be divided between 
the two countries with the help of Russian arbitration if needed, while it vaguely 
indicated that the Macedonian territories south and east of that zone would accrue to 
Bulgaria.  This agreement did not explicitly consider whether Greece would annex 
any of Macedonia’s territory.  Nor did Greece’s more informal prewar accords with 
Bulgaria and Serbia include agreements as to the dispos tion of Macedonia’s territory.   
Compounding these uncertainties now was the significant presence of all three 
of these allied Balkan armies in Macedonia.  In effect, three zones of occupation were 
established corresponding to where the Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian armies 
respectively ended up and met each other as they pushed out Ottoman forces.119  The 
landlocked Serbian zone encompassed the northwestern portion of Macedonia, 
including the cities and towns of Skopje, Kumanovo, Veles, Prilep, Bitolj, Resen, 
Ohrid, Debar, and Tetovo.  The Serbian zone was contiguous to other territories 
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conquered by Serbia at the same time, including Kosov  and parts of what became 
Albania.  The Greek zone included the southwestern pa t of Macedonia with the 
towns of Kastoria, Florina, Vodena/Edessa, Kozani, d Verroia, and further east 
included the coastal areas of the Halkidiki peninsula and the city of Salonika.  It was 
contiguous with other territories taken by the Greek army including Thessaly, part of 
Epirus, and a small part of what became Albania.  The Bulgarian zone in the 
northeast and southeast of Macedonia included the inland towns of Gorna Djumaia, 
Shtip, Strumitsa, Melnik, Nevrokop, Serres, and Drama and part of the Aegean coast 
including the port town of Kavalla.  It was contiguous to Thrace, much of which was 
also conquered by the Bulgarian army in 1912 and early 1913.  Although Salonika 
was effectively part of the Greek zone, some Bulgarian troops were also stationed 
there by agreement.  Also, mixtures of Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek troops 
coexisted uneasily in a small area, including the town of Gevgeli, where the three 
zones effectively met.  The three zones had no formal legal status, and indeed the 
informal borders between them remained uncertain, co tested, and jealously guarded 
during the entire period leading to the Second Balkan War several months later. 
* * * 
For the diverse Orthodox Christian population of Macedonia, the First Balkan War in 
1912 had seemed to offer hope for a better political future.  Orthodox Christian 
optimism in 1908 in the wake of the Ottoman constitutional revolution had reflected 
their embrace of ideals introduced into the Ottoman public political arena at that time: 
the French Revolution ideals of liberty, equality, fraternity, and justice.  Nationalist 




familiarity with and even frequent embrace of one or another national identity 
propagated by the neighboring nation-states of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, they 
enthusiastically placed their hopes in 1908 in their continued existence within a 
reformed Ottoman state.  In the autumn of 1912, they s ifted their hopes to the 
advancing armies of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia bec use these countries claimed to 
represent in effect the same governing principles initially espoused, but apparently 
abandoned, by the Ottoman constitutional regime.   
But the often aggressive behavior of the incoming Balkan armies towards 
Muslim civilians in 1912 also offered a kind of warning to Orthodox Christians in 
Macedonia.  These armies were willing to inflict immense suffering upon civilian 
populations they perceived to be representing or supporting enemy forces.  As the 
following chapters will show, groups of Orthodox Christian civilians, if perceived by 
the newly ruling Balkan state governments to be hostile or disloyal because of their 
ethnicity, could become the targets of the Balkan st te armies’ cruelty just as Muslims 
had during the First Balkan War.  Orthodox Christians in Macedonia, as Chapter 3 
will reveal, would therefore not welcome the war between former allies (the Second 





Chapter 3: The Pressures of Impermanence: Macedonia fr m a 
Collapsing Balkan Alliance to a Second Balkan War, 1912-1913 
 
This chapter examines the brief, but volatile period fr m the Balkan 
Alliance’s victory over the Ottoman Empire in Macedonia at the end of 1912 to their 
war amongst themselves during the summer of 1913 over the territory they had just 
liberated.  The longstanding tensions between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia began to 
return to the fore at the beginning of this period, as their governments began to 
confront in concrete fashion the question of how they would partition their newly-
won Ottoman territory.  As if to lay permanent claims to Macedonian territory, each 
of the three would-be successor states rapidly set up mixed civilian and military 
administrations in the zones they occupied during the autumn of 1912.  From the start 
they all imposed policies of national assimilation on the new multi-ethnic 
populations.  Greece and Bulgaria also proceeded with incorporating their new 
territories into the state’s central administration.   
It was nevertheless clear to all, not least Macedonia’s residents themselves, 
that the borders represented by the three occupation zones were fluid and likely to 
change.  Macedonia’s residents often took canny advantage of these international 
political rivalries in pushing for their varied interests, including economic prospects 
and control over local institutions.  And more than in any other period analyzed here, 
many ordinary inhabitants acted as though they saw in this interim of uncertainty a 




involved themselves directly in various efforts to secure an autonomous international 
status for Macedonia or later on (as autonomy proved unlikely) to ensure that one or 
another favored national government would rule over th ir local area.   
Yet residents of Macedonia continued, with some notable exceptions, to stop 
short of violence in pursing these efforts.  In particular, local Christians showed little 
enthusiasm for the inter-allied war that broke out in June of 1913, a war which they 
correctly judged would spell disaster for their communities.  The Balkan armies that 
had engaged in brutal violence against primarily Muslim civilians in the first Balkan 
War now did so against groups of Christians they deemed hostile to their respective 
national causes.  The Second Balkan War thus generat d unprecedented numbers of 
Christian refugees who hastily fled for their lives when they sensed they would be on 
the receiving end of the violence perpetrated by the armies and paramilitary forces of 
the Balkan states.  However, the refugees almost uniformly saw the abandonment of 
their homes, property, and ancestral lands as a last, and hopefully temporary, resort.  
They had little intrinsic interest, as we shall see, in joining their purported “brethren” 
in some kind of imagined homogeneous national utopia.  They much preferred to 
return home, even in the face of considerable danger.   
The Second Balkan War featured brutal combat between states whose 
majorities all adhered to the same religion of Orthodox Christianity.  Their excesses 
have subsequently been used to demonstrate the hopelessly deep ethnic (not simply 
religious) divisions and the endemic nature of local violence in the Balkans.  This 
chapter provides an important corrective to that presumption.  It calls attention 




Christian population who had until then lived in the Ottoman Empire and their co-
religionists who had been socialized in nation-states and fought in the Greek, 
Bulgarian, and Serbian armies.  Orthodox Christian inhabitants of former Ottoman 
Macedonia identified to varying degrees with particular national groups.  But they 
still considered local security, prosperity, and the liberating political principles they 
heard from the Young Turks and then from incoming Balkan armies to be more 
important priorities.  More violence and war would only undermine those priorities.  
By contrast, soldiers in the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian armies and allied 
paramilitary forces were motivated by an exclusionary national ideal.  Encouraged by 
their military and political leaders, they usually understood that they were obligated 
to fight, die, and kill for their nation.  The wartime violence that accompanied such 
attitudes among army and paramilitary fighters included crimes against 
noncombatants, primarily Christian in the Second Balkan War.  Yet the sorts of 
abuses committed were not uniquely “outrageous” for their time.  They should be 
seen instead, as this chapter will also argue, as of  piece with the kinds of abuses that 
occurred in European wars of the nineteenth century and even those that occurred 
during opening campaigns of the First World War. 
 
Advertising Permanence: Establishing Administrations in the New Territories 
The partial armistice of December 3, 1912, ushered in an unstable period of 
eight months in Macedonia during which the hitherto veiled tensions lurking within 
the Balkan Alliance eventually overwhelmed the discord between the Allies and the 




other fronts until the signing of the Treaty of London ended the First Balkan War on 
May 30, 1913.  Greece, having refused to sign December’s partial armistice, initially 
continued its army’s siege of the city of Iannina i Epirus.  The Bulgarian, Serbian 
and Montenegrin armies also resumed hostilities against the Ottoman military in 
eastern Thrace and northern Albania when they abrogted the armistice in the wake 
of a Young Turk-led coup in Constantinople in late January, 1913.  As of December, 
1912, however, Ottoman rule had ended throughout the full extent of geographic 
Macedonia.  Talks in London among representatives of the belligerent countries and 
the Great Powers dragged on until the treaty’s signing on May 30.  Yet the Ottoman 
delegate did not try to contest his government’s los  f Macedonia.  The banishment 
of Ottoman authority from Macedonia was indeed the only political change in the 
region of which anyone could be certain.   
Manifestly uncertain for months was how Macedonia’s territory would finally 
be apportioned among the successor states – Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia – each of 
whose armies occupied parts of the region.  As noted in Chapter 2, the separate 
bilateral alliance agreements reached between Greece, S rbia, and Bulgaria before the 
First Balkan War stopped well short of specifying definitively which country would 
receive what territory in the event of victory over the Ottoman Empire.  The contents 
of the most specific agreement, that between Bulgaria and Serbia, now remained 
secret while the ambassadors of the Balkan states and the Great Powers were 
apparently negotiating the future of Macedonia and other Balkan territories in 
London.  Furthermore, Greek and Bulgarian forces continued to share the important 




The very air of uncertainty that hung over the fateof Macedonia spurred the 
Bulgarian and Greek governments to demonstrate how permanent and legitimate their 
authority was over their respectively occupied territo ies.  Rather than simply use 
their armies to impose a provisional order while war s still being waged, the 
Balkan states rapidly erected elaborate structures of mixed civilian-military 
administration, in effect signaling that their respctive “new territories” were 
extensions of their respective old ones.  At the top of the hierarchy and in the central 
administrative base of the conquered territory, each administration typically 
employed a mix of men imported from within the state’s old boundaries.  They 
allowed local notables to fill only municipal and other positions lower in the 
hierarchy.   
Thus, the Greek-held part of Macedonia came under the authority of a General 
Administration of Macedonia based in Salonika.  The Gr ek Minister of Justice, 
Konstantinos Raktivan, was appointed Governor-General (replaced in a few months 
by former Prime Minister Stephanos Dragoumis, who was also Governor-General of 
Crete.)  Greece’s Prince Nicholas became Military Governor of Salonika.  The 
General Administration of Macedonia was itself subdivided into prefectures and sub-
prefectures, replicating the regional administrative structure of the rest of Greece.  In 
a deliberately symbolic gesture, Nicholas’s father King George of Greece reinforced 
Greece’s claim to the important port of Salonika by deciding to reside in the city only 
days after the entry of the Greek army in November, 1912.  He became a conspicuous 




walk through the center and port with practically no armed protection.1  The King’s 
bravado finally cost him his life in March of 1913, when on a clear spring day an 
indigent and mentally unstable local Greek assassinted him during his stroll near the 
city’s famed White Tower.   
Military authority played a larger role at the top f the mixed civilian-military 
administrative structure in the parts of Macedonia i itially conquered by the 
Bulgarian army, as suggested by the name given to the administrative structure, the 
Macedonian Military Governorship.  The Macedonian Military Governor, General-
Major Mihail Vûlkov, resided at the administration’s seat in the town of Serres, while 
General-Major Hristofor Hesapchiev was installed as the Representative of the 
Bulgarian Army in Salonika.  These officials, in turn, answered to civilians in the 
Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sofia and to the Bulgarian Prime Minister, 
Ivan Evstratiev Geshov.  The Macedonian Military Governorship was, like the 
Bulgarian state itself, subdivided into smaller units of provinces and districts.   As in 
the Greek case, local civilian notables were typically limited to serving in posts lower 
down the administrative structure.2 
Both Greek and Bulgarian authorities broadcast liberal principles of rule by 
popular representation to contrast with the Ottoman regime that preceded them.  In an 
interview published in a Salonika Jewish newspaper two weeks after the Greek 
                                                
1 Dispatch from U.S. consul in Salonika, John Kehl, to U.S. State Department headquarters, Mar. 20, 
1913, from Correspondence of the American Consulate in Saloniki, 1912-1913, Consular Post Files, 
Records Group 84, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter abbreviated as CACS, RG 
84, NARA). 
2 The Serbian governing structure in its conquered territories was similar to that of the Bulgarian one – 
mixed civilian-military but more military-heavy at the top.  However, locals were appointed less 
frequently as officials in lower-level positions.  See Petar Stojanov, Makedonija vo vremeto na 





army’s entry into the city, the new Greek governor K nstantinos Raktivan 
emphasized these high purposes on his arrival: “Ouraim is to bring to an end tyranny 
and bad government, which infests this land; we bring these principles, the treasures 
of freedom, completely irrespective of religion ... as befits a civilized state.”  
Raktivan pointed out that a statement to this effect had already appeared in an earlier 
issue of the same newspaper and in greater length i domestic (Greek) newspapers, 
and then elaborated upon it again: 
This is not at all to say that I mean to overturn everything.  The administrative 
organization, the judicial, as well as the remaining branches of services we want to 
continue to work as they did under Turkish rule, after the changes, that is, established 
by the new situation.3 
 
Raktivan’s added qualification suggests that he mayhave anticipated some 
apprehension on the part of his audience about the concrete meaning of his promise 
“to bring to an end tyranny and bad government.”  The notion of replacing all former 
civil servants would not necessarily have comforted communities such as Salonika’s 
Jews, who, as noted in Chapter 1, had generally supported Ottoman authority.   
Raktivan’s words notwithstanding, the Greek governme t proceeded to 
replace most of the city’s top civil servants with telling swiftness.  Of the new 
functionaries listed in a translation of a November 14th Royal Decree issued by King 
George announcing a provisional government in Salonika, all were Greek citizens 
from outside Salonika and even Macedonia, except for a sole Muslim listed as the 
mayor.4  Even that mayor, Osman Sait Bey, appears not to have wielded anywhere 
near the actual power to be expected from his title, if his typical absence from 
                                                
3 Konstantinos Raktivan, Egrafa kai Simeiosis ek tis Protis Ellinikis Dioikiseos tis Makedonias (1912-
1913) (Documents and Notes from the First Greek Administration of Macedonia, 1912-1913), 
(Thessaloniki: Eteireia Makedonikon Spoudon), 1951: 39. 




correspondence related to the governance of the city is any indication.5  Such 
thorough transplanting of officials from pre-1912 Greece into municipal posts did not 
generally occur in other areas occupied by the Greek army.  The intense attention 
devoted to Salonika partly reflected the city’s central significance for Greece’s 
ambitions in Macedonia.     
The Bulgarian government also claimed that popular rep esentation would be 
a hallmark of its administration in Macedonia.  Employing lofty rhetoric similar to 
that of Raktivan, Bulgarian General Hesapchiev insisted in a letter to his Greek 
counterpart in Salonika in response to allegations of Greek complaints that “our 
administration … is established on the basis of a large tolerance respecting the 
sentiments of the population without distinction of nationality and of a perfect 
equality of all those we govern.”  Hesapchiev emphasized further that “a large 
number of Greeks have already been named as mayors, members of municipal 
councils and members of different commissions” in the regions of Serres, Drama, 
Kavalla, and Xanthi, whose populations he characterized as “in whole or in large part 
Greek.”6  Yet Dimitûr Bozhikov Bilukbashiev, headmaster of a Bulgarian school in 
Demir Hisar, revealed in his memoir what it might have meant in practice for a Greek 
to be named to a high position in an important town in the Bulgarian administrative 
zone: 
For commandant of the town Captain Chomakov (or Cholakov) was chosen, for 
district constable the school inspector A. Madjarov, f r mayor the Greek, Toma 
Maletov – and as deputy mayor, yours truly.  In reality, I was the mayor of the town, 
                                                
5 Mark Mazower indeed remarks that Osman Sait Bey had little power even to shield his co-religionists 
in the city from adverse treatment.  See Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 317.  
6 Tsentralen Voenen Arhiv [Central Military Archive] (TsVA), Veliko Tûrnovo, Bulgaria, Fond 1647 
[Macedonian Military Government] opis 2 a.e. 24 [Reports on Greek Complaints], 4-6 (Letter from 




while they chose Toma Maletov only as a formality.  This “mayor” did not even 
come regularly to the office and wanted the town’s correspondence to be conducted 
also in the Greek language – but of such a thing there was no need because all of the 
“Greeks” knew Bulgarian, as they were in reality Grecomans.7 
 
Indeed, ethnic Greeks appointed as mayors or municipal ouncilors could face 
beatings and threats of violence from Bulgarian police and military figures stationed 
in their areas.8 
The victorious Balkan states demonstrated their ambitions to incorporate the 
territories they had won in Macedonia not only through the administrative structures 
they established but also through their initial interactions with the new populations 
they encountered.  They thereby gave inhabitants of Macedonia a taste of what their 
transition from imperial subjects to citizens of nation-states might mean.  First of all, 
such a transition would entail not only becoming a citizen of Bulgaria, Greece or 
Serbia but displaying one’s ethnic kinship to the satisfaction of authorities.  The most 
striking imposition of such a policy occurred not against Orthodox Christians, but 
against the so-called Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking Muslims) living in the areas 
occupied by the Bulgarian army.  Based on Bulgarian eth ographic assumptions that 
the Pomaks (as distinguished from Turks or other Muslims) were of the same ethnic 
stock as Bulgarian Christians, Orthodox priests fanned out along with the occupying 
troops and presided over the forced conversion to Christianity of approximately 
                                                
7 Dûrzhaven Arhiv – Blagoevgrad [State Archive – Blagoevgrad] (DAB), Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria, 
Spomeni (Sp.) 225 [Dimitûr Bozhikov Biliukbashiev], 171; the memoirist refers again to the Greek 
“mayor” in quotation marks, 186. 
8 See, for example, TsVA, Fond 1647 opis 2 a.e. 24, 152 157 (complaint by residents of Kavalla to 




200,000 Pomaks.  The Pomaks were also forced to Slavicize their names and adopt 
other cultural markers of Bulgarian nationhood.9 
The Serbian occupying authorities were the most forceful early on in applying 
such pressures for national assimilation on Orthodox Christian inhabitants of 
Macedonia.  In December, 1912, the Serbian bishop Varnava of Debir-Kichevo 
toured districts throughout the Serbian-held part of Macedonia, at each stop 
summoning the local priests and warning them under thr at of persecution to leave 
the Exarchate and join the Serbian church.  Alongside priests, teachers and chetnitsi 
(paramilitaries who had nonetheless provided important aid to the Serbian army in its 
advance) active in the area were considered the potential agents of Bulgarian 
propaganda and became the prime targets of Serbian authorities.  The Serbs also 
began, albeit less systematically, to intimidate ordinary Orthodox Christian 
inhabitants, forbidding them to call themselves Bulgarian or even to speak 
Bulgarian.10   
Greek and Bulgarian actions toward national assimilation of Orthodox 
Christians were less thoroughgoing than those of the Serbs in the early weeks after 
the establishment of their respective administrations in Macedonia.  They still left 
locals with comparable indications of what to expect.  The Carnegie Commission 
report quotes a letter originating from a village near Kastoria in the Greek zone: 
                                                
9 However, the majority of these Pomaks lived not in Macedonia, but in adjacent Thrace, also occupied 
by Bulgarian troops.  For more on this episode of mass forced conversion, see Velichko Georgiev and 
Staiko Trifinov, Pokrûstvaneto na Bûlgarite Mohamedani, 1912-1913: Dokumenti (Sofia: 
Academichno Izdatelstvo “Marin Drinov”), 1995 and Mary Neuburger, The Orient Within: Muslim 
Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press), 2004: 41-42. 
10 Ivan Fichev, Balkanskata Voina, 1912-1913: Prezhivelitsi, belezhki i dokumenti (Sofia: Dûrzhavna 




The first care of the Greek officers and soldiers ar iving here is to discover if the 
population of the said village and its environs is Bulgarian or Greek.  If the 
population is pure Bulgarian, the officers order the peasants to “become Greeks 
again, that being the condition of a peaceful life.”11 
 
In December, 1912, a group of patriarchist residents of he town of Barakli Djumaia 
in the Bulgarian zone complained that during the previous month “Bulgarians,” led 
by the local occupying officer, forced them to give up their church against their will 
and had been conducting services there ever since.12  The residents in fact never once 
identified themselves by any kind of ethnic label in their complaint, and a patriarchist 
bishop who later wrote on their behalf even emphasized the joy of his flock at their 
liberation from the Turkish yoke “with the honored blood of the Bulgarian army.”13  
Nevertheless, the Bulgarian official who went to investigate and endorsed in his 
report the handing over of the church to the Bulgarian Exarchate clearly felt that the 
ethnicity of the petitioners was of utmost relevance to the question: 
It became clear that the residents settled in the town speak only Bulgarian – even 
those who pretend that they are Greek do not know even one Greek word.  I became 
convinced of this personally after I began to speak to those people in Greek.14 
 
Thus, although the petitioners did not ask to keep th ir church “Greek” per se, but 
simply to keep their church, for the Bulgarian official the act of transferring the 
church from the Patriarchate to the Exarchate meant nsuring crucially that the church 
would drop a “Greek” identity and take on a “Bulgarian” one.  However, such 
pressure on local Orthodox Christians to demonstrate he correct ethnic identification 
was still sporadic in the early days after the entry of the victorious Balkan armies into 
                                                
11 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, R port of the International Commission to Inquire 
into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washington, D.C.: 1914), 56. 
12 TsVA, Fond 1647 opis 2 a.e. 24, p.25-26 (petition fr m representatives of Barakli Djumaia to the 
provincial governor, date of submission Dec. 31, 1912). 
13 TsVA Fond 1647 opis 2 a.e. 24 p.29-29g (letter from bishop of Melnik Constantine to Serres 
provincial governor, Mar. 16, 1913). 





Macedonia, particularly in the Bulgarian and Greek administrative zones.  The ethnic 
pressures on civilians by officials, army personnel and paramilitaries increased 
considerably in frequency and intensity by the spring of 1913, when relations 
between Bulgaria and its allies Greece and Serbia had deteriorated markedly. 
 Beyond these pressures for national identification, the Greek and Bulgarian 
administrations also moved to extend central state au hority to the new territories.  
The Bulgarian government instituted military conscription of local Christians, 
forming the Serres Brigade in April of 1913 and theDrama Brigade in May, as the 
threat of a second war approached.  These new local brig des were separate from the 
Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Volunteers who were formed in Bulgaria on the eve of 
the First Balkan War and were still serving on the T racian front against the Ottoman 
army.  Bulgarian recruiters knowingly included young local “Greeks” and 
“Grecomans” rather than only youths they considered to be reliable “Macedonian 
Bulgarians” in the conscription efforts.  This practice caused Bulgarian commanders 
to express doubts on the eve of the Second Balkan War over whether they would be 
able to control the recruits and prevent desertions.15   
The Greek Minister of Interior and Minister of Defense also had a 
comprehensive military draft in mind.  In April, 193, they jointly asked the 
Macedonian Governor-General to order a census in his territory of all males “of all 
religions and ethnicities” born between the years 1862 and 1894.  The Minister of 
Interior underscored the urgency of this priority with a deadline of only one month for 
                                                
15 TsVA, Fond 1647 opis 2 a.e. 24, pp.169, 171, 171g (telegram from Doiran garrison commander 
Paskalev to Macedonian Military Governor, May 30, 1913, and memorandum from Strumitsa district 
constable to Macedonian Military Governor, May 29, 1 13); TsVA Fond 64 opis 2 a.e. 18 
(Operational Correspondence of the 3rd Brigade of the 7th Division, Mar. 26, 1913 – Jun. 6, 1913), p.85 




completing the census “under threat of the strictest disciplinary punishment for any 
employee of the [General] Administration who might delay.”16  Indeed, those living 
under Greek administration in Macedonia could not have failed to notice Greek 
officials’ various initiatives to gather detailed data on their new territory.  The smoke 
had scarcely cleared from some of the battlefields of Macedonia when, in early 
December 1912 the prefecture of Thessaloniki ordered all local owners of antiquities 
to submit a detailed inventory of their holdings.17  In January 1913, prefectural 
officials throughout the General Administration began compiling statistical tables that 
dissected populations of individual villages and towns according to “ethnicity,” 
language, and religion.  They then aggregated the statistics up to the overall sub-
prefecture and prefecture levels.18   
Yet the impulse to gather data went well beyond narrow nation-building 
concerns about the ethnic distinctions of different segments of the population.  Ethnic 
affiliation was by no means the only question of interest in the vast tables and reports 
compiled by the general inspector of schools about only the Greek schools in the 
General Administration in June of 1913.  In addition, these reports contained 
exhaustive information on number and gender of students; the birthplace, training, 
age, gender, salary, marital status, and previous pstings of each teacher; the school’s 
                                                
16 Istoriko Archeio Makedonias, Geniki Diikisi Makedonias (IAM, GDM), Thessaloniki, Greece, file 
45, pp. 29-30 (Minister of Interior Emmanuel Repoulis to Governor-General of Macedonia, Apr. 18, 
1913; Governor-General of Macedonia to prefects of Thessaloniki and Western Macedonia, high 
administrative commissioner of Kozani, and administrative commissioners of Macedonia, Apr. 19, 
1913).  Državen Arhiv na Republika Makedonija (DARM), Skopje, Macedonia, Fond 994 (Archival 
Materials on the Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia Between the Two World Wars), Box 1, 58-59 
(petition from Ilias Traikou Giaprakis to the Army Recruitment Board, Kozani, Jul. 6, 1914); 60 (12th 
Mountain Artillery Squadron to the 12th Recruitment Office, Jul. 10, 1914); and 81-82 (certificate from 
mayor of Sorovits Nikolaidis regarding Markos Dimitrios Roikou, Dec. 11, 1914) refer to the draft 
census taken in the area by Greek authorities in 1913.  
17 Dispatch from Kehl to U.S. State Department headqurters, Dec. 13, 1912, (CACS, RG 84, NARA). 
18 The statistics and analysis produced by such investigations occupy several files in the archive of the




sources of funding; and even pedagogical materials and furniture owned by each 
school.19  Thus, beyond consolidating national homogeneity through pressures for 
ethno-cultural assimilation, Greece and Bulgaria, through their rapid introduction of 
policies in Macedonia such as conscription and extensiv  data collection, were 
engaging in wider aspects of state-building.  All of these were elements of what 
Charles Maier has called the drive for the “saturation of space inside the frontier” that 
characterized the modern nation-state.20 
 
Interbellum Politics and Local Activism 
 Local Christians in Macedonia were not persuaded by the vigorous rival 
efforts, both symbolic and substantive, of the Bulgarian and Greek administrations to 
advertise their authority over the respective territories they conquered in the autumn 
of 1912.  Though Christian civilians had typically welcomed incoming allied Balkan 
armies and subsequently witnessed the new administrations’ policies of territorial 
“saturation,”21 they were also fully aware of the lack of genuine fri ndliness between 
the “Allies.”  Macedonia’s inhabitants understood that far-reaching changes awaited 
their region, and they acted to exploit opportunities and alleviate suffering occasioned 
by those changes and by the still unsettled borders. 
 Naturally, some longstanding local supporters of national causes pressed their 
advantage when they perceived an opportunity to do so after the autumn, 1912, 
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20 Charles Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the 





liberation.  The headmaster-turned-deputy mayor of Demir Hisar, Biliukbashiev, 
describes in his memoir the “cultural work” on whic he and other local Bulgarian 
notables embarked soon after their town was taken by the Bulgarian army.  A priest, 
Georgi, “took a mosque in the bazaar and turned it into a Bulgarian church,” which 
“assumed the name of the former Bulgarian chapel of the neighborhood, Sts. Kiril 
and Metodi.”  Another mosque became a cultural center (chitalishte) named after the 
Macedonian guerrilla-hero Gotse Delchev.  Biliukbashiev recalls that “Turkish 
notables … bore witness that [the two mosques] had in the past been Bulgarian 
churches.”  Leaving little doubt that the de-Islamizat on of the two mosques was in 
his mind part of a Bulgarian national project, not merely a religious one, 
Biliukbashiev recounts the naming of Demir Hisar’s streets as part of the same body 
of “cultural work”: 
We gave names to the streets – Bulgarian historical names – while the main street we 
named “22 October,” (the day of the town’s liberation by Bulgarian soldiers.)  The 
street where the Greek bishopric was located was named “Sts. Kiril and Metodi,” 
which the Greeks of Demir Hisar did not like one bit.22 
 
By converting mosques into “Bulgarian” institutions and naming streets after 
“Bulgarian” historical touchstones, Biliukbashiev and his colleagues were filling the 
symbolic space of Demir Hisar with their preferred national content, a process 
occurring in parallel, especially in large towns and cities, across the Bulgarian and 
Greek administrative zones of Macedonia.   
Inhabitants of Macedonia saw opportunities to reap personal, as well as 
public, returns from the new situation created by the banishment of Ottoman 
authority.  Biliukbashiev criticized some of his colleagues among the Demir Hisar 
                                                




intelligentsia, members of the rival Sandanski and Supremist Macedonian 
revolutionary factions, for trying to “pursue their own personal benefit” as they 
jockeyed for position within the new political power structure.23  As detailed in 
Chapter 2, in the first days of their liberation local Christians in several areas of 
Macedonia indulged in looting of properties abandoned by Muslim neighbors who 
had fled the advance of the Balkan armies.  Euphemia Piatsa saw in the liberation of 
her area by the Greek army an opportunity to be compensated personally for her long 
years of struggle for the Greek cause.  A native of Salonika, Piatsa was at twenty-nine 
years old already a fifteen-year veteran teacher and headmistress in Greek schools in 
southern Macedonia according to data collected on schools and teachers by the Greek 
administration in 1913.24  While in the town of Edessa in May, 1913, she drafted a 
petition to the newly formed local Greek prefecture detailing her years of service in 
Edessa, Gevgeli, Halkidiki, Doiran and Korytsa.  Piatsa emphasized that during all 
the years of her teaching she put her “national work” above her teaching, at risk to her 
life and without regard for her meager salary.  At one point, she was dispatched to a 
transhumant village eight hours walk into the heights above Gevgeli “under the 
pretext of being a teacher to the Vlach children, while my real aim was national.”  For 
Piatsa, this daring exploit, and the sacrifices she bor  for her nation, made a 
compelling closing case in her petition whose resoluti n unfortunately remains 
unknown: 
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I supplied the andartes with food, I carried the correspondence in coded letters.  I 
was pelted with stones by the Bulgarians, I was wounded by the bayonet of the 
Turkish police.  I ask now to be satisfied.25 
 
Nevertheless, while many residents of Macedonia ident fi d opportunities for 
their own advancement or that of their community upon their liberation by the Balkan 
armies, many others also encountered hardship ranging from inconvenience to acute 
suffering.  Residents acted frequently to influence the new Greek or Bulgarian 
administrations that ruled them to redress grievances, to change policies they did not 
like, or simply to act in their favor in specific cases.  Many men and women lodged 
complaints about deprivations occasioned by severe military requisitions and by 
simple looting, itself often the result of military indiscipline.  Among them were 28 
Muslim “innocent women, left with our children without any resources and far from 
our husbands who are prisoners of war, killed, or injured.”  According to their 
January, 1913, appeal to the German Consul General of Salonika for assistance, these 
refugee women, mostly wives of Ottoman officers andthus of a high social standing, 
had arranged to have their belongings transported in designated train cars as they fled 
Serres for Salonika ahead of the Bulgarian army’s advance in October of 1912.  
Rather than receiving their belongings, they learned that their “valuables, jewels, gold 
and silver, carpets, etc.” worth over 6,660 Turkish l ra had been spirited away to Sofia 
by Bulgarian officers.  Their less valuable items had simply been “sold on the spot for 
next to nothing” in Serres.26  Similar to the way the group of women emphasized th ir 
vulnerable position as a result of the wartime conditions, a Christian chiflik owner 
named Nikola Nashadzhik called attention, when asking for the return of three mules 
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requisitioned by the Bulgarian army in addition to compensation for dozens of goats 
and sheep, to “this uttermost time of need” in trying to recover from the recent war.27   
Occasionally, Christian natives of Macedonia such as Kosmas D. Velios, of 
Kastoria, even intervened with authorities in order to come to the aid of another 
beleaguered group.  In a letter he addressed directly to the King of Greece, Velios in 
the spring of 1913 lamented that in and around his hometown “the Muslim 
Communities still have not been given back their holy temples and their philanthropic 
and educational institutions, something which naturally injects significant misgiving 
and anxiety about the future.”  Professing “confiden[c ] that His Royal Highness 
would be so good as to agree to order immediately to pu  things right and return” the 
properties to the Muslims, Velios then launched into a defense of why the continued 
subsistence of the Muslim community in his area “would recommend itself from the 
economic, political and military point of view.”  The local Muslims were “paragons 
of honor and industriousness.”  Moreover, while still in power during the war of the 
previous autumn, they had maintained “a sympathetic and very tolerant bearing with 
respect to our28 element.”  Indeed, Muslim authorities would have caused no harm in 
the area had it not been for actions against “the Greek andarte units [that] committed 
rapes, extortions, murders and plunder in Mavrovo, Vogatsiko and elsewhere.”29   
As will be shown in the next chapter, this kind of deliberate display of local 
cross-group solidarity in Macedonia became more comm n after the Second Balkan 
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War when borders appeared permanent.  During the period between the two Balkan 
Wars, initiatives such as Velios’ to help a local group that he explicitly identified as 
different from his own were still comparatively rare.  Instead, the presence in the 
autumn of 1912 and the spring of 1913 of neighboring Greek and Bulgarian 
administrations with conflicting aspirations over Macedonian territory encouraged 
separate local initiatives to take advantage of these conflicts and the uncertainty.  
Residents of Macedonia during this period often exploited the unsettled borders and 
the rivalry they perceived between ostensibly allied officials of the neighboring 
national administrations in order to further their va ied interests. 
In particular, and already by February of 1913, resid nts were submitting 
thousands of complaints about conditions in their administrative zones, not directly to 
their own governing officials, but indirectly through officials in the neighboring 
zone.30  A minor criminal case involving a newspaper vendor, Dimitri 
Angelou/Angelov, provides an example of how even a single individual’s scrape with 
the law might occasion an appeal to the rival natiol administration for help.31  On 
February 11, 1913, Greece’s Military Governor in Salonika Prince Nicholas 
interceded with Bulgaria’s representative in Salonika on behalf of Angelou.  Nicholas 
claimed that, having been robbed of three Turkish lira by other passengers while on a 
train traveling in Bulgarian-held Macedonia, Angelou stopped off in Serres in order 
to file a complaint with Bulgarian authorities.  Atthat point, however, Angelou was 
                                                
30 About the extent of residents in the Bulgarian zone lodging complaints through Greek authorities, 
see TsVA Fond 1647 opis 2 a.e. 24, pp.3, 3g (Hesapchiev to Vûlkov, Feb. 12, 1913); on residents in 
the Greek zone lodging complaints through Bulgarian authorities, TsVA Fond 1647 opis 2 a.e. 24, pp. 
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31 The information on the case comes entirely from Bulgarian administrative documents, which refer to 
him sometimes as “Angelou”, and others as “Angelov.”  For brevity’s sake, he will be referred to 




himself arrested, accused of having robbed some of his companions of eight Turkish 
lira.  On top of that, the Bulgarian authorities had demanded a guarantee of five 
hundred leva from Angelou for his release.32  Аn earlier decree of the examining 
magistrate of the Serres Field Court Martial confirms that Angelou had indeed been 
detained in Serres and required to post the five hundred leva guarantee for his release 
“in order to bar the possibility for [him] to evade prosecution.”33  After ordering an 
investigation into the case, the office of the Bulgarian Military Governor in Serres 
replied to Prince Nicholas with details of the accusation against Angelou, indirectly 
rejecting the validity of the complaint.34  It is impossible to deduce from the extant 
documents on Angelou’s case which of the two starkly contrasting versions 
corresponded to the truth.  Perhaps Angelou had indeed been arrested under the 
capricious circumstances alleged by Prince Nicholas, or perhaps he had instead 
simply concocted an elaborate story of arbitrary arest in hopes of evading 
prosecution for a crime he had committed.  In either case, what is striking and typical 
for this period about the incident is that Angelou ( r perhaps someone on his behalf) 
had appealed to the Greek administration located nearby for intervention against the 
Bulgarian authorities in what otherwise would have be n nothing more than a 
common case of alleged pick-pocketing.   
 Macedonia’s residents also appealed to authorities (again, often authorities of 
the neighboring national administration) in order to aise issues of more general 
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community interest.  One of the most frequent subjects of complaint concerned the 
struggle in many villages in the Bulgarian and Greek zones to hold onto or gain 
control of local church properties.  This struggle was, of course, a direct continuation 
of the longstanding tug-of-war between the Exarchate and Patriarchate described in 
Chapter 1.  Yet, for the first time, each of the osten ible state patrons (Bulgaria and 
Greece) of those rival branches of Orthodox Christianity now directly controlled a 
section of Macedonia, instead of being limited as before to indirect influence through 
consulates and infiltration of guerilla bands.  Indivi uals and groups on the losing 
sides of the new hegemony (patriarchists in the Bulgarian zone and exarchists in the 
Greek zone) protested, typically about the forceful seizures of their churches and 
schools in actions led by nearby military and civil officials sometimes accompanied 
by a number of zealous allies among the civilian population.  In fact, Bulgarian and 
Greek government leaders at first took halting steps o rein in such transfers of church 
control, apparently fearing potential destabilization of their important military 
alliance as they still waged campaigns (in Thrace and Epirus) against Ottoman forces.  
Most significantly, Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and Bulgarian Army 
Representative Hesapchiev (under orders from Prime Minister Geshov) reached an 
accord in early February, 1913.  It ordered their rspective military and civil 
authorities in Macedonia to return all church and school jurisdiction to the status quo 
that obtained before the start of the war.35  Administrative correspondence about 
Macedonian residents’ complaints, however, suggests tha  lower-level military and 
                                                
35 TsVA, Fond 1647, opis 2 a.e. 24, p.50 (memorandum fro Bulgarian Army Representative in Solun 




civil functionaries on both sides violated the accord from the start without serious 
restraint from their superiors.36   
In contrast to the conversion of mosques and other Muslim properties to 
Christian uses, the seizures of Christian churches and schools by the competing 
Orthodox factions occurred almost exclusively in villages rather than large towns or 
cities during the period between the two Balkan Wars.  The rival national 
governments (as well as the Western consuls and journalists who helped shape 
international public opinion of the Balkan governments) could not readily monitor 
such remote locations.  Those Christians who openly complained about such seizures, 
as well as their rivals who justified them, typically cast themselves as representing the 
wishes of the majority, or at least of a substantial portion, of their village population.  
Yet whichever way they might have leaned inwardly, most Orthodox villagers 
continued their time-honored pattern, observed during the preceding Ottoman period, 
of outwardly accepting whichever church jurisdiction appeared safest.  Most of the 
villagers of Radovo near Demir Hisar, for example, had switched their allegiance 
from the Exarchate to the Patriarchate in 1908 after  band of Greek andartes had 
appeared in the area and tortured and harassed three exarchist leaders.  With the 
arrival of the Bulgarian army in 1912, most switched back to the Exarchate.  Yet the 
Bulgarian district commander of Demir Hisar reported he following March that “a 
portion of the villagers declared themselves yet again as patriarchists” after a 
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Patriarchate bishop and priest from Demir Hisar came to Radovo and declared that it 
had not yet been decided whether their area would go to Bulgaria or Greece.37 
An even broader swath of Macedonia’s residents worried about their uncertain 
economic and commercial prospects after the First Balkan War than about the 
jurisdiction over their local church.  Whatever its flaws, the preceding Ottoman rule 
over all of Macedonia had provided an integrated single market.  In the large rural 
areas, peasant farmers and pastoralists produced crops and livestock, which they took 
to market in nearby commercial towns and cities.  Further afield within this single 
market, of course, were the Empire’s vast provinces in Anatolia, the Levant and 
North Africa.  In addition, Macedonian port cities such as Salonika and Kavalla 
served by the early twentieth century as dynamic and growing outlets for the 
worldwide export of cash crops (primarily tobacco and cotton) from the entire 
surrounding Macedonian and Thracian hinterland.  The First Balkan War brought this 
trade to an abrupt halt.  In November, 1912, the American consul in Salonika reported 
that “since October 1st, trade with the interior has ceased.”  Urban merchants on the 
coast faced bankruptcy due to the decline in shipments and to the grim fact that credit 
customers in the interior were now often dead or pennil ss.38  While minimal 
shipments soon resumed, the problems and worries of merchants only increased, as 
for many months there was no certainty of what would become of the surrounding 
territory.39  Indeed, the only certainty was that permanent new borders of some kind 
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would appear within Macedonia and Thrace where theyhad not existed before.  And 
borders would most likely entail tariffs that would restrict the flow of trade. 
For broader geographic Macedonia, prospective Greek rul  of the Aegean 
coast at first appeared as the biggest threat to commerce.  Drawing a border just north 
of the coast between new Greek and Bulgarian territory would cut the coastal port 
cities off from any of the rural hinterlands that hd traditionally supplied them with 
products for export and markets for imports.  Members of Jewish organizations in 
Salonika, representing both large labor and commercial classes, expressed precisely 
this concern.  They initially favored Bulgarian rather than Greek annexation of the 
city as a second-best solution if they could not achieve their favored outcome of 
designating Salonika as an internationally-controlled free trade zone.40  Under 
Bulgarian rule, their reasoning went, the contiguous hinterland deep into the 
agricultural heartland of the Balkans would form a ore valuable market area for 
Salonika than the narrow coastal strip that Greek rule would have offered, though alas 
not as large as the free trade zone promised by an inter ationalized city.  Furthermore, 
Greece had several other major ports, including Piraeus and Chalkis, to which 
Salonika would be an afterthought.  The Greeks might therefore treat Salonika 
primarily as a border city and military bulwark against the Slavic threat. 
Nevertheless, if Greek rule initially seemed disadvantageous from an 
economic point of view, a number of groups in Macedonia soon began to perceive the 
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new Bulgarian administration as discouraging even th  most basic revival of 
economic activity and commerce.  Villagers living i the Bulgarian zone near the 
towns of Serres, Pravishta, and Kavalla reportedly faced dire food shortages and were 
“sinking into dark misery.”41  They could not import wheat and other basic goods 
because Bulgarian authorities had banned the export of wheat from Kavalla and too 
often blocked villagers from traveling between the villages and the towns in order to 
buy and sell.  Similarly, many merchants and others from Serres could not conduct 
their trading activities in Salonika and elsewhere because of the Bulgarian 
administration’s restrictions on civilian use of rail and road transport. 42  Bulgarian 
authorities, in their investigations of such complaints, actually confirmed that customs 
officials in Kavalla had banned the export of wheat from that city, a policy endorsed 
by the Ministry of Finance.43  They also confirmed (even while denying that such 
policies hindered civilian travel) that rail travel was forbidden to civilians between 
Serres and Salonika, while road travel by car, horse  foot required permission from 
the local Bulgarian commandant.44  Residents in the Bulgarian zone often relayed 
allegations about these and other restrictions (they also included discrimination 
against Greek-flagged merchant vessels, high taxation, and double taxation) through 
officials of the neighboring Greek zone.  Greek officials suggested in turn that 
Bulgarian authorities targeted ethnic Greeks with such policies.45   
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Nonetheless, the perception that Bulgarian officials displayed indifference 
toward the revival of commerce in Macedonia was not limi ed merely to the Greek 
community.  While the Greek customs authority allowed goods to come into Salonika 
duty-free from Serbia and Bulgaria (the former hinterland), Bulgaria and Serbia 
began to charge high tariffs on goods from Salonika in January of 1913.46  The 
following month, the mostly Jewish Salonika Chamber of Commerce circulated a 
protest to the foreign consuls of the Great Powers against the Bulgarian and Serbian 
tariffs.47  An American tobacco exporter complained about howBulgaria had 
administered the Aegean port city of Kavalla before l sing it in the Second Balkan 
War: 
To sum the matter up, the Bulgarians at no time during their occupation showed any 
inclination to assist merchants in facilitating therunning of their businesses; in fact 
the reverse was more often the case.  Several deputations waited upon them on 
various business matters, which, however, were neither appreciated nor even 
considered by the Officials. 
 
The merchant also complained that the Bulgarian authorities arbitrarily confiscated 
large sums of money from wealthy Jews and Turks, closed the port often with no 
warning and for seemingly arbitrary reasons (something the Greek administration did 
not do in Salonika), and imposed various new taxes on the tobacco trade.48 
 Greek and Bulgarian officials in liberated Macedonia established (at least on 
paper) bureaucratic processes whereby they investigated locals’ claims about 
misconduct or neglect by their respective administrations.  From the start, however, 
rather than viewing residents’ complaints as opportunities to correct problems and 
                                                                                                                                 
Religion, note to Bulgarian Army Headquarters regarding complaint from Greek minister 
plenipotentiary, Apr. 10, 1913).  
46 The Times of London, January 1, 1913: 5. 
47 2/10/13 dispatch from Kehl to State Department headqu rters (CACS, RG 84, NARA). 




win over the populations they governed, officials often treated such complaints as 
manifestations of recalcitrance from potentially disloyal ethnic groups.  Investigations 
of criticisms usually resulted in blanket denials of their validity, and sometimes in 
orders to threaten or punish those who had dared to submit them.  Thus, Greece’s 
Governor-General of Macedonia reported that soon after the Greek army’s entry into 
Salonika, in response to Jewish newspaper publishers “stoking passions against the 
Greeks, I court-martialed one of them and installed preemptive censorship.”49  A 
week later, Prince Nicholas issued a general “[o]rder egarding the reporting of news 
in the press.”  The order prohibited “criticism of actions of commanders and of the 
army and the publication of images or representations that diminish their prestige.”  
Also banned was the publication of items “that aim t negatively influencing the army 
and popular morale or which may bring about estrangement and antipathy between 
the different nations and sections of the population.”50  The next day, the Governor-
General fumed that “the Bulgarian newspapers refused to submit to any kind of 
censorship,”51 and on December 13, 1912 his administration suspended publication of 
Salonika’s Bulgarian newspaper, Bulgarin.52   
 Bulgarian officials also suspected ethnic treachery b hind complaints about 
their own administration in Macedonia, and they react d accordingly.  “Our tolerance 
towards all non-Bulgarian nations is almost criminal,” wrote one, insisting that a 
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nearby Greek commander’s complaint about Bulgarian t eatment of ethnic Greek 
civilians was nothing but a “Greek fantasy.”53  In reacting to a February, 1913 report 
that thousands of ethnic Greeks under Bulgarian administration were lodging 
complaints about mistreatment, the Bulgarian army representative did not pause to 
reflect upon which Bulgarian policies might be giving rise to such complaints.  
Instead, he urged Bulgaria’s Military Governor of Macedonia to “issue the necessary 
orders to your dependent authorities to pursue and c pture the Greek agitators who 
disturb the spirits of the inhabitants and incite th m to file complaints.”54  Some days 
earlier, Bulgaria’s Serres provincial governor directed his district authorities to 
“exercise a tight police surveillance especially over the non-Bulgarian elements” in 
those areas where “the majority of the population is ot Bulgarian, but consists either 
of mixed elements or is pure Muslim or pure Greek.”55  Yet residents’ complaints of 
misconduct or neglect by Greek or Bulgarian administrations were not generally 
attempts to destabilize those administrations.  When filing complaints, residents never 
questioned the authority of the new administrations that governed them.  On the 
contrary, they arguably reinforced their rulers’ legitimacy by asking them to use their 
power to rectify problems.  Even when local residents enlisted Western consuls or 
officials of the rival neighboring administrative zone to transmit their grievances as 
extra leverage, their express purpose was always to persuade those who governed 
them to address various concerns about property rights, security, corruption, 
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restrictions on economic activity, and indeed even issues potentially related to ethnic 
questions such as church jurisdiction.   
Yet, as months passed without a clear signal regarding what would become of 
Macedonian territories in a final settlement among the victorious allies of the ongoing 
Balkan War, some of Macedonia’s residents did begin try g to influence the 
outcome themselves.  Local calls within Macedonia for rule by a specific Balkan 
government (Bulgaria, Greece or Serbia) were, however, slow to appear.  Instead, a 
growing and surprisingly diverse array of local resid nts became attracted to the 
notion of establishing some form of autonomous status for Macedonia, rather than 
partition by the Balkan states.  Of course, autonomy for Macedonia was the ideal long 
advocated by many activists of VMRO.  Their hopes wre crushed as they came to 
realize, during the course of the Balkan Wars, that M cedonia’s “liberation” would 
mean its partition.  Upon the outbreak of war in 1912, one of its members, Todor Pop 
Antov, had volunteered with his wife Poliksena Mosinova as medical orderlies in the 
Bulgarian army’s Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Volunteers unit.  Yet Antov’s support 
of Bulgaria’s war effort was wrapped up with his impression that Bulgaria supported 
an autonomous status for Macedonia.  While serving, A tov and his comrades 
became dismayed when during the course of the London egotiations it was revealed 
that Bulgaria (along with its Balkan allies) had in fact embarked on the war against 
the Ottoman Empire with the intention of partitioning Macedonian territory. 
For the Macedonian volunteer it was a sad thing to en ertain the notion that his 
fatherland, for which countless sacrifices had been given in the epic revolutionary 
struggles to realize the ideal of freedom for Macedonia in its geographic entirety, 
now, with the Balkan War, was being torn into pieces to be distributed like spoils to 
the Balkan Allies.  The Bulgarian government, which only seven years before (during 
the European mission in Turkey to implement reforms in Macedonia) had supported 




Serbian principle of partition …. the Macedonian volunteer could not understand 
this!56 
 
 But many others without connections to the Macedonian revolutionary 
movement also began to consider autonomy for Macedonia as an attractive practical 
solution to overlapping territorial claims, especially fter experiencing some doubts 
that their “liberators” would treat them better than the preceding Ottoman imperial 
regime.  A friendly sergeant who entered Demir-Hisar with the Bulgarian army in 
1912 made a lasting impression even on the generally pro-Bulgarian headmaster from 
Macedonia, Biliukbashiev, when he predicted that the only difference Biliukbashiev 
would perceive with his liberation was that his “tsar” would now be Bulgaria’s 
Ferdinand instead of the Sultan.57  Soon afterwards, stronger misgivings about the 
Bulgarian regime crept into Biliukabashiev’s mind as a lieutenant in the Bulgarian 
army frankly explained to him, “We, Mr. Biliukbashiev, fight Turkey because we 
need territory, because we need the White [i.e. Aegean] Sea; the liberation of 
Macedonia is only a pretext.”58   
As noted earlier, many of Salonika’s Jews strongly favored a settlement that 
would accord some form of autonomy to their city.  More surprising agitation for 
local autonomy during the period between the two Balkan Wars arose among Greeks 
or Greek-speakers living in the Bulgarian zone of Macedonia.  Traditionally, pro-
Greek activists in Macedonia had not been associated with any proposals for the 
region’s autonomy.  Yet Bulgaria’s Assistant Commander in Chief received 
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disturbing reports by January 1913 that “Greeks in the various towns and villages” of 
Bulgaria’s Macedonian Military Governorship were collecting signatures to petition 
the Great Powers at the ongoing London conference for autonomy, “as they 
supposedly are not pleased with the Bulgarian administration.”  Macedonian Military 
Governor Vûlkov ordered the arrest and exemplary punishment under military justice 
of those guilty of the agitation for autonomy.59 
 In contrast to the relatively early appeals from various quarters for 
Macedonian autonomy, local public agitation in Macedonia in favor of rule by a 
particular Balkan government (either Bulgaria, Greece, or Serbia) took more time to 
surface.  Certain long-time activists for one or the other national cause probably 
began working behind the scenes in the interest of their favored national government 
from the start of the First Balkan War.  A memoirist ecalled that a certain Stoian, 
who operated the most well-appointed café in the Bulgarian-administered town of 
Demir Hisar, was reportedly “not only a Grecoman, but a big fanatic.”  Around the 
start of 1913, Stoian gained the trust of Bulgarian officers, who enjoyed sitting in his 
café and bantering about politics.  Occasionally in co versation they would reveal 
Bulgarian troop movements.  Unbeknownst to the officers, Greek sympathizers who 
sat nearby and “gave off the impression that they wre uninterested” were listening 
intently and reporting what they heard to Greeks in Salonika and Serres.60  Over time, 
the provisional nature of the three Balkan administrations in Macedonia became 
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increasingly obvious.  So did the lack of interest on the part of the Balkan Allies and 
Great Powers alike in any scheme for Macedonian autonomy.  This political situation, 
combined with the kinds of disagreeable post-liberation experiences under new 
administrations surveyed above, eventually engendered more overt agitation for rule 
by a favored Balkan government.   
The most dramatic – and even violent – instance of local agitation in favor of 
a national government occurred in June 1913 during the days immediately preceding 
the commencement of the Second Balkan War in Tikveš, an area under Serbian 
administration.  From January 1913, Serbian authorities had begun exacting heavy 
requisitions from the local population, even as they exerted pressure on Christians to 
assimilate.  They closed schools and cultural centers, r quired instruction and church 
services to be conducted in Serbian, deported and imprisoned teachers and priests 
deemed pro-Bulgarian, and in a May census forced local Christians to declare that 
they were Serbs who had been “Bulgarized” under Bulgarian pressure.  Apparently in 
reaction to this repression, around 250 local civilians took up arms against the Serbian 
regime in early June, 1913, in what scholars have termed the “Tikveš Uprising.”  The 
locals were organized by members of the Bulgarian-affiliated Macedonian-
Adrianopolitan Volunteer Corps who had returned to Tikveš during the previous two 
months, and were joined by around 1,000 seasoned guerillas of VMRO.  The 
insurgents managed to seize and proclaim a Bulgarian government in much of Tikveš, 
in anticipation of the arrival of Bulgarian troops who were now beginning their 
offensive against the Serbian and Greek armies.  As the military momentum in the 




Tikveš and exacted severe reprisals.  All in all, the Serbian reprisals claimed as many 
as 1,200 victims, along with up to a thousand houses burned.61 
Tellingly, such instances of agitation in favor of a particular national 
government were most highly concentrated in those areas where jurisdiction seemed 
most uncertain or disputed.  These districts either lay near the fuzzy provisional 
borders of the neighboring administrative zones (like Bulgarian-held Kukush 
province) or (like Serbian-held Tikveš) had been specified by Serbia and Bulgaria in 
their 1912 alliance as areas whose future would be et rmined with the help of 
Russian arbitration.  The governor of the Bulgarian administration’s Kukush province 
remarked upon this geographic pattern of instances of national agitation in March, 
1913.  A pro-Bulgarian resident from the town of Gumendje had informed the 
provincial governor that Greek priests, accompanied by “Grecoman” town elders 
made the rounds in Gumendje among the “Grecoman” inhabitants, having them sign 
a petition proclaiming their desire to remain under th  rule of the Greek kingdom.  
According to the Bulgarian governor, “Grecoman” resid nts of the Lûgadinsko area 
even gathered signatures for a similar petition from Muslim villagers.  The Muslims 
supposedly expressed their preference for Greece sin “the Christian population 
living in the area is exclusively Greek and Grecoman and the Turks would live much 
better if they were to be under Greek authority.”  Muslims who might have harbored 
reservations about this petition no doubt reckoned th y had better sign it, as the local 
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pro-Greek Christians who circulated it were “dressed up in military clothes and 
accompanied by soldiers and police.”  Both sites of pr -Greek agitation (Gumendje 
and Lûgadinsko) at this time lay at the edge of the Gr ek administrative zone next to 
the Bulgarian one.  Greece’s control over them at this time was still tenuous and their 
political future appeared unclear.  However, the Bulgarian provincial governor 
managed to visit Greek-held villages around Salonika, where he spoke “with both 
Bulgarians and Grecomans.”  There, no nationalist agitation was occurring “because 
it is reckoned that the area will surely remain under Greek rule.”62   
 
Descent into the Second Balkan War 
As detailed in Chapter 2, Serbian forces during the First Balkan War had 
occupied all of the zone designated for Russian arbitr tion in the secret annex to the 
Bulgaro-Serb treaty of March 1912, along with much of the area designated in that 
annex to go to Bulgaria outright.  But by January, 1913, Austria-Hungary had secured 
the Great Powers’ commitment not to permit Serbia any territorial outlet to the 
Adriatic Sea despite the latter’s successful campaign in Albania.  Claiming that the 
1912 Serb-Bulgarian agreement over Macedonian partition had been predicated on 
the assumption of acquiring such an Adriatic outlet, S rbia now demanded as 
compensation a revision of the treaty that would award it more territory in 
Macedonia.63  Bulgaria rejected these demands.  Talks between Gr ece and Bulgaria 
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during the early months of 1913 to delineate a boundary between them in eastern 
Macedonia also broke down, as the quarrel over Salonika continued to frustrate any 
overall agreement.  Their parallel disputes with Bulgaria spelled an increasingly 
apparent convergence of interests between Serbia and Greece.     
By the spring of 1913, events on the ground demonstrated to Macedonia’s 
local inhabitants the distinct possibility that this territorial impass might bring about a 
second armed conflict, this time between the Balkan Allies themselves.  Tension 
between the Greek and Bulgarian armies at all levels had been highly visible in 
Salonika from the start.  Salonika was the one Macedonian locality where significant 
numbers of two allied armies (Greek and Bulgarian) were continuously stationed by 
mutual agreement after the expulsion of the Ottoman ilitary.64  The two armies did 
not share the city amicably, as shown by a highly visible fracas reported by the Times 
of London within the first two weeks of the city’s joint occupation: 
Another incident arose from an attempt of the Greeks to seize the mosque of Saint 
Sofia, of which the Bulgarians had taken possession in rder to provide 
accommodation for their troops.  The Greeks interpreted this as indicating a desire on 
the part of their allies to dedicate the mosque to the Bulgarian Church.  The 
Bulgarians were forced on two occasions to drive the Greeks troops away.65 
 
The mutual hostility between the two armies existed even at the rank and file level.  
In December, 1912, Bulgarian troops “threw the Greeks out bodily” after Greek 
soldiers had tried to occupy a telegraph post along the Salonika-Constantinople line, 
otherwise held by the Bulgarians.  This occurred unbek ownst to the Greek and 
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Bulgarian high commands, who stepped in to reach a mutually face-saving solution to 
the confrontation.66  Bulgaria’s 7th Rila Division had only lightly occupied certain 
points along its 1912 invasion route against Ottoman forces south towards Salonika.  
Much of the division soon moved on eastward to the T racian front where Ottoman 
resistance was fiercest, and Greek units took the opportunity to infiltrate those areas 
largely vacated by the Bulgarian forces.  As a consequence, incidents occurred almost 
daily between Bulgarian and Greek soldiers, sometime resulting in fatalities.67   
Such clashes only increased in scale and seriousness ov r the winter and 
spring of 1913.  Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia wrapped up their respective remaining 
campaigns against Ottoman forces in Thrace, Epirus and Albania and began 
concentrating their troops in Macedonia in order to press their competing claims 
there.  One confrontation in March, 1913, between Greek and Bulgarian troops 
northeast of Salonika at Nigrita resulted in at least 300 deaths.68  Large Greek-
Bulgarian clashes followed in April and May as well.  As noted above, the Bulgarian 
military formed two new brigades by conscripting young male residents in its 
occupied areas of Serres and Kavalla during the spring of 1913.  The new Bulgarian 
brigades were intended to help guard against Greek d signs on eastern Macedonia 
while the bulk of Bulgarian forces were still arrayed against the Ottoman army in 
Thrace.69  There could be no more direct sign than this to locals that the currently 
allied Balkan governments were not only attempting o consolidate state power in 
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newly occupied territories but also mobilizing for potential military campaigns 
against each other. 
Following secret talks over the spring of 1913, Serbia and Greece agreed to a 
treaty essentially committing each other to defend the territory their armies had taken 
in Macedonia against Bulgarian claims.  They signed th  treaty on June 1, 1913, just a 
day after the Balkan Allies (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro) signed the 
Treaty of London ending their war with the Ottoman Empire.  The situation 
deteriorated rapidly afterwards.  Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek leaders refused to back 
down on their territorial demands in Macedonia.  They were each supported or even 
pressured by significant segments of their respectiv  political elite to press these 
claims by force if necessary.70  Clashes between Greek and Bulgarian soldiers and 
between Serbian and Bulgarian soldiers continued.  On June 30, 1913 – only a month 
after the formal end of the First Balkan War – a Bulgarian attack along several points 
against Greek and Serbian lines inaugurated the Second Balkan War. 
As shown above, many Christians living in Macedonia had become active 
during the preceding few months in promoting the territorial claims of a particular 
national government, especially after autonomy for the region proved an unrealistic 
goal.  Nevertheless – and perhaps unlike many of their counterparts living within the 
old borders of the belligerent Balkan states – avail ble evidence suggests that their 
activism generally did not translate into enthusiasm for a second war to resolve the 
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territorial dilemmas.  In Demir Hisar, fear of cholera infection from soldiers 
outweighed otherwise pro-Bulgarian civilians’ potential desire to aid their own 
putative side in war preparations.  Residents hesitat d to house soldiers, and civilians 
often even administered beatings to “thirsty and tired [Bulgarian] soldiers who defied 
orders not to drink from the public fountains.”71   
Indeed, the widespread desertion among local men mobilized into various 
“volunteer” or “Macedonian” units, already feared by commanders, occurred even as 
war between the former Balkan Allies approached and commenced.  By February 
1913 the Bulgarian General Staff was struggling to combat demoralization among a 
large part of the Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Volunteer Corps who wanted to return 
to their homes in Macedonia and apparently saw little connection between their 
fighting in Thrace on Bulgaria’s behalf and their personal aspirations for a liberated 
Macedonia.72  Yet the Volunteer units’ subsequent relocation back to Bulgarian-held 
parts of Macedonia apparently did not satisfy many of their ranks either.  A large 
number deserted on the eve of the Second Balkan War, defying arrest by Bulgarian 
authorities for some time by traveling in armed groups.73  Fear of contracting the 
cholera then spreading within Bulgarian army ranks i fluenced the decision of some 
to desert.74  Bulgaria’s Chief of Staff Fichev blamed both a residual “spirit of 
Grecomanism” and a general “unpreparedness for war”for the particularly high 
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number of desertions from his army’s newly formed “Drama” and “Serres” brigades 
in the first days of the Second Balkan War.75  Indeed, the young men from Macedonia 
drafted into those units had been exempt as Christians under Ottoman rule from 
military service in return for payment of a special mi itary tax.  Many of them no 
doubt now balked at this onerous and dangerous new civic obligation.76   
Anxiety and even panic – not belligerence or anticipation of national 
redemption – were the most widespread sentiments among civilians in Macedonia 
when the Second Balkan War actually broke out.  Many local Christians had seen 
only months before what Balkan armies had done to Muslim civilians perceived as 
enemy populations.  They now feared (often with justification, as it turned out) what 
might happen to them at the hands of invading armies if they were perceived as 
enemy civilians.  Four days before the formal outbreak of war, civilians escaped 
across to Bulgarian lines from the villages of Braikovtsi and Bogdantsi, reporting acts 
of cruelty against them by Serbian and Greek soldiers who were setting up positions 
there.77  According to a commissioner of Vodena in Greek-held western Macedonia, 
he and other local Greek officials were powerless in the opening days of the war to 
assuage the panicked flight of roughly 500 civilians i  his area when the Bulgarian 
army occupied Gevgeli and false rumors circulated that Bulgarian units had come 
even closer.  Although certain “trained and tested Muslim former soldiers” requested 
arms to resist the expected invasion, militarily inexperienced Christian Greek 
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civilians did not.  “The terror of the Muslims and of the Greeks as well comes from 
their having read in the newspapers about the savageries and atrocities of the 
Bulgarians,” the commissioner explained, revealing the effectiveness of national 
propaganda.78   
Maria Izmirlieva, a Bulgarian teacher from the town of Kukush, recalled her 
experience of the Second Balkan War’s onset as one of tragedy and trauma from the 
start.  Entering an abandoned Turkish house where she heard that wounded Bulgarian 
soldiers from the front were being treated, she “witnessed a horrible scene.”  “Only 
one other woman” (Rusha Delcheva, the sister of slain M cedonian guerilla leader 
Gotse Delchev) was helping the military doctors there.  Although she heard the 
groans of wounded soldiers begging for help, doctors whispered to Izmirlieva that 
there was no time for the seriously wounded as the Greeks were approaching; she 
could only daub light wounds with iodine and send the soldiers on their way.  The 
same afternoon, apprentices from her brother’s patisserie informed her that she must 
go home because her family was getting ready to flee th  town.  As she left the ward, 
one gravely wounded young soldier whom she wanted to help “burst into desperate 
tears.  I burst into tears as well, but I was powerless to help him.”  Later during her 
flight, she cried again over the memory of this soldier “who so hopefully expected my 
help.” 79  Even though she personally (and perhaps somewhat exceptionally among 
civilians in Kukush at that particularly dangerous time) went out of her way to help 
soldiers, Izmirlieva recalled nothing resembling initial patriotic euphoria locally at the 
outbreak of hostilities, but rather apprehension and horror. 
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After Bulgaria’s initial June 30 attack along Greek and Serbian lines, it lost 
the military momentum immediately.  Its armies were pushed almost continuously 
back towards the old Bulgarian borders by the Serbs from the west and by the Greeks 
from the south.80  Izmirlieva’s flight from Kukush occurred four days after the war’s 
outbreak, just before the destruction of her home town in a fierce battle that would 
end in a major victory for Greek over Bulgarian forces.  Her family was part of a tide 
of refugees who, identifying themselves as Bulgarians or fearing that they would be 
identified as such, fled mostly on foot in advance of the oncoming Greek and Serbian 
armies.  Yet records of these refugees’ stories overwh lmingly suggest they left their 
homes with great reluctance, not to reach a national promised land, but as a last resort 
when their situation appeared physically untenable.   
Many of those who fled indeed appear not to have understood the imminence 
of the threat to their lives for quite some time.  They put off their preparations and 
departures until the last minute, causing them to be woefully unprepared for the 
conditions they would face as refugees.  Izmirlieva’s f mily spent a fearful night 
trying to sleep and “wondering what to bring and what to leave from our full home” 
before leaving her town the next morning.  For her part, Izmirlieva ended up that 
morning wrapping “one dress and [her] fine suit of English fabric tailored in Solun” 
in a cloth.  Her mother wrapped a few articles of children’s clothing in another cloth, 
while each of them had to carry a child too young to walk.  Her brother gathered a 
few documents.  None of them brought food. 81 
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A little girl at the time, Maria Bozhkova remembered the utter dread and 
confusion of the refugees literally running on foot n rth along the Struma River 
valley from Kukush.  Her mother gripped her tightly out of fear that the rush of 
refugees would separate them, while she carried her infant in another arm.  Like 
Izmirlieva’s family they took almost nothing with tem.  Bozhkova’s mother had to 
strip down to her petticoat at night in order to cover her daughter with her skirt.  
Although it had been hot during the day, it became too cold at night to sleep on the 
bare earth, and the refugees opted to press on rather than sleep.  They reached the 
town of Gorna Djumaia, a distance of no less than sixty-eight miles from Kukush, the 
whole group on foot or in wagons having neither eaten nor slept.82  The refugees 
generally said nothing to each other during their flight.  Among the few who spoke, 
one cried, “God, they will butcher us all.”  Another suggested that “we should all be 
in a heap at the time we are slaughtered,” apparently so that some at the bottom might 
have a chance of surviving.83  Another memoirist in this stream of fleeing refugees, 
Ivan Tenchev Gelebeshev, remembers how many women and children became ill 
during the journey through the difficult mountain terrain.  Refugees “cried and cursed 
both the war and liberty” while in mid-flight.84  Retreating Bulgarian soldiers, among 
them Bozhkova’s father, soon caught up with this stream of refugees.  Heeding his 
wife’s stern order, Mr. Bozhkov remained with his family for the remainder of the 
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journey instead of with his unit.  As suggested above, this was not an unusual choice 
for local men drafted by the Bulgarian government in preparation for this war.85 
The Bulgarian refugees’ dismay upon the outbreak of war was not rooted in 
an expectation of the Bulgarian army’s defeat.  Quite the contrary, several recall their 
mistaken assumption, even while in flight for their lives, of an eventual Bulgarian 
victory.  As Bozhkova explains, “the reputation of our army was at that time great, 
having won many victories,” and thus she heard conversations “to the effect that our 
troops will make the Greeks pay.”86  In Demir Hisar, the post office master reassured 
the school headmaster Biliukbashiev, who had been worried, that two Bulgarian 
brigades coming south from Petrich would soon help to turn the tide against the 
Greeks.  This reassurance indeed played a role in Biliukbashiev’s negligible 
preparation for his own flight from the town.  On the morning of July 5, he noticed 
uneasiness in the streets including Bulgarian troops moving in disarray.  Even at that 
moment he “had a lot of difficulty believing that the Bulgarian army could retreat 
before the Greek one.”  Yet when that same morning a cavalry officer told him in no 
uncertain terms that he must “run if you are Bulgarian,” he escaped with his four 
children after ordering them to dress hastily.  Besid  the clothes they wore, they took 
only a rifle, something Biliukbashiev attributes to “having lost my head completely” 
in the panic.  Yet Biliukbashiev “still thought that this flight was temporary, that we 
would run to some spot outside the town, and we would soon return.” 87 
This common delusion among the fleeing refugees that they would soon be 
able to return home also appears to have been conneted to their desperate desire to 
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return and disinclination to countenance the possibility that they might not.  The 
moment Biliukbashiev heard an unfounded rumor that Bulgarian authority was being 
reestablished in Demir Hisar and it would be safe to re urn, he and his family along 
with three other men spun around in mid-flight in order to walk homeward.  Several 
Bulgarian soldiers they met along the way back failed to comprehend how Bulgarian 
civilians could decide to walk home southward toward Greek lines at this time.  They 
could not believe they were Bulgarians, crying “Greeks – grab them and slaughter 
them!”  When one soldier came to their defense, others responded “These are Greeks, 
or at the very least spies for the Greeks.  The Bulgarians are running to the north, and 
these people are turning south.”88   
The incident points to a fundamental gulf in mentalities between long-time 
citizens of the Balkan states – socialized for at le st a generation to believe that 
people naturally wanted above all else to live with their own kind in a nation-state – 
and residents of former Ottoman Macedonia, who might have identified with an 
ethnic or national group but whose attachment to their ancestral home and locality 
typically came first.  Bulgarian soldiers, bound to their national identity, could only 
conceive of this group of civilians returning home against the tide as either Greeks or 
traitors.89  Despite warnings that it was dangerous from a more friendly group of 
officers, Biliukbashiev continued stubbornly homeward, if only at that point to try to 
retrieve some valuables.  Only when he reached Demir Hisar and realized that he was 
very near the front line did he give up and turn back to escape for his life.90  
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Indeed, there was no quick return home.  The enemy ar ies continued to 
advance swiftly, generally causing the refugees to escape eventually to cities within 
the old borders of Bulgaria, first to Dupnitsa or Radomir where they could board a 
train to Sofia further north.  The nature of refugees’ encounters with other 
Macedonian Christians along their flight path through Macedonia once again supports 
the argument of the previous chapter that there was little overarching solidarity – no 
larger “imagined community” – between people of the same purported ethnicity 
across long distances in Macedonia.  Even now in the grave circumstances of war the 
sense of shared sacrifice and ethnic brotherhood/sisterhood was at best uneven, as 
refugees often pointedly revealed in their recollections.  As they stopped in 
Macedonian villages and towns along the way, desperate for shelter, food, or other 
support, their reception by other local Christians ranged from generously sympathetic 
(especially when they were lucky enough to find relatives or acquaintances) to 
indifferent and even unfriendly.  Maria Bozhkova’s family arrived in Gorna Djumaia, 
“but there they did not want refugees,” she recalls.  The men had to beg at the 
municipal building for a place to stay, and her family was “crammed like sardines 
with many other refugees in a dirty house” that hadbeen abandoned by a Greek.91  
Zlata Serafimova, thirteen years old at the time her family fled, recalled that “in one 
village the women pelted us with stones and shouted, ‘You have left to escape with 
your men, while our men have been killed on the battlefield.’” 92  Thus, despite many 
pro-Bulgarian civilians’ expectation of Bulgarian victory, none recalled any euphoria 
or sense of excitement at the beginning of the war,as took place for example 
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throughout Western and Central Europe at the start of the First World War or even 
among many Macedonian Christians at the start of the First Balkan War. 
Because the war went quickly against Bulgaria, the majority of Christian 
refugees were those who fled in advance of the oncoming Greek and Serbian armies.  
Yet streams of refugees also moved in the other dirction, many under quite different 
circumstances from those who fled toward Bulgaria.  One large influx into Greece 
was composed of civilians from the vicinities of Strumitsa (in Vardar Macedonia) and 
Melnik (in Pirin Macedonia.)  These districts had constituted part of the Bulgarian 
administrative zone after the First Balkan War, andwere taken by the Greek army 
during the second war.  The civilians left their homes in August 1913 shortly after the 
signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, which formally ended the Second Balkan War and 
awarded both Melnik and Strumitsa again to Bulgaria.  Actual military combat had 
already ended weeks before, but at the time of the civilians’ exodus the Greek army 
was still present in the area, preparing to withdraw peacefully to the newly drawn 
Greek borders under the terms of the Treaty.  Later that month, the Greek Bureau of 
Labor put the number of refugees from those localities at no less than 43,000, out of a 
total of 133,935 who had fled into the Greek-annexed areas of Macedonia.93  A Greek 
exposé of abusive Bulgarian conduct during the Balkan Wars explained the departure 
of these civilians from their homes as follows:  
The Greeks and Turks of these regions tremble at the idea of again coming under the 
Bulgarian yoke…. They are so terrified that many of them have decided to gather the 
remains of their belongings, burn their homes and churches, and re-establish 
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themselves in Greece, and not be martyrs to a new tyranny.  This clearly shows that 
these miserable men have suffered much during several months of Bulgarian 
occupation.94 
 
Yet members of the Carnegie Endowment for Internatio l Peace commission 
sent to investigate the episode questioned this version of the refugees’ motivations.  
Having interviewed both Muslims and Christians who had taken part in this exodus, 
the commission reported in 1914 that the Greek military, before its departure, had 
ordered the Greek and Muslim residents to gather thei belongings and leave for 
Greece, after which their houses (in Strumitsa and neighboring villages) were 
systematically burned.  “The Bulgarian quarter” of Strumitsa “was not burned, since 
the object of the Greeks was to circulate the legend that the non-Bulgarian inhabitants 
had themselves burned their own houses.”  The commission heard from Muslims for 
whom “the future was a blank.  They did not wish to go to Asia, nor did they wish to 
settle, they knew not how nor where, in Greek territory.  They regretted their 
homes…”  The Greek military managed to persuade some of the Greeks of the 
wisdom of their flight, having warned them that “the Bulgarians would massacre 
them if they remained.”  Yet there were “indications” that some Greeks from Melnik, 
where the houses had not been burned, “will endeavor to return when the pressure is 
relaxed.”95  This extraordinary explanation of the departure of civilians from 
Strumitsa and Melnik is independently confirmed in the contemporaneous reports 
from the American consul in Salonika, dated several months before the publication of 
the Carnegie Commission report.  “In conversation with several of these 
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unfortunates,” the consul wrote, “a uniform story was told – they had no desire to 
abandon their village, after passing through two wars, but were forced to do so by the 
Greeks.”  An American missionary also reported to the consulate that “a Strumitsa 
Greek was weeping to a friend of mine today.  He said, ‘We did not want to leave our 
home and goods, but the soldiers forced us.  There w  had at least a roof and bread to 
eat.  Here we have nothing.’”96   
The episode once again illustrates the high priority that civilians in Macedonia 
placed on their attachment to ancestral homes, and their extreme reluctance to leave 
them.  This group of civilians left either because th y were coerced (by an army that 
purported to be acting on behalf of their welfare) or because they understood their 
lives to be at grave risk if they stayed.  Indeed, evidence suggests that many of the 
civilians in question in fact did endure significant suffering under Bulgarian 
occupation after the First Balkan War, to give some credence to the Greek exposé.  
Charges were lodged during the Bulgarian administrat on of threats, “outrages,” 
murders, and persecution committed in the Strumitsa are  against Greek civilians by 
Bulgarian paramilitary forces.97  The local Bulgarian constable reportedly arrested 
two men who had come to complain of abuses, and evicted and “insulted” the wives 
of a murdered and an injured man.98  The Carnegie commission estimated that 
between 700 and 800 Muslim civilians were rounded up, tortured and executed 
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mainly by Bulgarian forces in and around Strumitsa after the Ottoman army withdrew 
in the autumn of 1912.99  And yet remarkably, despite these harsh experiences under 
Bulgarian rule, many civilians from the area stated ruefully that they would have 
preferred to stay in their homes under Bulgarian sovereignty than be forced to 
immigrate to Greece by the Greek army, with only vague promises of free land and 
assistance.  A chasm once again appears between the atti udes of Greek officials, who 
assumed that Greeks should want to live in Greece, and the statements of supposed 
Greeks (adherents of the Patriarchate) from Macedonia.  They showed only sorrow 
and trepidation at the prospect of leaving their homes to immigrate to Greece. 
A clue to understanding the readiness of civilians to cling to their ancestral 
home and community even after harsh wartime experiences is provided by statements 
attributed to Muslim survivors of the massacres of the autumn of 1912 who were then 
forced by the Greek army to move to Greece.  “It is true that they had a terrible 
experience under the mixed Serbo-Bulgarian rule in the early weeks of the first war,” 
wrote the Carnegie commission.  “But this they had survived, and most of them stated 
that Bulgarian rule, after this first excess, had been at least tolerable.”100  In other 
words, the civilians hopefully linked such abuses by authorities of the Balkan states, 
terrible as they were, to abnormal wartime conditions.  One local Greek official noted 
this assumption among families from a group of “rather suspicious Bulgarian 
villages” around the town of Karatzova in southwestern Macedonia.  During the war 
while the Greek army was mobilized in the area the villagers fled their homes to the 
surrounding heights.  Now that the fighting had ended, the official commented, “the 
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families want permission to return home as soon as pos ible and are obeying the 
orders of the authorities – having seen the failure of the Bulgarian effort and owing to 
the coming reaping season, the care of the source of th ir livelihood beckons 
them.”101  Minorities thus expected the situation to normalize under peacetime 
conditions, especially if they did not challenge thlegitimacy of the new government 
and if they showed themselves to be loyal citizens.  Perhaps then they could continue 
to live unmolested where they had for generations.  This mentality among minority 
inhabitants in Macedonia lingered long after the end of the Balkan Wars, as will be 
demonstrated. 
 
Violence against Civilians during the Second Balkan War 
Many of those civilians who stayed put during the Second Balkan War instead 
of fleeing from the path of unfriendly armies endured far greater horrors than those 
who became refugees.  The grim record of how the Balkan armies and paramilitary 
forces treated civilians as they traversed Macedonia during the two Balkan Wars 
would today undoubtedly qualify as war crimes and ethnic cleansing, although the 
latter term had not yet come into use at the time.  Balkan governments attempting to 
cast their rivals’ behavior in a bad light, along with interested Western observers, 
extensively cataloged and publicized such events.  Scattered accounts of some of 
them also survive in archives.  A semi-official 1913 Greek report on Bulgarian ill-
conduct during the Balkan Wars cited a British journalist who estimated the number 
of peasants massacred by the Bulgarian army in the districts of Demir Hisar and 
                                                





Serres at 50,000.  It suggested, according to other reports from French and Italian 
journalists, a total number of 220,000 to 250,000 civilian victims of Bulgarian 
“atrocities” in Macedonia and Thrace as a whole.102  A Bulgarian report written as a 
rebuttal to the Greek one found that “almost all” of the thirty-seven villages in the 
district of Gevgeli – home to over 19,000 residents before the war – “have been 
burned” by the Greek army.103  It cited a British journalist and an American professor 
who put the number of refugees stranded in Bulgaria from the war in Macedonia at 
between 100,000 and 150,000.104   
Based far outside the Balkans in Washington, D.C., the newly formed 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace undertook one of its first major 
initiatives in 1913 by establishing a commission to study the “causes and conduct” of 
the Balkan Wars. 105  The commission traveled to Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece in 
order to gather information for its lengthy 1914 report.  As noted in the Introduction, 
the commission’s findings were highly influential in shaping international 
understanding at the time of the Balkan Wars and even of the Balkans in general.  
The commission’s report about both Balkan Wars – clearly more balanced than any 
of the contemporary exposés emanating from Balkan cou tries – found that all armies 
involved committed a large number of abuses against non-combatant populations, 
including executions, torture, arson, and rape.  It documented many such abuses in 
detail, including how the Greek army put to flight t e inhabitants of the town of 
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Kukush/Kilkis before burning it completely.  The Bulgarian army did much the same 
thing to the town of Serres after Greek paramilitares had earlier executed scores of 
local Bulgarian civilian inhabitants.106  The pre-war population of each of these towns 
numbered in the tens of thousands.   
Evidence from contemporary writings of Balkan military officers reveals 
strikingly casual attitudes, particularly among those high up in the chain of command, 
regarding the destructive activity of their armies toward civilians.  They only 
mentioned in passing, when they mentioned them at all, such actions as burning 
villages, summary executions of civilians, and creation of streams of refugees, as 
though they were simply a regrettable matter of course in war.  While the memoirs of 
General Hasan Tahsin Pasha – an Ottoman general in the First Balkan War – 
exhibited Ottoman patriotism and anguish at the Empire’s territorial losses, they are 
striking for the detachment with which they discuss the Muslim refugees who 
congregated around Salonika.  He matter-of-factly stated that the local authorities 
“had difficulty with the laborious task of housing and relief, due to the ceaseless 
influx [of refugees].”  Although mentioning that they were forced out by the 
Bulgarian army, he did not bother to identify them as Muslims, Albanians, or Turks 
with whom he had religious or ethnic kinship, nor did he dwell on their plight.107  
Greek army corporal Philippos Dragoumis, whose father was Greece’s Governor-
General of Macedonia, openly justified some Greek atrocities as a necessity of war in 
a letter to his friend Ronald Burrows, a British philhellene who had offered to help 
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him plead Greece’s moral case in front of British public opinion.  “We never 
concealed that the Greek Army burnt villages when military reasons necessitated it 
and also admit having killed comitadjis (armed peasant ) on the spot,” Dragoumis 
wrote.  “But what is equally true is that the Greek Army never did this as a reprisal to 
the Bulgarian atrocities but as a measure of security and prudence.”108  As we shall 
see, a public statement by the Greek King gave the lie to Dragoumis’ claim that the 
army would not act in reprisal.  Dragoumis’ definition of “comitadjis” as “armed 
peasants” is itself revealing.  Greeks traditionally used this term to refer to organized 
pro-Bulgarian paramilitary groups.  “Armed peasants” represented an unusually broad 
understanding of the term, suggesting that for Dragoumis, potentially any individual 
peasant encountered during military operations who appeared to pose a threat might 
be summarily executed.  
Balkan military personnel and civil officials understood atrocities against 
civilians they considered unfriendly to their cause a  legitimate reprisals.  The 
perpetrators saw a spate of them as a response to similar crimes already committed by 
the enemy.  Civilians thus served as a currency in this deadly game of score settling 
between armies.  King Constantine of Greece himself spelled out this justification in a 
telegram he sent to Greek diplomatic representatives abroad in the middle of the 
Second Balkan War.  In direct response to a reported massacre by Bulgarian soldiers 
of over a hundred notables in Demir Hisar, Constantine ordered his diplomats to  
[p]rotest in my name to the representatives of the powers and to the whole civilized 
world against these abominations, and declare that to my great regret I shall find 
myself obliged to proceed to reprisals, in order to inspire their authors with a salutary 
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fear, and to cause them to reflect before committing s milar atrocities.  The 
Bulgarians have surpassed all the horrors perpetrated by their barbarous hordes in the 
past, thus proving that they have not the right to be classed among civilized 
peoples.109 
 
With that last sentence, the king made clear that he considered the Bulgarian people 
as a whole inclined to commit such crimes and therefore culpable.  Reprisals might be 
directed against “[t]he Bulgarians,” as opposed to merely particular Bulgarian 
soldiers who had violated accepted norms of warfare.   
Similarly, the massacre at Demir Hisar was itself viewed by Bulgarian army 
personnel as a reprisal for earlier acts committed by Greek forces, as the resident 
Bulgarian headmaster of the town, Biliukbashiev, reealed in his memoir.  Upon 
reaching Demir Hisar in his futile attempt to return to his house, he was informed by 
a Bulgarian sergeant that “in Demir Hisar at the moment Greek notables were being 
captured and slaughtered, and indeed in response to th slaughter of Bulgarians by the 
Greeks, especially in the town of Serres, our soldiers also slaughtered the Greeks in 
Demir Hisar.”  Perhaps foreshadowing the burning of Serres that took place three 
days afterwards, the sergeant also declared to Biliukbashiev that he and his colleagues 
in the army “will know what to do if we enter Serres one more time.”  Moments after 
the conversation with the sergeant, the train station master advised Biliukbashiev and 
his comrade against returning home on foot precisely b cause “in the town at this 
moment our troops were massacring Greeks and Grecomans, and it is possible that by 
some misunderstanding we might also be affected.”110 
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An intense preoccupation with “honor,” to the exclusion of other concerns, 
also motivated the military hierarchies of the Balkan states in directing their armies’ 
conduct in Macedonia.  Military commanders worked to impress upon their ranks the 
importance of maintaining the army’s and the nation’s honor and of its corollary, 
avoiding “humiliation.”  Thus, in the closing days of the Second Balkan War 
Bulgaria’s King Ferdinand (in his capacity as Commander in Chief) issued a telegram 
to all Bulgarian military personnel as his country faced catastrophic defeat, reminding 
them that “Bulgaria wants us today to exert all our efforts so that we may save her 
honor – and this we must do.”111  Besides speaking of saving Bulgaria’s honor, 
Ferdinand might have attempted to boost the motivation of his fighting forces by 
referring also to the masses of Bulgarian Macedonian civilians whose lives and 
livelihoods hinged on Bulgaria’s military efforts, but typically for a high ranking 
military figure he neglected to do so.   
Balkan military personnel also understood the ideal of upholding honor and 
avoiding their own humiliation as being served by humiliation and dishonor inflicted 
on the enemy.  When formulated in this zero-sum fashion, the preoccupation with 
honor and dishonor also took on a gendered dimension, according to which the 
ultimate humiliation for a nation’s men was for them to lose the ability to protect and 
provide for their women and children.  This was illustrated vividly four days before 
the start of the Second Balkan War in a tense encounter between Bulgarian and 
Serbian troops over a disputed bridge on the Zletovska River between the towns of 
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Shtip and Kochani in Vardar Macedonia.  A deputation of Serbian troops requested 
that the Bulgarians withdraw from the bridge and taun ed the Bulgarian troops with 
stories of demoralized and malnourished Bulgarian deserters crossing to Serbian lines 
where they received food and clothing.  Upon this insult, the “indignant” Bulgarians 
retorted, “in Bulgaria there is so much clothing, footwear, and food that, besides us, it 
can sate the entire Serb nation together with the dogs and pigs for three years – soon 
our army will bring it with us to your women and children.”  The Bulgarian soldiers 
added that the Serbs would be “made to pay for the dishonors they inflicted in 
Macedonia.”112  The Bulgarians’ offer to provide for the Serbian men’s women and 
children was of course not a friendly overture.  In an earlier encounter at the bridge 
the same Bulgarian unit told the Serbs “we will take all of Macedonia and when we 
enter Serbia we will not leave a living soul.”113  The Bulgarian soldier who uttered 
this last threat was actually promoted for doing so from private to junior officer.114  
Indeed, these accounts of Bulgarian soldiers’ verbal defense of Bulgaria’s honor (and 
threats to humiliate the Serbs, including by supplanting the role of Serb men as 
providers to Serb women and children) were meant to inspire.  The commander of 
Bulgaria’s fourth army had ordered them to be distribu ed and read to all soldiers 
under his command.   
The mentality of honoring oneself by dishonoring the enemy, especially 
through demonstrating men’s impotence to protect and provide for their women, 
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helps to explain the many documented instances of rape committed by soldiers and 
paramilitaries in the Balkan Wars.  Greek and Bulgarian official documents, whether 
in the Greek, Bulgarian or French languages often render the act of rape as 
“dishonoring,” “insulting,” or “outraging” of a woman, although each language had 
alternative means of expressing the concept of rape.  Scholars writing about rape in 
other violent conflicts of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have also noted 
the central emphasis on communal or national honor in the respective societies’ 
understandings of the significance of rape.115 
As noted in the Introduction, Maria Todorova and other scholars have 
identified the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, perhaps more than any other event, as 
giving the Balkans a reputation in the West of uniqe inherent propensity for brutal 
violence against innocent civilians.  Furthermore, this genre of Balkan violence was 
understood to be fratricidal – in other words, not only armies, but local communities 
were implicated as likely perpetrators of atrocious acts against their neighbors in the 
name of obscure ethnic hatreds.  In the context of the Balkan Wars, the local civilians 
of the regions where fighting took place – including Macedonia – figured as primary 
perpetrators as well as victims in the understanding of the outside world.  Claiming to 
have found “the common feature which unites the Balkan nations,” the 1914 report by 
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the Carnegie commission expressed this kind of indiscriminate indictment of the 
civilian populations of the embattled regions: 
The local population is divided into as many fragmentary parts as it contains 
nationalities, and these fight together, each being desirous to substitute itself for the 
others.  This is why these wars are so sanguinary…. We have repeatedly been able to 
show that the worst atrocities were not due to the excesses of the regular soldiery, nor 
can they always be laid to the charge of the volunteers, the bashi-bazouk.  The 
populations mutually slaughtered and pursued with a ferocity heightened by mutual 
knowledge and the old hatreds and resentments they cherished.116 
 
And yet the authors in their own report were not in fact “repeatedly… able to 
show” what they claimed.  Analysis of who generally committed the violence against 
civilians in Macedonia – even in the text of the Carnegie commission report itself – 
belies the notion that local civilians themselves committed “the worst atrocities” or 
even took part as perpetrators in significant numbers.  The perpetrators were, as in the 
examples given above, overwhelmingly members of the Balkan armed forces or 
seasoned paramilitary bands.  The latter, as noted in Chapter 1, themselves usually 
arrived from outside the local communities where they committed violence or from 
outside Macedonia altogether.  That is not to say th t political frictions did not exist 
between groups of civilians in Macedonia.  To the contrary, as shown earlier, the 
volatile geopolitical atmosphere that characterized the period between the two Balkan 
Wars heightened pre-existing local frictions.  The tensions that came to the fore now 
more than at any other time during the years spanning the Balkan Wars and First 
World War were those connected with national identity.  Groups of civilians 
frequently took advantage of the unsettled situation and used new configurations of 
state power to gain the upper hand in local disputes ov r control of religious buildings 
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and schools.  Some advocated energetically for the sov reignty of their favored 
Balkan state over their particular corner of Macedonia.  Yet local civilians continued 
in general to stop short of committing violence against their neighbors who took the 
other side in disputes over such issues.   
The international infamy that the Balkans gained from the Balkan Wars 
related not only to the question discussed above of wh  committed violence, but also 
to the kind of violence committed.  As the Carnegie commission put it: 
The moralist who seeks to understand the brutality to which these pages bear witness, 
must reflect that all the Balkan races have grown up amid Turkish models of warfare.  
Folk-songs, history and oral tradition in the Balkans uniformly speak of war as a 
process which includes rape and pillage, devastation nd massacre…. The extreme 
barbarity of some episodes was a local circumstance which has its root in Balkan 
history.117 
 
Yet comparison with other wars also shows that the regular Balkan armies, which 
indeed committed a large amount of executions, torture, rapes, and arson against the 
civilian populations of Macedonia, did not thereby exhibit uniquely “Balkan” modes 
of warfare for their time.  Such behavior towards civilians was common enough in 
European and Western armies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  John 
Horne and Alan Kramer have documented in detail the ext nsive acts of summary 
execution, torture, beatings, extortion, arson and r pe that German soldiers committed 
against noncombatant civilians in Belgium and northern France during the opening 
months of the First World War.  As in Macedonia during the Balkan Wars, hundreds 
of thousands of civilians fled their homes in order to escape those acts by German 
soldiers.  Nor were those particular German actions an aberration among Western or 
Central European armies, as noted in the Introduction.  Authors have shown that 
                                                




similar acts against civilians were carried out early in the same war by the Austro-
Hungarian army in northwestern Serbia, by the German army against French civilians 
in 1870, by the Union army in the American Civil War, nd by the French and 
Russian armies during the Napoleonic Wars.118 
* * * 
 The establishment of internationally recognized borders in Macedonia 
between Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia and the short inte val of peace inaugurated by 
the August 1913 Treaty of Bucharest that ended the Second Balkan War would put 
whatever unique features might be attributed to “Balkan violence” into clearer relief 
in Macedonia.  As argued above, these unique featurs had little if anything to do 
with any sort of abnormal thirst for the blood of their neighbors among local civilians 
in Macedonia.  Rather, they reflected the weakness of the state’s monopoly of the 
means of violence.  This was a structural limitation the Balkan states inherited from 
Ottoman rule over the area that allowed paramilitaries and corrupt low-level officials 
to continue to present themselves as alternative proprietors of coercive force.  The 
presence of new internationally recognized borders in Macedonia would also dampen 
local inhabitants’ inclination (seen at a peak during the period of the Balkan Wars) to 
raise locally destabilizing issues such as agitation for rule by a different Balkan state.  
Instead, local civilians – both ethnic majorities and minorities – sought to 
accommodate themselves to novel experiences of life und r a nation-state, and to try 
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to maintain social stability in their local communities.  State authorities remained 
suspicious of ethnic minorities, however.  As the next two chapters will demonstrate, 
they began exploring new methods of dealing with minorities as a perceived threat.  
These new methods made use of the bureaucratic structures of the military and 
civilian administrations and thus introduced a veneer of order in contrast to the 






Chapter 4:  Macedonia’s “Construction of Life” after Two 
Balkan Wars 
 
Nikola Zografov reflected in 1927 on the disasters hat had befallen his 
Bulgarian compatriots and other inhabitants of former Ottoman Macedonia.  
Zografov was himself a veteran of both the Supremist and Internal factions of the 
militant Macedonian revolutionary movements and had worked closely with the 
assassinated revolutionary Gotse Delchev.  Yet now he regretted passionately the 
militant path he had chosen in his younger days:   
[H]ow weak in culture are the Bulgarians who use violence, who hurled the people 
into a terrible mutual destruction, where old and young Bulgarians lost life by the 
thousands…. The time has finally come for all who use force to voluntarily refrain 
from it… 1 
 
Zografov repeatedly exhorted his readers to dedicate themselves to what he termed 
the “construction of life” through peaceful pursuit of economic and educational 
progress.  The Bulgarian majority in Bulgaria should pursue this “construction of 
life” in harmony with other ethnic groups, whose cultural uniqueness should be 
respected and even promoted by the state.   
This chapter examines the short peacetime interval in geographic Macedonia 
that began in August 1913, with the signing of the Tr aty of Bucharest, and ended in 
September 1915, when the First World War again turned the region into a theatre of 
military operations.  The Treaty of Bucharest did at le st confer international 
legitimacy on the new borders drawn across former Ottoman Macedonia between 
                                                





Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia.  Uncertainty about the region’s political status, a central 
cause of local instability during the period before th  Second Balkan War detailed in 
Chapter 3, now looked as though it had been resolved.  Christians living in the newly 
annexed Greek and Bulgarian territories in former Ottoman Macedonia adjusted 
pragmatically to this new, calmer, international political environment by acting in 
ways that anticipated Zografov’s “construction of life.”  When interacting with their 
new citizens, however, the governing Balkan states often failed to act in the same 
spirit. 
With borders apparently settled, Christian inhabitants of the newly annexed 
Greek and Bulgarian territories in Macedonia now focused on making the best of 
their lives under new ruling governments.  They turned away from agitating for an 
autonomous Macedonia or for rule by a rival Balkan claimant to the territory as some 
of them had during the unstable period of the Balkan Wars.  Many proved willing to 
endure significant hardships in order to make this adjustment.  Recent refugees 
crossed the new borders to return home and rebuild destroyed homes and workplaces.  
When ethnic minorities were confronted with harsh asimilatory measures, most fell 
into line rather than defy the state’s authority.  By showing themselves to be obedient 
citizens, they tried to negotiate a legitimate space for themselves within the political 
frameworks of nation-states that advertised themselve  as liberal and modern, while 
continuing to live in their ancestral communities.  Priorities such as economic well-
being, education, a strong say in local affairs with respect to the central government, 





Again contrary to stereotypes about the endemic nature of Balkan violence 
that emerged from international observation of the Balkan Wars, long-time residents 
of the annexed former Ottoman territories continued to refrain from fratricidal ethnic 
violence.  Instead, the short period of peace covered in this chapter reaffirms what 
was in fact unique about Balkan violence.  The Balkan governments’ inability to 
monopolize the use of force allowed paramilitaries and corrupt low-level state 
functionaries to continue to prey upon local populations, as they had during Ottoman 
times.  Local residents generally responded to the apparent consolidation of new 
borders and national sovereignty as though the time for fighting had finally passed.  
Many went out of their way to consolidate social stbility within their local 
communities.  They tried to preserve it in cases where they perceived state authorities 
or others from outside the locality acting in ways that exacerbated potential tensions.   
On the other hand, administrators of incoming Balkan governments were still 
obsessed with the ethnic characteristics of the populations living in the newly 
annexed territories.  Force was now newly legitimized if serving to consolidate the 
nation-state.  Authorities acted all too quickly on any suspicion that heterogeneous 
elements might prove disloyal.  But in place of the relatively chaotic, terroristic acts 
that characterized the Balkan War operations of their military and paramilitary forces 
against civilians perceived as unfriendly, administrators in peacetime began to 





Local Priorities in Peacetime 
The war was over.  Whether on the Greek or Bulgarian s de of the new border, 
Orthodox Christian residents saw the rule of a centuries-long Muslim-led empire 
replaced by Christian-majority Balkan states.  Even if their armies had committed 
abuses against non-combatants during the anomalous nd inevitably cruel 
circumstances of war, these nation-states had been founded as constitutional 
monarchies and advertised themselves as bearers of Eur pean civilization and 
liberation from tyranny.  It was time to rebuild and make the best of the future – to 
engage in Zografov’s “construction of life.”  Typical of this mindset was Ivan Hristov 
Gramatikov’s and his father’s reaction after the Second Balkan War when they 
returned to their native village of Marikostinovo in Bulgaria’s newly annexed 
territory to find it completely burned down by Greek forces.  As Gramatikov 
recounted in this memoir, they wasted no time in rebuilding and restarting their mill, 
which had processed wheat and cleaned cotton, and indeed even enlisted the aid of 
Greek soldiers to initiate small-scale trade across the new border with Greece.  That 
they had already rebuilt the mill less than a year before, after it had been burnt by 
Ottoman forces in the First Balkan War, gives the full measure of the father’s and 
son’s determination.2   
Gorna Djumaia, the largest town in Bulgaria’s new trri ory of Pirin 
Macedonia, became a magnet for refugees from the parts of Macedonia annexed by 
Greece and Serbia.  Economic migrants from Bulgarian M cedonian territory and 
even from within Bulgaria’s old borders also entered the town at this time.  Many of 
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those who fled the town of Kukush during the Second Balkan War just before it was 
destroyed and then annexed by the Greek army congregated in Gorna Djumaia, 
causing it to become “the largest ‘Kukush-ian’ town in Bulgaria” after Sofia.3  Krum 
Hristov’s family, coming with this tide of refugees, moved to Gorna Djumaia in 1914 
in search of work after having first failed to find any in Sofia or elsewhere.  “The 
motley population quickly breathed new life into the town,” which had “withered” 
after the 1912 flight of many of the Muslim former inhabitants.  “Already by 1914 
every kind of activity was in full swing,” Hristov recalled.  There was an incessant 
buzz of conversation “in the homes and in the streets” among the new neighbors.  
Together they took interest in “all that was new” and pondered “how to organize and 
arrange this new, yet difficult and complicated refugee life so that it might not be 
quite so ‘refugee-like.’”  Nevertheless, Hristov and his fellow refugees could not push 
the homes and communities they had left out of their minds: 
The anguish over the town of our birth was still very strong.  Wherever two people 
from Kukush might run into each other, inevitably there followed conversation about 
fellow-acquaintances from the town.  At home Kukush and people from Kukush were 
constantly talked about.  Thanks to this, unforgettable memories have piled up in my 
mind of names and individuals, of customs, events ad occurrences, and all of these 
have left a sharp, indelible interest in the life o those years, in the fate of those who 
have a personal or family connection to Kukush. 4 
 
As we shall see, this yearning for the old home among refugees was also powerful 
enough to entice many to return to locations they had fled under dangerous 
circumstances and try to rebuild their lives there.  
The previous chapter described how the Greek and Bulgarian governments 
introduced pressures for ethnic assimilation in former Ottoman Macedonia, if 
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haltingly, even as the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 were still being waged.  The 
apparent stability afforded by new, internationally recognized borders in Macedonia 
codified by the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest gave the Balkan states the opportunity to 
intensify such drives for assimilation through religious conversion, education and 
propaganda.  Pressures for assimilation took various f rms, from mortal threats and 
violence to more subtle, long term incentives to gain economic or social advancement 
by embracing the dominant national culture.  Yet resid nts of Macedonia in this 
period quite deliberately put their rights to live productively in their ancestral 
communities and to participate in the new political systems under which they found 
themselves first, over their rights to national self-assertion.  In order to safeguard 
these higher priorities, potential ethnic minorities proved willing (if unhappy) to 
sacrifice their ethnic affiliation by quickly falling into line with measures for 
assimilation.  They did not resist them.  Also, while inhabitants resented assimilatory 
state policies during this period, they did not view the attendant hardships primarily 
as a process of “denationalization,” but rather as part of a more general experience of 
imposition and personal humiliation on the part of he state. 
Followers of the Bulgarian Orthodox Exarchate who found themselves on the 
Greek side of the border after the Second Balkan War quickly understood that their 
lives would become difficult if they did not transfer their allegiance to the Greek 
Orthodox Church and its Patriarchate.  A Bulgarian newspaper reported in March 
1914 that in Salonika local Greek authorities were  
continually busy compelling the small number of Bulgarian families as soon as 
possible to submit declarations that they accept Hellenism and pass under the bosom 
of the true Christian church – the Patriarchate, and that they will send their children 




neighborhoods of Pirgi, Transvaal and Kukushki issuing deadlines for Hellenization, 
imprisoning, and threatening, “become Greeks or leave within 24 hours.”5 
 
Bulgarian consular reports from the period suggest that such Greek actions, rather 
than being systematically directed from the center, va ied depending on the initiative 
of authorities and militia in each locality.  Disorganization and lack of sympathy for 
minority interests on the part of more central Greek authorities such as the General 
Administration of Macedonia encouraged the abuses, but only indirectly.6  
Yet well before those Bulgarian reports, a variety of contemporaneous Greek 
sources celebrated the “spontaneity” and rapidity wh hich the vast majority of 
former followers of the Exarchate “returned to the Mother Church.”  Thus Stephanos 
Grammenopoulos, resident of the village of Zelenits i  Greek western Macedonia and 
a longtime local supporter of the Greek cause, proudly reported how his “Bulgarian” 
co-villagers converted after the arrival of the Greek army: 
Afterwards they spontaneously gathered the Bulgarian books of the church and 
delivered them to the head of the detachment… , who rep rtedly took them to His 
Holiness Bishop Ioakim of Kastoria.  [The Bulgarians] who followed along were 
accepted into the embrace of the Mother Greek Orthodox Church, forgiven for their 
error which resulted either from fear or from compulsion. 7 
 
Although Grammenopoulos was a local villager, Greek government officials often 
remarked on the same phenomenon of willing and “spontaneous” conversion.  
According to Stephanos Dragoumis, the Governor-General of Macedonia,  
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… in the countryside and the small centers in general… the numbers of schismatics 
are disappearing as the Exarchists have turned out in multitudes along with the 
[Exarchist] priests, spontaneously declaring repentance, delivering over churches, 
schools and Slavic liturgical books and accepting pardons and blessings from the 
Orthodox Bishops and from the Patriarchate. 8 
 
Yet later in the same letter, Dragoumis suggested that state coercion remained an 
option to encourage those inhabitants whose conversion might not be so 
“spontaneous.”  He reported that “in the urban centers majorities have returned in 
every way to the Greek traditions to which they are unmistakably inclined.”  But a 
minority had failed to do so “only out of timidity, as they await to be convinced that 
the violence of the dismantled Bulgarian organization would not again bring about an 
alteration of the existing situation.”  Dragoumis pro osed that this timid minority 
would be quickly reassured “if we remand in custody those who subscribe to the 
wiles of externally lurking politics of intervention.”9  The vague language Dragoumis 
used to denote those who ought to be arrested opened the way for such a policy to be 
implemented in an indiscriminate and arbitrary fashion.   
The Greek military personnel, police, and church notables, who openly 
welcomed the conversion of former followers of the Exarchate to the Patriarchate, 
also provided the presence capable of making good on the threat of repression for 
those who appeared suspicious.  This combination of factors sent a strong signal to 
the local inhabitants.  Thus, their conversions, even if rapid, could hardly qualify in 
general as “spontaneous,” despite this triumphal description in contemporary Greek 
sources on the episode.  Rather, followers of the Exarchate quickly got the message 
that their relationships with those in power would proceed much more smoothly if 
                                                






they made a show of “returning to the embrace of the Mother Church” – the 
Patriarchate.  Even if not a genuinely spontaneous phenomenon, the fact remains that 
the vast majority of former followers of the Exarchate did rapidly switch to the 
Patriarchate, instead of holding out to test the Grek authorities’ tolerance.  Their 
choice demonstrated their priorities.  Having to “repent” for the “error” of 
longstanding attendance at their family parish chur and exchange a Slavonic liturgy 
close to their spoken language for the Greek liturgy would have been painful 
experiences for many of these inhabitants.  Yet most of them rapidly made this 
sacrifice with a view towards avoiding trouble with their new rulers.  
 The remaining Greek Orthodox churches in Bulgaria were likewise closed 
soon after the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest.10  Their experience mirrored the 
fate of the Bulgarian Orthodox Exarchate churches in Greek Macedonia.  After the 
reluctant and semi-forced exodus of patriarchists and others from locations such as 
Strumitsa and Melnik described in the previous chapter, virtually no former followers 
of the Patriarchate remained in the portion of Macedonia annexed by Bulgaria.  
Theodora Dragostinova, however, has found that in western Thrace, another former 
Ottoman territory annexed by Bulgaria in the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest, many Greeks 
did remain.  A number – especially those of lower class background – promptly 
began to attend Bulgarian Exarchate churches before they would have been forced to 
do so by the closure of their former Patriarchate chur hes.11  Again, these inhabitants 
displayed a clear willingness to sacrifice important cultural traditions for the higher 
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priority of remaining in their ancestral homes and localities and building their future 
there. 
 This commitment to the native home was so powerful that refugees who had 
fled for their lives from the Greek army during the S cond Balkan War quite 
commonly resolved to return to their homes, now in Greek territory, after the Treaty 
of Bucharest.  Many of Krum Hristov’s compatriots who had fled the Kukush area in 
terror were now petitioning the Greek embassy in Sofia f r permission to return, as 
Greece’s assistant commissioner of Kilkis (the Greek name for Kukush) noted at the 
start of 1915.  The Greek assistant commissioner admitted that “Bulgarian-speakers” 
had fled to Bulgaria “likely out of fear of reprisal  from sections of our army” in 
1913.  But he surmised that they were now “relatively happy” with the current Greek 
authorities, whose behavior he contrasted with the alleged harshness of Bulgarian 
authorities towards the same population during their eight months’ control of the area 
in 1912 and 1913.12   
Ivan Tenchev Gelebeshev was among a group of refuges who had fled before 
the Greek army but who decided as early as October 1913 to return to their village of 
Machukovo, now on Greek territory.  Gelebeshev’s account suggests that the Greek 
assistant commissioner’s cheerful assessment of returnees’ experiences was over-
optimistic.  Machukovo’s residents’ first brush with Greek authority came during the 
Second Balkan War, and it could hardly have been less auspicious.  In apparent 
reprisal for Bulgarian paramilitary executions of Greek army prisoners of war taken 
in Machukovo, the Greek army burned most of the village’s houses and executed the 
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few remaining elderly inhabitants who had been unable to flee in advance.13  Why, 
then, did Gelebeshev and his fellow-villagers decid to return to Machukovo in 
October, 1913?   
… under the guarantee of the Russian consulate we rturned by train through Serbia 
… they told us that all is past, there is no danger from anything, we would return to 
our villages to repair our homes and look after our properties, no one would take 
them from us. 14 
 
In other words, what drew the villagers back was the apparent assurance that they 
would be safe, and that they would be able to rebuild their homes and revive their 
former livelihoods.  For Gelebeshev, at the time, th  recent cruel behavior of Greek 
military forces towards civilians in the area appeared as though it might be an 
anomaly – a by-product of wartime, even instigated by war crimes committed in the 
area against Greek soldiers.  Among the reasons he gave for the return of the residents 
of Machukovo – the assurance of safety, the opportunity to rebuild ancestral homes 
and tend property – Gelebeshev did not mention any n tional goals such as 
Macedonian autonomy or a revision of borders that would award the village to 
Bulgaria.  On the contrary, Gelebeshev’s family understood full well upon their return 
that “with the apportionment of the border between S rbia and Greece our village 
Machukovo was left in Greek territory.”   
Nonetheless, Greek authorities treated the returnees with contempt and even 
suspicion, as though they harbored erroneous or even potentially traitorous affinities 
with Bulgaria.  Gelebeshev’s family rebuilt their house which had been “burned to the 
foundations.”  The returning villagers were “received very coolly” by the Greeks and 
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subjected immediately to measures that amounted to forced cultural assimilation.  In 
his memoir, Gelebeshev did not describe these measur s using terms such as 
assimilation or denationalization, but complained more directly and bitterly about 
them as cruel and humiliating.  Not only were children required to learn Greek in 
school: “on the teacher’s desk there was always hot red pepper, and if a child began 
to speak in Bulgarian they would put red pepper in his mouth.”  Gelebeshev even 
remembered, in broken Greek which he spelled out in Bulgarian Cyrillic letters, the 
warning these wayward children would receive: “pios umilaii vulgarika kokino biberi 
isto stoma.”15  Authorities forced residents to speak only Greek “even in the home” 
and “in the shops in the village center.”   Policemen kept a strict surveillance over 
adults and “arrested them when they heard them speaking Bulgarian.”  Even if they 
might have considered themselves as ethnically Bulgarian, residents of Machukovo 
clearly did not return to their native village in order to struggle for Bulgarian national 
liberation.  The repression of villagers for speaking the only language they knew thus 
came as a shock to them and stuck in Gelebeshev’s mind in particular.  As 
Gelebeshev summed up the Greek authorities’ initial tre tment of his fellow villagers 
after their return home, “they greatly tormented anreviled us.”  Gelebeshev clearly 
resented not only the repression but also the disdain th t Greek authorities showed 
them: “they lectured us to the effect that here it had once been Greek, and that they 
were cultured while Bulgarians were lowly immigrants.  They uttered every epithet 
possible against the Bulgarians.”16 
                                                





A 1913 report from the Greek assistant commissioner f the Edessa district in 
the western part of Greek Macedonia clearly bears out Gelebeshev’s understanding of 
Greek authorities’ attitudes and motivations in their d alings with new Christian 
minority populations.  The assistant commissioner began his report by frankly 
admitting that “[t]he first work of the Greek Administration was the placement of 
Greek teachers in the one-time Bulgarian communities – Greek teachers were so 
minimal as to be able to count them on one’s fingers.”  The assistant commissioner 
complained that even if the current local Greek teach rs might know Greek grammar 
and were “honorable breadwinners,” they were not str ngly enough imbued with 
Hellenism – they did not “carry the holy mission.”  It would be better to send “the 
best teachers from Old Greece,” the assistant commissioner reasoned: 
[They] will have the added advantage of not knowing the Bulgaro-Macedonian 
language, and will be equipped with the necessary qualifications of knowing how to 
act as Greeks [ellinoprepeia], of dominance, and of power of assimilation.  Today’s 
teachers are also excellent in their conscience, yet not at all assimilative and 
completely incapable of the full Hellenization of the soul, of the firm Hellenization of 
conviction, and of the Hellenization of the minds of the shabby Macedonian youth.  
Bulgarian-speaking Greek Macedonia does not have need of honorable breadwinners, 
taking shelter in their secluded settlements in order to win their bread.  The supreme 
national need is for apostles of the Greek idea, bards of Greek beauty, pioneers of 
Greek thought and especially laborers of the Greek language to be sent.  17
 
For the assistant commissioner of Edessa, who clearly h d a low opinion of the state 
of “Macedonian youth” under his jurisdiction, a mere passive acceptance of Greek 
education by “honorable breadwinners” was not enough.  There were local teachers 
whose loyalty was beyond reproach and who could and did teach Greek.  But the 
mere fact that they could also speak the “Bulgaro-Macedonian” language was a 
liability.  The assistant commissioner clearly would not have been satisfied with the 
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mentality of families such as Gelebeshev’s.  Even if the latter showed “excellent 
conscience” and dutifully sent their children to school to acquire a Greek education, 
their priority was indeed essentially to “tak[e] shelter in their secluded settlements in 
order to win their bread” honorably – something the assistant commissioner felt was 
not what “Bulgarian-speaking Greek Macedonia” needed.  It is not hard to imagine 
this civil servant endorsing the demeaning “hot red p pper” punishment employed by 
the Greek teachers in Machukovo.   
Although residents in particular did not complain in abstract terms of their 
“denationalization,” they certainly did resent being singled out and humiliated by 
Greek authorities for being “Slavic-speakers,” or “Bulgarians.”  That a Greek 
garrison commander and gendarmerie officer in the village of Zûrnovo near Drama 
“went around the houses with swords drawn and forcibly compelled the female 
population to visit the night school opened there” was clearly viewed as an assault 
upon local masculine honor in particular.18  Adult residents did not view such night 
schools, which in fact were not only for females but “for the men, the women and the 
elderly to learn the Greek language,”19 as benign educational opportunities, but as 
forms of humiliation in the context of the contemptuous attitudes of Greek authorities 
that Gelebeshev perceived.20  Nikola Ivan Shopov thus told the Bulgarian consul in 
Salonika that “he could not bear the Greeks insulting his compatriots and neighbors” 
                                                
18 TsDA, Fond 334k opis 1 a.e. 380, 37 (report by A. Petrov in Bulgarian general consulate in Solun, 
dated Apr. 22, 1915). 
19 TsDA, Fond 334k opis 1 a.e. 380, 38-39 (report from Bulgarian general consulate in Solun sent to 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Jun. 27, 1915). 
20 Anastasia Karakasidou, “Women of the Family, Women of the Nation: National Enculturation 
Among Slavic Speakers in Northwestern Greece,” Women’s Studies International Forum 19 (January-
April 1996): 105 mentions such compulsory night schools as a way in which the Greek government 
targeted women in Greek Macedonia as agents of (Greek) nationalization in Greek Macedonia during 
the decades after World War I.  The Bulgarian archival sources I discuss here indicate that this practice 




in his village of Starchishta near Drama.21  The insults included not only compulsory 
night school for adults and especially women, but also beatings meted out to 
residents.  In 1915, members of the Greek garrison stationed in Starchista beat 
villagers for leaving the village to go shopping in the town of Serres without first 
obtaining permission, for refusing to commandeer a neighbor’s livestock to transport 
sand for military use, for allowing sons to avoid Greek army conscription, or 
apparently even “without any reason,” as when Greek soldiers searched houses and 
stole valuable objects from them.22  
Bulgarian state representatives such as the consul in Salonika worried in 
particular over the “national depersonalization of the Bulgarian element” that such 
repressive Greek policies portended.23  Affected local residents, on the other hand, 
complained in more concrete terms that reflected thir own priorities of wanting to 
sustain their economic livelihoods and dignity in their ancestral lands under the new 
ruling regime.  Some were driven to consider emigrating because, economically and 
physically, “life in the village of their birth has become unbearable.”  Authorities 
confiscated basic goods such as wood for burning, chickens and eggs without giving 
compensation. 24  In Starchishta, after many of the livestock for sale died off due to a 
disease outbreak, “… the military authorities began to take the only livestock 
available for subsistence: horses and donkeys…. The unfortunate villagers as a result 
of this were not able to seed their fields, because there was nothing with which to take 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nov. 10, 1914); also TsDA, Fond 334k opis 1 a.e. 380, 21-34 
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the seeds to the fields.”25  Many residents were “forced to abandon their ancestral 
village and depart for Bulgaria,” not because they longed to live in their national 
motherland and refused to live under a foreign governm nt, but because Greek 
authorities “embolden and cooperate with [Greek] refug es in the seizure of 
Bulgarian properties.”  In the village of Mezhdursko near Salonika in particular, 
residents finally left because refugees were installed in their houses without 
compensation.  This was apparently a common complaint that the Bulgarian consul in 
Salonika was receiving “from everywhere where Greek refugees have settled.”26  
While ethnic minority groups in particular resented being targeted for 
assimilatory measures and humiliated, inhabitants of Macedonia of all ethnic origins 
struggled with the impositions into their lives and livelihoods introduced by central 
governments ambitious to extend their reach into newly annexed territories.  
Hardships were widely felt in the new territories as a result of central government 
policies affecting both education and commerce.  In 1914, the Greek government 
promulgated detailed decrees extending compulsory primary education to its New 
Territories and began to enforce them aggressively.27  Each local area was obliged to 
form one or more three-member school committees, with “ladies” preferred as 
members of the committees for girls’ schools.  It was the job of the committees to aid 
in the implementation of state directives and to secur  local funds for a long list of 
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expenditures: heating, cleaning, school property repai s, purchase or rental of a school 
yard, required furniture, teaching equipment, library books, and aid to needy students 
for books, writing materials, footwear and clothing.  The state also centralized and 
standardized teachers’ ranks, introducing three distinct career levels based on criteria 
such as prior experience and educational background.   
In the wake of those decrees, the Greek Governor General of Macedonia 
Themistoklis Sofoulis ordered all the prefects, assistant commissioners and police 
authorities in Greek Macedonia to compile reports showing the detailed breakdown of 
all funding sources for every school community under th ir watch.28  Reports 
submitted to the assistant commissioner of Zichni reveal that many communities were 
unable or unwilling to shoulder the burden of these requirements because they were 
too poor, devastated by the recent wars, inundated with refugee children, or recently 
deprived of traditional sources of funding.29  The last reason is particularly ironic.  
Many communities had once apparently received substantial funding from the Greek 
central government through local Greek consulates while still under Ottoman rule.30  
Now that they fell under Greek sovereignty, the Greek consulates disappeared.  The 
Greek state in any case lacked the same incentive to fund schools through them in 
                                                
28 IAM, GDM, file 50, 190-191 (Governor General of Macedonia Sofoulis to the Prefects, Assistant 
Commissioners and Police Authorities of Macedonia, Oct. 26, 1914). 
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order to compete with Bulgarian and Serbian national ambitions.  Communities also 
often reported crippling reductions in contributions for education traditionally 
provided by local church income.31   
Central and regional Greek authorities did not look kindly on local school 
committees in the new territories when they explained why they could not pay 
teachers their full salaries or meet other education l expenses.  The assistant 
commissioner of Zichni district, for example, issued a circular warning school 
committees of all localities within his jurisdiction that if they failed to submit 
required reports or to pay their teachers what theyw re owed, their members would 
be “considered as incompetent to implement the duties entrusted to them and 
consequently unfit to remain as School Committee members to the detriment of 
School interests.”32  Soon afterwards, he warned the school committee mmbers of 
the village of Gornitsa specifically that if they “continue[d] to refuse to comply with 
the orders” to pay their teachers the required salaries “the lawful compulsory 
measures [would] be taken” towards them.33  This warning followed an initial report 
from the school committee detailing what residents had already paid the village 
teachers from individual contributions but pleading an inability to secure more 
funding due to lack of church revenue and loss of former government financial aid.34   
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It is tempting to see the failure of many communities in Greek Macedonia to 
fulfill the educational mandates of the Greek state primarily as a subtle form of 
“passive resistance” to the assimilation pressures inherent in required Greek 
education.  However, a large number of the newly deinquent school communities 
who failed to meet the funding requirements were Christian refugee communities 
who had fled to Greece from persecution elsewhere or communities that had long 
supported Greek schools with the help of financing from a nearby Greek consulate or 
from the Greek Orthodox Church.  It is unlikely that these groups were strongly 
motivated by a desire to resist assimilation into Greek culture.  Especially after a 
destructive war and disruption in traditional funding sources, the blanket 
requirements to finance school infrastructure and teaching were heavy burdens for a 
large number of communities, as well as unprecedent ones.  The number of schools 
expanded greatly during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and came under 
increasing regulation by the state.  Yet schooling had never been made universal or 
mandatory.35  Modern nation-states operating on the principle of territoriality and 
“saturation of space inside the frontier,” 36 especially states such as Greece and 
Bulgaria that claimed to be bearers of civilization and modernity to formerly 
“backward” Turkish-ruled lands, could not be seen to brook exceptions on education.  
Every child in every corner of the governed territory would have to receive schooling 
(even if the quality of education might have been questionable in practice.)   
                                                                                                                                 
(Assistant Commissioner of Zichni to School Committee members of Egri-Dere, Kioup-Kioï, Provista, 
and Karlikovo, Jan. 30, 1915). 
35 Selçuk Akşin Somel, The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: 
Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline, (Leiden: Brill), 2001.  The Regulation of Public Education 
document of 1869 theoretically made elementary education compulsory for Muslim children, yet its 
implementation remained far from complete; see ibid., 109-11, 243, 253. 




The national governments of Bulgaria and Greece also valued education to a 
significant degree because of its potential for shaping a culturally homogeneous 
nation.  We see this motivation in the aforementioned opinion of the Greek assistant 
commissioner of Edessa district.  He had little use for mere “honorable breadwinners” 
and clearly viewed “Hellenization” of the local youth as the primary purpose of 
education in “Bulgarian-speaking Greek Macedonia.”  By contrast, as demonstrated 
below, residents of former Ottoman Macedonia promoted and welcomed education 
primarily as the key to economic, social and cultural advancement for their children 
and their communities as a whole.  For them the goal of strengthening (or even 
resisting) national acculturation was at most an afterthought.  Despite the postwar 
hardships that caused shortages in school funding, local communities themselves 
acted in ways that suggested education was among their own highest priorities.  The 
above reports relating to the Greek district of Zichni reveal that many rural village 
communities voluntarily derived a significant percentage of their school funding from 
sources other than government aid or church revenues, s ch as household 
contributions and proceeds from sales of the tobacco crop. 
Not surprisingly, the local commitment to provide for educational needs was 
stronger in wealthier communities and in larger communities with a critical mass of 
well-off residents whose resources could underwrite education for the community as 
a whole.  In December 1913, scores of residents from in and around the market town 
of Razlog in the Bulgarian-annexed part of Macedonia declared their support for the 
reestablishment of the local chitalishte (literally “reading room,” or “cultural 




a version of the recent history of the chitalishte and its rationale not in terms of 
national struggle (although such a rationale was there to draw on in Bulgarian 
history), but in terms of its role in bringing cultre and education to the town.  Indeed, 
instead of casting the stillborn 1909 founding of thechitalishte as an act of national 
struggle against Ottoman rule, the declaration explained that the chitalishte had been 
forced to close because of the “draconian censorship” of the Ottoman state, which 
incorrectly harbored “strong suspicions of the founders of ill intentions toward the 
state.”  In other words, authorities suspected the founders of intending to undermine 
the Ottoman state (perhaps of struggling for nationl liberation), but they were 
apparently mistaken in those suspicions.  The writers of the declaration described the 
“noble goal” of reestablishing the chitalishte simply as “the cultural and educational 
elevation of the townspeople.”  They noted that without the institution “an emptiness 
is felt in the life of the town.”  In fact, variants of the words “Bulgarian” or “nation” 
(narod or natsiia) appear nowhere in the declaration. 37   
Indeed, a year later, the president of Razlog’s town council registered the 
apparent indifference of the local residents toward the concept of the nation, as he 
suggested to his fellow-council members that action be taken to encourage residents 
to show more enthusiasm for a patriotic celebration: 
It is well-known to you that the 11th of October has already been established as a 
holiday for our town, on the occasion of the liberation of the town of Mehomiia 
[Razlog].  In order to create a larger significance for this great holiday for our town in 
the eyes of the local residents, who up until now have hardly paid any attention to its 
significance, and in order to encourage whatever kind of festivities to be celebrated 
with more heart in the future by the townspeople, it would be good to set up at least 
one modest reception of the townspeople and the officials. 
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To make this reception more attractive, the council president proposed that guests 
should be entertained by musicians and plied with freelukum (Turkish delight) and 
cognac, while those coming from the surrounding villages should also be fed lunch.  
Yet, even after detailing his plan for food, drink and festivities, the council president 
still apparently doubted that it would all be enough to entice the local residents to 
show more enthusiasm for the patriotic holiday.  Tellingly, he felt the council ought 
to appeal also to the residents’ stronger concern for the community’s educational 
well-being: 
In order for these festivities to be celebrated with greater enthusiasm by the 
population and by the students, it would be very humane if a certain amount of aid 
were to be released by the municipality also for some charitable purposes such as for 
the local town chitalishte, for needy students, etc. 38 
 
As already noted, residents of Razlog and its surroundings attached great importance 
to their chitalishte as a local, not necessarily national, institution that promised 
“cultural and educational elevation of the townspeopl .”  The Bulgarian state elites in 
charge of the municipality were chagrined at the apparent local indifference to a 
holiday of national significance.  Only by linking the national holiday to the 
important local priority of education, through visible financial contributions to the 
chitalishte and to needy students, could they hope to draw attention to it.   
 While celebrating the nation and consolidating national identity were not 
among the local Christian population’s top priorities, a distinction should still be 
made between such priorities and the desire to secure the benefits of representation 
within the structure of the nation-state.  Residents of former Ottoman Macedonia 
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clearly valued the latter priority, which went togeth r with a desire to preserve a 
robust level of local autonomy as a counterweight to central government power.  The 
town council of Razlog thus found itself in a struggle with the central government in 
1915 over reasserting traditional local prerogatives to exploit the forests around their 
town.  In preparing to draft a petition to the Bulgarian parliament on the matter, the 
council president noted that the “townspeople are impoverished” not only because of 
plunder by Greek and Turkish soldiers during the recent wars.  Their petition bluntly 
stated that “our town was burned upon the entry of the Bulgarian army.”  As it could 
not expect to collect taxes in the near future from the impoverished inhabitants, the 
municipality would not be able to function unless it could regain its traditional control 
over the proceeds from the local forests.  “Since the Turkish time,” the council 
president asserted, “the municipality made use of the forests, which are now taken by 
the state authorities.  Other than the income from the forests the municipality cannot 
have any other income, because they are the only source f natural wealth.”39  The 
Razlog council president’s words strongly suggest local disquiet over the reduced 
local autonomy that accompanied the residents’ recent liberation from “Turkish” rule. 
 A similar local-central power struggle over forest resources occurred on the 
Greek side of the border in a dispute involving the village of Emporion near Kailaria 
in southwestern Macedonia.  Emporion’s residents peitioned their district assistant 
commissioner for permission to appoint a man from their village as the local forest 
ranger.  The forest surrounding the village was a private one, the residents claimed, 
and they therefore needed a forest ranger to guard it.  The state authorities, however, 
did not recognize the villagers’ claim to jurisdiction over the forest.  As the district’s 
                                                




chief forester advised the assistant commissioner, th  forests in question were 
“neither private, nor indeed community owned.”  Regional police authorities were in 
charge of patrolling the forests and the thus villagers could not appoint their own 
forest ranger.40   
The above request on the part of villagers in Greek-annexed Macedonian 
territory to appoint one of their own as forest ranger involved an (unsuccessful) 
challenge to state jurisdiction over a valuable loca  resource by the local community.  
On the other hand, petitions from local communities o central authorities to appoint 
men whom they elected as rural constables – or indeed even to replace those they did 
not want – were routine occurrences in Greek Macedonia in the months following the 
Treaty of Bucharest.41  Such requests were usually approved, and on the whole they 
did not reflect an oppositional relationship per se between the locality and the center.  
On the contrary, they represented initiatives on the part of residents of former 
Ottoman Macedonia to integrate themselves into the framework of the new ruling 
state in order to have maximum say in decisions affecting their own communities.  
Residents also viewed their central governments as potential sources of funding for 
local priorities.  Communities on both sides of the Bulgarian-Greek border tried to 
                                                
40 Državen Arhiv na Republika Makedonija [State Archive of the Republic of Macedonia] (DARM), 
Skopje, Macedonia, Fond 994 [Archival Materials on the Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia Between 
the Two World Wars] kutija 1, 36 (petition from the residents of Emporion to Kailaria district assistant 
commissioner, Nov. 18, 1914) and 37 (memorandum fro Kailaria district chief forester to assistant 
commissioner, Nov. 29, 1914.) 
41 Typical cases are DARM, Fond 994 Box 1, 12-14 (petition from Dimitris Nikolaou, Tzafer Ahmet 
and Rakio to Kailaria district assistant commissioner for removal of Konstantinos Athanasiou as 
constable in Demvri, Jun. 19, 1914; Kailaria district police chief to assistant commissioner, Jul. 5, 
1914); 21 (petition from residents of Frakgotsi to Kailaria district assistant commissioner to appoint 
Anastasios Dimitriou Karatsas as constable, Sep. 20, 1914); and 40 (petition from residents of 
Emporion to Kailaria district assistant commissioner to appoint Konstantinos Georgiou, Simeon 




enlist the aid of their respective education ministrie  in procuring state financial 
support for their local schools.42   
Beyond even education, economic revival and progress usually ranked as the 
most important priority for residents of former Ottoman Macedonia after the Balkan 
Wars.  This has already been suggested in the determination of inhabitants, refugees, 
and returnees to rebuild homes and workplaces, to be first and foremost “honorable 
breadwinners” to the frustration of at least one Grek civil servant, and to maintain 
control over valuable local resources.  Discussions at town and village council 
meetings typically resembled the one that occurred in the town of Bansko in 
Bulgarian Macedonia on April 28, 1914.  Items discussed included the question of 
raising revenue for the municipality given the impoverishment of most of the 
inhabitants, the installation of streetlights in the most frequented areas, raising 
revenue to pay rural constables to guard local fields and meadows, and setting aside 
property for school use.43   
The hard tasks of economic rebuilding understandably preoccupied residents 
of areas that suffered extensive material damage from the wars.  A number of 
merchant and craft associations in Serres, much of which was destroyed by fire 
during the Second Balkan War, made a concerted effort to convince the Greek 
government to decree temporary limits on rents charged by departed Muslim 
property-owners to residents whose own homes were destroyed.  They also attempted 
to extend to five years a moratorium on commercial debt repayment for businesses in 
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IAM, GDM, file 50, 252 (Representative and school cmmittee chair of village of Anastasia to 
assistant commissioner of Zichni district, Dec. 18, 914). 
43 DAB, Fond 26k [Bansko municipal government, 1912-1946], opis 1 a.e. 12 (minutes-book of the 




their town.  The petitioners first noted that Serres had once been “a thoroughfare in 
Macedonia for her prosperity and the acme of her commerce.”  They then warned that 
creditors’ aggressive attempts to collect on debts in Serres would result in “our full 
extermination and our economic death.”  They also drew a pointed comparison 
between their town’s post-war situation and that of Salonika, where their creditors “in 
their entirety” were based.  Whereas Serres merchants suffered “the general 
catastrophe of their houses” and the “depredation and arson of their commercial 
shops,” “not one” of Salonika’s commercial houses “got a taste of the calamity of 
war.”  On the contrary, the petitioners argued, Salonika’s commerce had “multiplied” 
due to the influx to that “large capital of the country of Macedonia” of military and 
others from Old Greece who increased the local demand for commercial services.44 
Although local inhabitants often tried to enlist the central government in 
furthering their economic recovery, the process of tate-building – in particular, the 
imposition and policing of new political borders divi ing what had once been a large, 
integrated economic region – also posed serious challenges to the residents’ priority 
of reviving economic activity.  During the course of the Balkan Wars, as seen in 
Chapter 3, residents had complained about how tariffs levied by the Bulgarian and 
Serbian governments had discouraged trade with areas inside the Greek-occupied part 
of former Ottoman Macedonia.  Now, the new international borders established by 
the Treaty of Bucharest threatened to permanently disrupt long-established networks 
and even lifestyles that relied on the previously undivided economic space.   
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presidents of thirty-four guilds to Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, Sep., 1914) and 100-
103 (Merchants of Serres to General Administration of Macedonia “concerning the extension of debt 




Many residents of Macedonia had a hard time adjusting to these new limits, 
and some tried to circumvent them.  Three hundred Vlach-speaking pastoralist 
families who wintered on the Greek side of the border in the villages of Lapovo and 
Siatrovo appealed to the General Administration of Macedonia in March 1914 when 
initially denied permission by prefectural authorities to make the annual journey 
along with their roughly 44,000 sheep and 1,000 horses to their summer pastures in 
the Pirin mountains, now in Bulgaria.45  Their elders explained that “throughout the 
Turkish rule and consistently until now” their families and livestock traveled annually 
between the same summer and winter pastures.  Like others discussed above, they 
attempted to shame their new governments into action by referring to the relative 
permissiveness of previous Ottoman authorities.  The shepherds emphasized that 
“[f]or this yearly movement … the Turkish Administra ion of the time afforded us 
without question the pertinent permission.”  The head of the local Greek army corps 
in charge of policing the new border with Bulgaria now advised against granting 
permission, “for reasons of security,” to the shepherds to migrate to their summer 
pastures.46  The prefect of Serres also expressed his uneasiness with allowing this 
cross-border seasonal migration, for both nationalist nd economic reasons: 
Having in mind that the shepherds in question and their roughly three hundred 
accompanying families during the period of the Turkish and Bulgarian occupation of 
these places were among the first to renounce their nation [ethnismon] – as recently 
as two years ago, abiding in Lapovo and Siatrovo, they accepted a Romanophile 
priest  and teacher – there is thus a danger that in going to Bulgaria they would 
Bulgarize and stay for good in Bulgarian territory.  It is to be wished that we manage 
to find summer pasturage for them inside Greek territory, in order that local 
stockbreeding does not suffer damage.  
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received on Apr. 14, 1914); 81 (Petition from chief shepherds who come from Melenikon and spend 
the winter in the vicinity of Serres province to the prefect of Serres, March 1914). 






The prefect made this last pronouncement despite having himself acknowledged that 
“in Greek territory in this vicinity there does not exist adequate pasture for 
maintenance of their flocks, that which exists already having been occupied by other 
shepherd chiefs.”47  The Greek official thus worried about what he correctly saw as 
the relative national indifference of these shepherd families, whose clear goal was 
literally to cross national borders in order to be a le to maintain their traditional 
lifestyle and livelihood.  Ironically, it took the shepherds’ enlistment on their behalf 
of none other than the Romanian Consulate in Salonika finally to induce the 
Governor-General to order permission to be given for the Vlachs to cross the border 
to their summer pastures.48 
Residents involved in commerce on both sides of the border did have some 
limited success in their efforts to pressure the new governments to help revive long-
established trade networks that were now threatened by the new border.  Ivan Hristov 
Gramatikov’s flour and cotton mill had been burned by Greek forces in 1913 and its 
location now fell on the Bulgarian side of the border.  Yet later that very same year, 
“after the situation had normalized,” he contacted Greek soldiers patrolling on the 
other side and managed to gain permission to engage in small-scale trade across the 
border in order to supplement his income from the mill.  A çiftlik (large agricultural 
estate) owner on the Greek side needed a large quantity of charcoal, and 
Gramatikov’s area on the Bulgarian side was the cheapest source for it.  And 
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Army Corps, Apr. 30, 1914).  Romania had long cultivated claims of ethnic kinship with Vlach-
speakers and thus prerogatives to act as their protector.  Its government had no serious pretensions to 




customers in Gramatikov’s area wanted manufactured goo s such as cigarette paper 
and clothes from Greece.  Quite simply, as Gramatikov put it, “[t]here they were 
cheaper; here they were expensive.”49  This basic market incentive was strong enough 
to drive people who had recently suffered so grievously from the wartime abuses of 
Greek soldiers to enlist Greek soldiers’ help in reestablishing trade networks across 
the new border.  And here at least, new tariff regimes and customs officials did not 
intervene. 
Indeed, for the Pirin region of former Ottoman Macedonia now annexed by 
Bulgaria, long established trade routes still pointed mostly southward toward what 
was now Greek Macedonia, rather than northward toward the territory of pre-1912 
Bulgaria.  Producers of silk cocoons around the Pirin town of Strumitsa thus had 
difficulty finding merchants elsewhere in Bulgaria to buy their products because of 
“the remoteness of the town of Strumitsa from the commercial centers of the Tsarstvo 
[i.e. Bulgaria] and because of the lack of rapid communication links to them.”  As a 
result, the provincial governor of Strumitsa pushed the Bulgarian central government 
to initiate contacts with merchants in Salonika andwith Greek authorities in order to 
revive silk cocoon exports to Greek Macedonia, which had better connections to 
Strumitsa.50  Demand for the revival of this trade also came from the Greek side of 
the border.  Merchants in Salonika inquired about the possibility of importing opium 
from Bulgaria in order to re-export it to Western Europe, where demand for the 
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product was outstripping Salonika’s current export capacity.51  The response to that 
specific query does not survive in the archival reco d, but at around the same time 
Bulgaria’s foreign ministry did convey to its consulate in Salonika a request from the 
Bulgarian Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Labor foinformation about foreign 
importers who might be interested in Bulgarian agricultural products.52  Economic 
considerations trumped national rivalry with Bulgaria again in the proposal 
(unsuccessful, as it happened) by the Salonika branch of The American-Hellenic 
Army and Navy Contracting Agency “to supply a certain quantity of uniforms, fabric, 
etc., for the Bulgarian army.”53 
 
Balkan Violence and the Weak State 
 Although Balkan armies and paramilitary groups caused immense destruction 
and often acted with brutality towards noncombatant populations during the Balkan 
Wars of 1912-1913, this record had not, as argued in Chapter 3, set the Balkans apart 
from the Western world.  What was, however, unique about “Balkan violence” in this 
era does become clearer when analyzing the period of international peace following 
the Treaty of Bucharest.  The relative weakness of states in the region allowed armed 
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men or groups, not fully under government control, s metimes to supplant 
governments’ authority to wield coercive force within their sovereign borders.54 
 The paramilitary groups that sowed terror among noncombatants during the 
Balkan Wars simply continued to do so, albeit on a sm ller scale, after wartime 
military operations ceased.  And they typically didso in communities from which 
they did not themselves originate.  Yet the important role of corrupt low-level state 
employees also becomes apparent when we examine this interlude between the 
Balkan Wars and the First World War.  In November 1913, assistant commissioner 
Kyriazis of the freshly annexed Greek province of Sari-Saban (near the city of 
Kavalla) complained openly to his superior that militia in and around the village of 
Moutzinos were “wreaking havoc and terrorizing” local inhabitants by abusing a 
government order to disarm the population.  The militia accused residents (mainly 
Muslims) of hiding weapons and threatened to report them to a regional tribunal in 
Kavalla.  In the next breath the militia offered the inhabitants immunity if they paid a 
certain amount of Ottoman lira.  Kryiazis noted the “curious” coincidence that those 
who came under this suspicion of harboring arms always happened to be the 
wealthiest residents, calling it a “paradox” that this all somehow happened right under 
the eyes of police and the andartis Kapetan Antonis and his men.55 
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55 IAM, GDM, file 78.1 [Reports on weekly events by the Agricultural Department of Macedonia], 3 




 During 1914, the first full year of peace after the Balkan Wars, the Greek 
High Command of the Macedonian Gendarmerie compiled w ekly reports 
summarizing all crimes reported in Greece’s newly annexed territory in Macedonia.56  
The large majority of incidents appear to have been conventional crimes (theft, 
trespassing, fires started through negligence.)  Among the violent incidents, ethnic 
conflicts do not stand out, as far as is possible to t ll from names and other recorded 
information.  The majority of violent incidents occurred between members of the 
same ethno-religious group, or else placed members of different ethno-religious 
groups on the same side as either perpetrators or victims.  In other words, an 
inhabitant of Greek Macedonia in 1914 would have had far more reason to be 
concerned about getting robbed by a common thief than about being targeted 
violently because of his or her ethnicity.  Even among crimes with apparent political 
cause, other factors besides ethnicity were often th  most important.  When two 
tobacco workers (one Greek, one Muslim) beat and robbed a Muslim co-worker who 
refused to join a strike, socio-economic, not ethnic, tensions predominated.57  When a 
Christian man murdered his wife reportedly “for reasons of honor,” the motive was 
apparently gender-based.58   
What does stand out among the recorded crimes is the trikingly common 
incidence (among violent events) of aggravated robbery, murder, rape, and other 
violence committed by low-ranking Greek state employees, such as soldiers, 
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gendarmes and constables.  In one unexceptional week in June, 1914, for example, 
crimes allegedly committed by state employees in Greek Macedonia accounted for 
over 14 percent of total crimes reported.  Among violent crimes, the percentage was 
higher: soldiers and gendarmes allegedly perpetrated thr e (a sexual assault of a 
twelve-year-old girl and two aggravated robberies) out of the twelve reported.  The 
actual percentage of these crimes committed by state employees might in fact have 
been higher, since suspects were not identified for all reported crimes.59  While ethnic 
motives might have been involved in some of these crimes committed by state 
functionaries, being considered a Greek certainly did not necessarily shield one from 
such assaults.  For instance, the twelve-year-old girl who was assaulted by the Greek 
gendarme was a Christian refugee, thus likely understood to be an ethnic Greek.  The 
peacetime abuses carried out by state employees, who e duties were ostensibly to 
protect inhabitants of the newly incorporated terrio ies, did not reflect any deliberate 
central state policy to terrorize certain segments of hat population.  Instead, this was 
a weak state that had trouble in limiting its poorly paid employees’ frequent abuses of 
armed power.  Hence the large number of reports by he central command of the 
gendarmerie in Greek Macedonia that regularly recorded the crimes committed by its 
own members as well as by Greek soldiers, only sometimes succeeding in 
apprehending and punishing the offenders. 
Remarkably, the Bulgarian ambassador in Athens, Georgi Pasarov, made the 
same point a year later in a memorandum written in response to a report on Greek 
state abuses of ethnic Bulgarians by the Bulgarian consul in Salonika.  Pasarov 
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asserted that the situation in Greek Macedonia that his colleague in Salonika had 
described “cannot be attributed exclusively to some kind of special regime set up by 
the central state government in Athens in their newprovince, because even within the 
confines of Old Greece the same kind of brigandage and pillage occurs, due to the 
disorder of the Greek state and deeper causes related to he Greek national way of 
life.”  Pasarov condescendingly compared the backwardness of Greek state “control 
over security and lawfulness” to that which obtained in Bulgaria just after its 
liberation in 1878.  He also predicted that, due to the ravages of the recent war, it 
would take years for normal life to resume in the region, “regardless of the regime in 
place.”60  To prove his point, Pasarov subsequently submitted a report of abuses 
committed contemporaneously by soldiers and gendarmes against residents of 
Greece’s capital, Athens.61 
Contrary to Pasarov’s optimistic assumptions about Bulgaria, his own state 
apparently had serious problems reigning in the actions of its low-level army and 
police, and not just paramilitaries.  The 1914 Greek g ndarmerie reports discussed 
above mention eleven incidents of either Bulgarian soldiers or paramilitaries 
(“komitadzidhes” in the Greek parlance that specifically designated Bulgarian 
paramilitary members) crossing the border into Greece and committing violence or 
theft, often of livestock.  Of those eleven incidents, at least seven of them were 
committed against Muslims who lived on the Greek side of the border.62  
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Antagonizing Muslim minorities in Greece would hardly have furthered the official 
Bulgarian interests in reclaiming some of Greek Macedonia.  In a couple of cases, 
Bulgarian authorities managed to apprehend the suspects or return livestock, further 
suggesting that the cross-border pillage was probably not policy but instead an 
indication of the Bulgarian government’s “lack of control over security and 
lawfulness,” to reuse the words of the its ambassador in Athens.  Further illustrating 
the tenuousness of Bulgarian state control were the ongoing factional struggles 
among VMRO paramilitaries within the confines of Bulgaria’s new Pirin Macedonian 
territory.  These resulted in the April 1915 assassination of Jane Sandanski, leader of 
the movement’s leftist faction.63 
Yet even civilians’ harrowing experiences in the two Balkan Wars failed, as 
we saw in Chapter 3, to polarize most inhabitants of former Ottoman Macedonia 
enough to cause them to begin taking ethnically motivated violence into their own 
hands or against their own neighbors.  Contemporary local sources reveal that 
residents of Macedonia typically continued to stop short of resorting to violence in 
resolving local political tensions.  When it appeared that state borders had been fixed 
after the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, many locals now took measures to 
preserve stability in their communities where they p rceived the new state authorities 
or other non-local agents acting in ways that exacerbat d potential tensions. 
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The actions of Stephanos Grammenopoulos, the aforementioned pro-Greek 
villager from Zelenits, provide an example.  After he cessation of hostilities from the 
Second Balkan War, Grammenopoulos wrote a letter to the Greek Governor-General 
of Macedonia to report that “during the entire period of the war the Bulgarians of our 
village did not engage in plunder or pillage.”  Indee , Grammenopoulos added, all 
residents displayed their utmost willingness to help the Greek forces.  He implored 
the Governor-General in advance to order his authorities not to arrest anyone in his 
village.  “If any arrests should occur they will have occurred unjustly,” he insisted.64  
Not long afterwards, Grammenopoulos traveled to Salnika and tried to meet with the 
Governor-General.  Unable to secure a meeting, he wrote him a letter from his hotel 
to ask the release from prison of a group of men from his neighboring village, 
Aetozion.  Grammenopoulos began by reminding the Governor-General of his 
family’s long service in the struggle for Hellenism.65  On this basis of trust he 
presumed to establish with the Governor-General, he insisted that he could tell quite 
well who the “bad Bulgarians” in his area were.  Ofthe sixteen residents of Aetozion 
arrested as “suspect Bulgarians” by Greek authorities three months before (including 
a priest named Papa Ilias), Grammenopoulos asserted that eight had been detained 
completely in error.  They had been “Greeks all along”; indeed the father of one of 
them “was hacked to pieces long ago by a Bulgarian Committee [Komitatou],” while 
the others had also long suffered from abuses by Bulgarian armed bands.  
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Grammenopoulos pleaded for the eight “Greeks” to be released, but he then went a 
step further: “The others remaining had always been Bulgarians, but now the entire 
village [including those formerly adhering to the Bulgarian Exarchate] has come 
around and the Holy bishop of Kastoria celebrated th  li urgy and blessed them and 
forgave them,” he noted.  He named only the Exarchate priest, Papa Ilias, as “worthy 
of the gallows; he is the one who has committed all the crimes and was the key to 
Bulgarianism in Aetozion.”66 
Once the danger of Bulgarian rule appeared vanquished after the Second 
Balkan War, longstanding Hellenic patriot Grammenopoulos risked his own 
reputation to protect all the Bulgarians in his village as well as all but one of the 
Bulgarians imprisoned from a neighboring village.  To explain this kind of post-war 
overture toward putative ethnic rivals, it is not necessary to invoke unrealistic notions 
of a lack of national identity or extreme local solidarity.  Instead, as has been argued 
above, economic and cultural development were now the most important priorities for 
residents of the towns and villages of former Ottoman Macedonia.  Local residents – 
including those who actively supported the new national government 
(Grammenopoulos was a Greek teacher) – therefore had a strong interest in 
maintaining the social stability of their communities.  Widespread acts of violent 
retribution would generally serve to undermine such stability.  By fingering only the 
Exarchate priest as “the key to Bulgarianism in Aetozion,” Grammenopoulos would 
eliminate the one person he saw as the most important agent of past instability - and 
potential cause of future instability – in his local area.  
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Petitions submitted for permission to appoint civil officials in villages in the 
Kailaria district of Greek Macedonia also suggest efforts among local notables to 
reinforce social stability across ethno-religious lines within their localities.  In these 
petitions, groups of signatories were in general ethnically mixed.  When more than 
one position was to be filled, the proposed appointees were also typically of different 
ethno-religious backgrounds.67  It was not unusual for groups of petitioners to draw 
explicit attention to their diversity, as in the requ st by “the undersigned Christian and 
Ottoman residents of the community of Devri” to appoint Dimitrios Lazarou, 
Kostantinos Efthimiou, and Anastas Ioannou (Christian names) and Demirali Iseïn 
and Souleman Osman (Muslim names) as local constable .68  Such instances reinforce 
the impression that village notables had made a consci us effort to ensure 
representation across ethno-religious lines in making these decisions.  Three Christian 
and Muslim rural constables of the village of Devri collaborated on a petition to have 
a fourth constable, Konstantinos Athanasiou, removed from his position because of 
abuses he allegedly committed against the local population which were causing some 
of them to leave the village.  The petitioners noted that they themselves were from 
Devri, and emphasized that the residents of Devri had lived in that location “from old 
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commissioner to appoint Kosmas Christou and Ahim Suleiman as rural constables, Feb. 26, 1914); 21 
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times.”69  The petitioners – Muslim and Christian – clearly felt collectively that their 
own and their co-villagers’ longstanding roots in that community, whose stability 
they saw to be under threat because of the actions of the abusive state employee, gave 
them particular legitimacy in their request to remove him.  The regional authorities, 
for their part, approved the request.  The approval ag in suggests that the violence 
perpetrated by low-level armed state employees was not the result of a deliberate state 
policy, but on the contrary a reflection of the tenuous control that regional and state 
institutions had over the use of armed force in their territory.   
A telling exception to the general lack of violence among residents of former 
Ottoman Macedonia after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 was its frequency between 
newly arrived refugees and residents of long standing in the region.  Scholars have 
already noted the sharp distinction that residents of Greek Macedonia began to make, 
and even today continue, between “refugees” (prosfiges) and “locals” (dopioi) as 
waves of refugees settled in the region between 1912 and 1925.70  As we saw in 
Chapter 3, over 100,000 mostly Greek Orthodox Christian refugees from the two 
Balkan Wars initially settled in the portion of Macedonia annexed by Greece before 
the end of 1913.  Both Greek and Bulgarian archival sources contain numerous 
reports about violence between refugees and local inh bitants.  In the large majority 
of these cases, refugees were attacking locals.71  Both the Bulgarian consul in 
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Salonika and a Greek administrative official, for example, lamented (unbeknownst to 
each other) a pattern of attacks by refugees that was causing Bulgarian or Bulgarian-
speaking residents from the Kukush/Kilkis area to abandon their homes and emigrate 
in fear of their lives.72  The frequency of such aggressive behavior on the part of 
refugees of course reflected in part their often desperate situation, needing housing, 
land and other resources to survive.  Nonetheless, accompanying this economic 
motive was a clear political antagonism toward inhabitants of Greek Macedonia 
whom refugees considered non-Greek, including Muslims and former members of 
Bulgarian Exarchate churches.  Most, though not all, attacks by refugees on local 
inhabitants targeted members of these two major groups.73   
A reciprocal pattern could also be seen on the other sid  of the Greek-
Bulgarian border.  As Theodora Dragostinova notes, refugees from Greek Macedonia 
and Ottoman Thrace often settled in areas of Bulgaria with Greek-speaking 
populations.  The refugees often assaulted the latter, seizing their houses and inducing 
many to migrate to Greece.74  Social distinctions between refugees and locals were 
also apparent in Bulgaria for decades afterwards.  Meanwhile, Bulgarians who had 
                                                                                                                                 
125-127 (High Command of the Macedonian Gendarmerie, report on the past week’s events, Nov. 29, 
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between mostly Muslim refugees desparate for resources and mostly Muslim local inhabitants of the 
Ottoman vilayet of Kosovo where the refugees initially settled after they were expelled from Serbia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 




long lived as neighbors with the same Greek-speaking communities were more likely 
than the newly arrived refugees to refrain from andeven protect their neighbors 
against such violence.  The exceptional phenomenon of frequent violence obsrved 
between refugees and locals in former Ottoman Macedonia in the period following 
the conclusion of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 (with refugees usually the 
aggressors) only serves to highlight the lack of such politically charged violence 
among the diverse, longtime residents of the region.  In the preceding years, local 
cleavages along ethno-religious lines did often emerge as external governments had 
openly competed for influence and eventual sovereignty over Ottoman Macedonia.  
Even then it was rare for such cleavages to end in outright violence between members 
of local communities.  Now that the question of sovereignty appeared resolved for 
better or for worse, long-time residents focused on g als such as economic recovery 
and education, which required basic local stability and not a resort to violence.  They 
even took measures to consolidate stability across p tential fault lines.  The 
appearance of outsiders (refugees, paramilitaries from places as far away as Crete, 
and armed state agents) indeed threatened that stability.  
 
New Forms of Political Violence: International Agreements and Administrative 
Deportations 
Authorities in the Balkan states that conquered Macedonia in 1912 and 1913 
often did not trust this tendency within local communities to let bygones be bygones.  
During the Balkan Wars, the new authorities imprisoned or assaulted dignitaries of 




they fail to declare themselves members of the corre t nation.  Now, between the 
Balkan Wars and the First World War, the Balkan governments also contemplated 
new, distinctly bureaucratic ways of preventing the t r at they perceived from newly 
incorporated minorities.  The attacks during the Balkan Wars by armies against 
civilians had generated large waves of fearful refug es who fled spontaneously to 
countries they hoped would provide safety.  Governme ts now saw the apparent 
benefits of those population movements, increasing the ethnic homogeneity of their 
respective nations, and looked for ways to confirm the facts on the ground by law.  At 
the end of 1913 the Ottoman and Bulgarian governments signed a landmark 
convention on exchange of populations and properties.  Rather than directing new 
emigration, however, this convention effectively codified the movement of Muslims 
to Ottoman territory and of Christians to Bulgarian territory that had already taken 
place.  Following this precedent, the Ottoman and Greek governments in 1914 began 
talks that envisioned a voluntary exchange of Greeks and Muslims between the two 
states.  These talks, however, took place even as Ottoman paramilitary forces 
terrorized Orthodox populations in Thrace and Anatoli , causing many to flee to 
Greece.  As Yannis Mourelos has argued, it is likely that the real goal of the talks was 
not an orderly exchange of populations: rather, through them the Ottoman 
government sought a way to confirm retroactively new facts on the ground.  The 
Greek government, meanwhile, was stalling for time n order to stop further 
persecution and to avoid the burden of housing a new wave of refugees.75  The 
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discussions broke down in any event at the end of 1914 without any agreement being 
concluded. 
After having observed their armed forces massacring and putting to flight 
masses of terrorized non-combatants, Balkan state functionaries clearly began to 
contemplate a more radical possibility: the pre-planned, comprehensive and 
compulsory removal of an entire ethnic group or ethnic identity from a defined 
territory.  Such ideas, without exception, occur in documents concerned about enemy 
designs, rather than in actual plans or orders of authorities, and so caution must be 
taken in the conclusions to be drawn from them.  Nonetheless, those documents 
indicate at the very least that fears of deliberate and systematic “extermination” and 
“annihilation” of one’s ethnic own group were in circulation.  Thus, on the eve of the 
Second Balkan War the Greek legation in Sofia lodged a disturbing complaint with 
the Bulgarian government, still formally its ally for the moment:  
The Deputy Mayor of Kavalla declared to a prominent Greek notable that a Greek 
village was destroyed at Pravi because its inhabitants have helped the Greeks during 
the Greco-Bulgarian incident of Pravi and at the slightest movement of the Greeks of 
Kavalla the same fate was reserved for them.  Upon this threat, a commission 
composed of four notables and of His Eminence the Metropolitan came to the 
Military Governor Doucoff and the latter declared that the threat of the deputy mayor 
on the extermination of the Greek element was serious, since the Greek element of 
Kavalla was planning some movement.  As the metropolitan protested, saying that 
the Greek element was unjustly suspected, the military governor replied: “you know, 
and this is regrettable, that Kavalla is participating in its own extermination.”76 
 
The previous month another Greek official in the vicinity of Kavalla and Pravi 
charged that Bulgarian irregular units together with regular soldiers “have decided to 
annihilate” the “Greek element” in all the “Greek towns.”77   
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The following year, the Bulgarian consul in Salonika mputed analogous 
designs of “extermination” to Greek authorities in the part of geographic Macedonia 
annexed by Greece after the Treaty of Bucharest.  He reported that “[t]he Greek 
government, supported by the terrorist committees in Macedonia, are waging a 
systematic struggle for the decisive depersonalization of the Bulgarian population 
here” and were “leading this struggle for Bulgarian extermination… to bring about 
the exit of the last Bulgarians in this area.”78  While the preceding communications 
were internal government and inter-governmental ones, at least one charge of designs 
for ethnic “extermination” was made publically.  Shortly after the Second Balkan 
War, a group of Bulgarian professors at the University of Sofia published their own 
catalog of Greek and Serb atrocities to refute public Greek charges of Bulgarian 
atrocities.  In it they charged that both the Greeks and the Serbs separately had a 
“plan for the extermination of the Bulgarian population” in their occupation zones.79  
Nevertheless, despite the inferences drawn by some tat  functionaries and political 
elites occasioned by the grim events of the Balkan W rs, there is no direct evidence 
of any overarching plan on the part of a Balkan government or state institution to 
remove an entire ethnic group from a territory in 1912 or 1913.  
During and after the Balkan Wars governing authorities nonetheless began to 
act concretely on their suspicions and deported selected minority inhabitants, either 
across the new border or to a distant internal locati n away from the Macedonian 
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borderland.  During the period between the two Balkan Wars, Bulgarian officials 
initially targeted prominent individuals whom they considered to be subverting 
authority within their occupation zone in Macedonia.  A complaint by the Greek 
Bishop in Doiran alleging abuses committed by Bulgarian military authorities sparked 
a Bulgarian general’s decision “to exile him from Doiran to the interior of the 
Kingdom – Vratsa or Dobrich.”  The Bulgarian general suspected the bishop of acting 
as a spy for the Greeks, and being “in secret contat with Greek military and civil 
authorities outside of the lands occupied by our soldiers.”  In fact, the contact was no 
secret, since the bishop had filed his complaint specifically with Greece’s Prince 
Nicholas, who brought the allegations of abuse to the attention of Bulgarian 
officials.80  
Greece initially made more frequent use in Macedonia f deportations of 
ethnic minority individuals to protect “the national interest of the state.”81  
Deportation in Greece dates back to the state’s establi hment in the 1830s, though the 
practice was limited for several decades to punishig individuals suspected of 
brigandage and sometimes their families.82  However, a law promulgated in 
December 1913 broadened the scope of possible reasons for “administrative 
deportation” to include political criteria.83  This occurred, of course, just after Greece 
had incorporated a sizable territory with an ethnically diverse population.  Deportees 
from Greek Macedonia deemed “dangers to public security” were sometimes expelled 
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from the country, and other times sent to interior locations away from the 
Macedonian borderland, such as Crete and Larissa.84 
In some cases, Greek officials in Macedonia ordered deportations out of the 
country for violent criminals such as Spase Aggelou and Ilias Stephanou, two 
convicted murderers who would otherwise have been rleased from prison as part of 
an amnesty order.85  But the stated grounds for deportation could alsobe remarkably 
flimsy.  Aggelos Pavlov found himself deported essentially for being a Bulgarian who 
had once worked at a Bulgarian-owned hotel and was now “an unemployed vagabond 
who wanders the streets.”  These circumstances apparently sufficed to convince 
officials that Pavlov was “indisputably working on behalf of the Bulgarians.”86  
Authorities decided to deport Ioannis Velits as a “Bulgarian dangerous to public 
security” because of an article he submitted to a Sfia newspaper that criticized 
abuses of ethnic Bulgarians in Greek Macedonia.  Interestingly, the Greek authorities 
deliberating internally on the case did not even take pains to deny the accusations 
Velits made in his article.87 
The confounding case of Haralambi Georgi Tudjarov highlights how easily a 
single native of former Ottoman Macedonia could trigger heightened ethnic the 
suspicions of both Greek and Bulgarian authorities.  Tudjarov, a native of Strumitsa, a 
town annexed by Bulgaria under the Treaty of Bucharest, had been living recently in 
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Switzerland with his wife and daughter.88  As his elderly father was living in poverty 
in Salonika and Tudjarov himself had recently spent time in Salonika and carried a 
Greek passport, it is likely that the family had been among the wave of Strumitsa 
residents whom the Greek army had goaded into abandoni g their homes and coming 
to Greece in 1913 before Bulgarian authorities moved in (see Chapter 3.)  In 1914, 
Tudjarov boarded a ship bound for Constantinople entrusted with four young girls, 
fellow-natives of Strumitsa, to accompany them back to their home town.  Upon 
arriving in Bulgaria, Tudjarov declared, he had intended to find employment and then 
bring his wife and daughter from Switzerland.  Yet on the voyage to Constantinople 
two of the girls’ passports and a large sum of money w re stolen during the ship’s 
stopover in Greece.  At Constantinople the Bulgarian consul issued new Bulgarian 
passports to Tudjarov and the four girls.  Tudjarov later admitted that he had 
neglected to inform the consul that he still had his own Greek passport, resulting in 
his possessing two different passports.  After delays, Tudjarov arrived in Bulgaria and 
sent the girls home to Strumitsa while he stayed in Sofia to find employment.  As 
Tudjarov waited one day in a park with all of his baggage for an acquaintance who 
had agreed to help him find work, a policeman eyed him “with suspicion” and 
ordered him to what Tudjarov called a “secret police” [taina politsiia] station.89  
There, agents questioned him harshly and beat him repeatedly.  Fixing on the fact that 
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he carried both Greek and Bulgarian passports (“Where are your 300 passports?”), 
they accused him of being “an agent, probably for the Greeks” and “a spy, a thief, a 
pimp.”  After more questioning, accusations of spying and beatings, the Bulgarian 
agents deported Tudjarov across the Serbian border after confiscating all of his 
money and most of his belongings.  In Serbia he spent more days in prison, before 
managing to make his way to Salonika (in Greece).  There, Tudjarov noted ironically 
in his petition to the Bulgarian consulate, “after a short questioning [the Greek 
authorities] released me like I was already a Hellen ,” despite his not knowing the 
Greek language well.  Yet after his initially positive reception in Greece, while 
Tudjarov waited in vain to be compensated for his losses, he encountered further 
troubles in Salonika.  He and his father were driven out of their home and could not 
find employment; they had no money, and nothing to eat.  In a second petition, 
Tudjarov complained that the Bulgarian consulate had ignored his first petition and 
again “accused me of being a Greek spy.”  Yet now the Greek authorities suspected 
him of the opposite.   
The Greeks don’t want me because I am Bulgarian, I have supposedly come as a spy 
– the Bulgarians the same.  And what will happen now, who will accept me?  And to 
whom should I go? …. I won’t be getting any more money.  Whatever I had I sold 
for us to eat.  Now look me up and down.  I am surely a spy.  Just come and see what 
kind of situation I am in.90 
 
Perhaps Tudjarov’s sardonic emphasis on his abject situation in Greece eased the 
Bulgarian authorities’ suspicions of his being a Greek spy.  In the end, the Bulgarian 
authorities allowed Tudjarov to return to Strumitsa, but only for a period of two 
months, “in order for him to settle some of his affairs at home.”91  It seems that 
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Tudjarov’s lack of enough vigilance in displaying a consistent national affiliation 
rendered him a candidate for deportation by both Bulgarian and Greek authorities, 
who each suspected him as a spy of the other country.  Tudjarov’s experience 
epitomizes the gulf in mentalities between two groups: the inhabitants of former 
Ottoman Macedonia who sought to revive their livelihoods but had trouble adjusting 
to the new order of nation-building and state-building, and on the other hand Balkan 
state functionaries who were quick to see such indiv duals as subversive ethnic 
minorities to be targeted for surveillance and deportati n.  
In the short period of peace following the Balkan Wars, deportations of 
ethnically suspect residents of former Ottoman Macedonia still typically occurred on 
an individual, case-by-case basis – not on a mass scale.  In Greece, which practiced 
deportation more frequently than did Bulgaria at this stage, individual 
recommendations for deportation traveled high up the bureaucratic chain of command 
for approval, sometimes by the Minister of Interior himself.92  Still, such initiatives – 
including the halting exploration of agreements to exchange populations between the 
Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria and Greece respectively – indicate that the idea of 
using bureaucratically planned coercion to sculpt the contours of population groups 
had at least occurred to Balkan government officials before the outbreak of the First 
World War.   
* * * 
As this chapter has argued, such ideas and policies of molding the population 
through bureaucratic coercion should not be considered measured responses to 
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justifiable fears of subversion by significant ethnically disloyal elements, but rather 
overanxious reactions.  Rather than hatch plans to destabilize the new authorities or 
even attempt to resist pressures for national assimilation, the vast majority of 
Orthodox Christian inhabitants of former Ottoman Macedonia focused on their own 
“construction of life” in peacetime.  Their priorities were to stay in or even return to 
the lands of their ancestors if physically possible, to rebuild and grow economically, 
to educate their children, and to negotiate a measur  of local autonomy over their own 
affairs while also reaping what benefits could be gotten from the central government.  
Rather than come to blows with their neighbors over ethno-religious disputes which 
would undermine those priorities, residents made efforts to consolidate local stability 
– especially now that the issue of the decades-long “Macedonian struggle” appeared 
settled by military fiat.  Challenges to that community stability were posed by what 
we might consider to be truly unique about “Balkan violence” in this period: the high 
incidence of abuse from low-level state employees, paramilitaries and refugees, all 
armed, who could take advantage of local residents with relative impunity due to the 
weak grasp of central state institutions.  Yet, as argued in the next chapter, the 
imminent onset of the First World War would cut short residents’ “construction of 
life.”  Balkan governments (along with other European governments) would make 
further innovations in dealing with unwanted or burdensome populations.  The 
bureaucratically directed deportations and detentions ntroduced in the period after 
the Balkan Wars would occur on a mass scale, one mor cl sely approaching the pre-
planned, forced removal of entire groups that some Balkan political elites had only 




Chapter 5:  Macedonia’s Civilians and the “European War,” 
1915-1918 
 
The First World War thrust the population of geographic Macedonia into a 
new and different set of wartime difficulties barely a year after the Second Balkan 
War ended in 1913.  The Vardar region of Macedonia, annexed by Serbia in 1913, 
initially became a Serbian “home front” as early as 1914 as tens of thousands of 
males were mobilized and sent north to help repel the Austro-Hungarian invasion.  
But Macedonia itself soon became a battle front again.  Bulgaria, Germany, and 
Austria-Hungary invaded Serbian Macedonia in 1915 while British and French troops 
tried to come to Serbia’s defense by landing in Greek (Aegean) Macedonia and trying 
to push north from there.  Bulgarian troops also advanced well into Greek Macedonia 
in 1916 against the Entente forces there.  By July 1917, Greece had officially joined 
the Entente.   
In military or diplomatic terms, the First World War can be considered a 
sequel to the two Balkan Wars in the region of Macedonia.  Bulgaria went to war 
against Serbia and Greece again to regain the territories it had lost to them in the 
Second Balkan War.  Yet the First World War introduced the civilian population in 
Macedonia to strikingly different conditions.  The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 were 
short wars featuring rapidly moving fronts.  The First World War in Macedonia, as on 
the Western Front, settled into immobile front lines and trench warfare for long 




produced a war of attrition and economic mobilization behind the lines and indeed 
between both rear areas of the same fixed front line.  Military authorities and 
governments came to treat everything in Macedonia –agricultural land and crops, 
minerals, and the local population itself – as strategic resources to be assessed and 
exploited for their ability to contribute to the larger war effort.  The resulting 
requisitions and economic restrictions led to sever material deprivation.  These 
burdens were generally far more protracted and onerous for the civilian population 
than in the preceding wars. 
The prolonged conditions of stalemate also changed th  sort of war crimes and 
abuses suffered by civilians in Macedonia.  As seen in Chapters 2 and 3, armies and 
paramilitary groups during the Balkan Wars had often used tactics of terror against 
civilians perceived to be unfriendly to their causes.  During World War I, armed 
forces operating in Macedonia adopted a new, more syst matic approach to dealing 
with ostensibly untrustworthy or burdensome populations, one that came to mark 
broader European wartime violence in the twentieth c ntury.  The limited 
deportations of local residents discussed in the previous chapter now took place on a 
mass scale.  Greece and its ally, France, continued to carry out internments and 
deportations on a case-by-case basis, but the criteria for suspicion became so broad 
that thousands were eventually swept up in them.  Bulgaria and its allies organized 
mass deportations for entire categories of civilians whose national loyalties were 
deemed suspect, as well as large-scale evacuations of civilians from frontline areas.  
A large number of deportees were sent to labor camps where they faced harsh living 




Such policies also caused economic disruption and even mass starvation in 
Macedonia, disproportionately affecting the female population.  State authorities were 
less likely to consider women as political actors and hence political threats.  Thus 
they often avoided targeting women for deportation.  When males in a family were 
deported or fled their homes, wives usually stayed put.  They assumed the role of 
maintaining the family’s stake in the household in expectation that the husband would 
come back once circumstances allowed.  Yet conditions f r women and others who 
stayed home were as arduous as those for deportees.  Women struggled to cope with 
conditions of wartime scarcity and requisitions, exacerbated by the absence of the 
male “pair of hands” and his experience in cultivation and selling produce.  Such 
wartime conditions in many cases made survival at home untenable.  Some women as 
a last resort eventually tried to follow their husbands to exile. 
Contemporary Bulgarian sources evocatively referred to the First World War 
as “the General European War” or simply “the European War,” which implied a 
distinction from the “Balkan War” (by which they meant the First Balkan War).1  
And indeed, the new presence of Western and Central European (primarily German, 
French, and British) military personnel seemed pervasive to locals and had far-
reaching effects on them.  The armies of the Great Powers requisitioned supplies from 
civilian populations, committed atrocities against them, and exercised various forms 
of surveillance and control over them.  German personnel in Vardar Macedonia 
engaged locals in ambitious economic development projects of agricultural 
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modernization, while at least some French personnel considered their presence in 
Macedonia as part of their “civilizing” role in the world.  French and German military 
personnel were, however, intimately involved in the policies of civilian internment on 
each side, a fact that was reflected in accounts and complaints of affected civilians.   
Residents throughout Macedonia, whose “construction of life” was cut short 
by the events of the First World War, generally regarded its onset not with the 
patriotic euphoria famously observed in much of the rest of Europe.  They displayed 
instead reluctance and trepidation informed by the hardships occasioned by the recent 
Balkan Wars.  War weariness only increased among Macedonia’s inhabitants as the 
war progressed and as fresh hardships accumulated.  But locals continued to refrain 
from violence against each other.  Nor did they violently resist occupying forces even 
from a different ethnic group.  Indeed, quite a fewengaged with the presumed ethnic 
enemy occupier in a manner that would later come to be characterized pejoratively as 
“collaboration.”  Such behavior is better seen at this ime as a continuation of the 
inhabitants’ previous inclinations to secure their most important priorities: economic 
well-being and local stability, rather than strugglin  for national ideals. 
While the mobilization for a wider war and support from one Great Power 
alliance against the other seem to suggest a strength ing in the Balkan states’ 
monopoly over the means of violence, the picture is actually mixed.  As was the case 
before, state-building ambitions were not always realiz d.  Most factions of the 
paramilitary Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organiz tion (VMRO) were 
integrated more deeply into Bulgaria’s military structure.  But this integration also 




use of force.  Meanwhile, a portion of the Greek soldiers stationed in central and 
western Macedonia, mostly from southern Greece and e ger to join the Entente, 
staged a mutiny in 1916 against their (still neutral) central government in Athens.  By 
the end of the war, the Bulgarian army faced widespread mutinies and the military 
command lost control over a large portion of its soldiers, many of them from 
Macedonia. 
 
War Weariness from the Outset 
 The outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 had an immediate impact on 
inhabitants of Vardar Macedonia – the area annexed by Serbia under the 1913 Treaty 
of Bucharest.   The Serbian army had already begun to draft males from its newly 
won Macedonian territory in April of 1914, before the crisis precipitated by the 
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.  During the initial defense of Serbia in 
1914 and 1915, the number of men mobilized from Serbian Macedonia reached 
roughly 53,000.  About 45,000 of these were Orthodox Christian but generally not 
Serb, the rest mostly Muslim.   Although these troops typically possessed the least 
military experience among the otherwise fairly battle-hardened Serbian army, they 
were often placed in the first line of defense in northwestern Serbia where they bore 
the brunt of Austro-Hungarian attacks.  They incurred high casualties, while many 
others wound up as prisoners in Austria-Hungary.2   
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Desertions plagued several European armies later in he war.  Yet according to 
recent scholarship in the Republic of Macedonia, Serbian army soldiers from Vardar 
Macedonia deserted at a remarkably high rate – almost 28,000 of the 53,000 
conscripts – over the first year of the war.  Most f these deserters escaped across 
borders to Greece or Bulgaria, both of which had not yet entered the war. 3  Others 
gave themselves up easily to Austro-Hungarian forces.4  When Bulgaria entered the 
war on the side of the Central Powers in 1915, prisoners in Austria-Hungary who 
originated from Vardar Macedonia were assumed to be pro-Bulgarian and transferred 
to be mobilized into the Bulgarian army.  But the Bulgarian army itself then 
proceeded to suffer from a high number of deserters from geographic Macedonia.  
Serbian military authorities attributed the high rate of desertion among the conscripts 
from their Macedonian territory primarily to treacherous pro-Bulgarian loyalties 
among this population, to which they referred at times by the epithet bugarashi.5  
This impression among Serbian authorities was surely strengthened by a very public 
prewar incident in the Serbian city of Kragujevac on April 14, 1914, when up to 
1,000 conscripts from Macedonia publically refused to take an oath of loyalty to 
Serbia’s King Peter on the grounds that they were Bulgarian.6  Believing that even 
more would desert to the enemy once Bulgaria joined th  war against Serbia, the 
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Serbian command began in 1915 to assign recruits from their Macedonian territories 
to the northern front against Germany and Autsria-Hungary, rather than assigning 
them to fight closer to their homes against the Bulgarian army that was invading from 
the east.7 
But the lack of enthusiasm early in the First World War among conscripts 
from Vardar Macedonia may be attributed more directly to a reluctance to perform 
military service in general, rather than to loyalty to Bulgaria or Greece.  This 
continues the pattern, seen in Chapter 3, of desertions before and during the Second 
Balkan War of soldiers from geographic Macedonia mobilized into Bulgarian and 
Greek army units.  These official impositions were still a novel and unwelcome 
phenomenon especially to Christian residents, who had been exempt in practice from 
military duties when under Ottoman rule.  Put simply, military conscription imposed 
a heavy economic burden and, in war time, it was dangerous.  These were in fact the 
concerns voiced from Vardar Macedonia by both conscripts and their family 
members.   
Lazar Mitrovich, a conscript from Vardar Macedonia st tioned with the 
Serbian army but writing in Bulgarian, complained to his relative in September 1914 
that he and his comrades were living in an “overratd pigsty” where “in one house 
there are 2,000 people one on top of the other.”  Compounding the rough conditions 
were shortages in clothing and food.  Finally, rain nd fog were causing all the men to 
become ill.  Mitrovich told his relative not to bother to write anytime soon, because 
“we already hear clearly how those cannons rumble – and it is said that after 5 days 
they will attack us from the north!!”  As an indication of the impact that his 
                                                




conscription was having back home, Mitrovich wrote, “you asked about grandpa, his 
eyes had been well, but from the constant crying over me [before leaving for the 
front] … his eyes got terribly much worse.”8  
Alekso Martulkov – originally a teacher in Bulgarian church schools – proved 
willing to be retrained as a Serbian teacher after his hometown of Veles was annexed 
by Serbia in 1913.9  In 1914 a couple of wounded soldiers from his town who did not 
want to face returning to the front approached him for help to escape across the 
Bulgarian border.  He organized an underground network that helped 2,500 deserters 
from Vardar Macedonia escape to Bulgaria by the end of 1914.10  As Martulkov 
assessed the attitude of his compatriots from Serbian Macedonia toward combat 
service, “[m]aybe the war was popular and legitimate for the Serbian people, but for 
our people it was a burden.  For foreign interests we were becoming meat for the 
Austrian guns.”11  Indeed, residents of Vardar Macedonia seemed reluctant to take up 
arms for any national cause, whether pro- or anti-Serbian.  Martulkov and some 
fellow former members of VMRO at this point considered trying to organize an 
armed struggle of the deserters against the Serbian authorities, but thought better of it.  
The underground escape channel was “supported by our entire people” precisely 
because they were “vitally interested in saving their loved ones.”  By extension, 
Martulkov judged that “support of the people was doubtful in an armed struggle, due 
to the great risks to them.”12 
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A collection of over two hundred letters and postcards written back and forth 
between conscripts in both the Serbian and Bulgarian armies and members of their 
families from the region of Kratovo in the northeastern part of Serbian Macedonia 
provides a revealing picture of the attitudes of conscripts and their family members 
towards the wartime military service.  Copies of the handwritten originals appear 
along with typed transcriptions in a 2008 volume published by the Foundation Open 
Society Institute Macedonia.  As the volume’s editors rightly note, many of the letters 
and postcards were written using a mixture of Bulgarian and Serbian Cyrillic letters 
in a distinctive local dialect that more closely resembles the later standardized 
Macedonian language than either Serbian or Bulgarian.13  Letters and postcards 
overwhelmingly confirm the sense that residents of Serbian Macedonia had little 
enthusiasm for their participation in the war on behalf of either Serbia or Bulgaria.  
Not a single patriotic statement for their respective armies’ national cause or war 
effort can be found in the correspondence, although military censors would 
presumably have had no reason to censor such statements.  Even one woman’s letter 
to her husband serving with the Serbian army that refers to the German or Austrian 
troops who had taken his relative prisoner as “Schwabs” was no more than the 
established Serbian word for Vojvodina Germans.14 
Instead, the letters and postcards dwelled on the of en difficult material 
consequences of the conscription.  Women repeatedly implored their husbands in the 
army to request leave to come home in order to help with the harvest or other chores 
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with which they were struggling alone.15  “We have no kind of life,” wrote Tasika 
Miialković: “until now work has been torture and from now on I cannot look after it, 
alone I cannot work.”16  Yet many women like Miialković had little choice but to 
attempt to take on the work previously done by their male relatives, in addition to the 
duties they already had.  For some, this entailed a difficult learning process.  
Magdalena Miialković informed her husband in the army that she was in the process 
of reaping the harvest with the help of a Mrs. Badeva, but she needed advice. “There 
still remain barley and oats to harvest, so tell us how to do it, should we hire 
someone?  But the daily rate is expensive, 15 pennies, and we don’t have the 
money… you tell us to beg at the municipality here, w  went and asked for the mayor 
and they did not receive us.”17  Ianinka Ignatiević wanted directions from her husband 
in the army about what to do now that their crop had been harvested.  “We want to 
sell it, but we wonder what to do, there is no one to sell it – and about the ox, should 
we sell the black ox… what should we do, should we sell it, write me.”  Ignatiević 
also closed her letter, as did so many other wives, by urging her husband to ask his 
commander for leave to visit home.18  For their part, men at the front almost 
invariably inquired intently in their letters back home as to details about the health of 
their crops and livestock, in addition to that of their loved ones.19 
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In 1914 and early 1915, the governments of both the Ent nte and the Central 
Powers each attempted to woo still-neutral Greece and Bulgaria to join their 
respective alliances in the war, or at the very least to maintain a policy of benevolent 
neutrality.  Both Bulgaria and Greece were then still recovering from military and 
material exhaustion from the preceding Balkan Wars.  Yet the new war also presented 
each with tempting possibilities for expansion into coveted territories if they could 
enter on the side of the eventual victor.  Bulgaria m ght finally achieve a longstanding 
goal that had eluded her in 1912 and 1913: the unification of all of geographic 
Macedonia with Bulgaria, including the territories ju t annexed by Serbia and Greece.  
Greece eyed irredenta in Northern Epirus (southern Albania) and Asia Minor.  The 
combination of these territorial ambitions with the obvious risks of entering another 
war unprepared induced both Greek and Bulgarian political leaders to sit on the 
sidelines in 1914, rather than plunge into the war immediately.  Leaders weighed their 
options and (especially Bulgaria) played the Entente and the Central Powers against 
each other as each alliance offered territorial rewards in exchange for cooperation.  
Also contributing to the hesitation of Greece and Bulgaria were serious internal 
divisions within each country, as different factions leaned towards cooperation with 
the Entente or with the Central Powers.20   
Although war thus came later to the Bulgarian and Greek parts of geographic 
Macedonia than to Serbia, residents of these areas lso regarded the prospect of 
another war with unease.  John Reed, the noted American journalist later drawn into 
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the Bolshevik Revolution, interviewed people in Salonika (in Greek Macedonia) early 
in 1915 before war came to that area.  The residents of Salonika already followed 
Greek national politics closely enough to have opinions on the deep split developing 
between the followers of Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, who favored entering 
the war on the side of the Entente, and King Constantine, who wanted to preserve 
Greek neutrality.  Constantine Chakiris, a Salonika café owner’s son who had come 
back from America in 1912 to fight in the Balkan Wars, told Reed he did not want to 
extend his time in the army.  He and his compatriots were already through with war: 
“Do you want Greece to go to war?” we [Reed and his American companion] asked. 
“No.” He shook his head. “Macedonia don’t [sic] want war; we want peace in 
Greece.” 
“What do you think of Venezelos?” 
He laughed: “Venezelos wants war. If I was for Venezelos, I would be killed now. 
We love Venezelos; he made us free. But we don’t want r.  The King? Oh, we 
don’t mind him, he is nothing…. In America I am just like brothers with all my 
friends; here there is no life for a man – he can win no money.” He paused for a 
moment. “We are Macedonians,” he finished; “we are children of Alexander the 
Great.”21 
 
While Chakiris’ banter flitted from subject to subject, it expressed the typical 
priorities and outlook of Christian residents of geo raphic Macedonia after the 
Balkan Wars.  His praise of Venizelos for “making us free” suggests he approved of 
the initial goal of overthrowing Ottoman rule because it had become repressive by 
1912.  Chakiris also clearly presented his views as representing those of Macedonians 
in particular.  While it is far from clear that he meant this in an ethnic sense (Reed in 
particular understood him to be ethnically Greek), he certainly claimed that 
Macedonians (in contrast to those Greeks who supported Venizelos’ policies) now 
wanted peace and not war.  Finally, after the Balkan Wars ended, locals were 
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preoccupied with economic matters; because Chakiris found he could “win no 
money” in Greece, he was planning to go back to America.   
Reed and his companion found the same sentiments among seven carpenters 
they interviewed in Salonika, six of whom were refugees from the Balkan Wars: 
“Do you want Greece to go to war?” we asked. 
“No!” cried some; others moodily shook their heads. 
“It is like this,” the English-speaking Greek said slowly: “This war has driven 
us from our homes and our work. Now there is no work f  a carpenter. War is 
a tearing down and not a building up. A carpenter is for building up –” He 
translated to the silent audience, and they growled applause. 
“But how about Constantinople?” 
“Constantinople for Greece! Greek Constantinople!” shouted two of the 
carpenters. But the others broke into violent argument.22 
 
The English-speaking Greek carpenter’s contrast between his profession, which was 
for “building up” and war, which was a “tearing down,” closely resembled Nikola 
Zografov’s advocacy a decade later, noted in Chapter 4, of the “construction of life” 
instead of war and violence.  Although a minority of the carpenters was aroused 
enough to trumpet the Greekness of Constantinople, none apparently would have 
wanted to risk another war to achieve that ideal of expansionist Greek nationalism. 
 Despite John Reed’s clear anti-war inclinations, he did not avoid giving 
people with pro-war sentiments in Salonika their say.  When he queried a pair of 
soldiers about the prospect of war, they answered  
 “Sure we want Greece to go to war! We conquer Constantinople. Our King – 
he is named Constantine, and once Constantinople was Greek! You 
remember? We will go back to Constantinople with Constantine. Fight! Sure 
we like to fight – fight Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania, It ly – all!” 
“Where are you from?” 
“We are from Sparta!”23 
 
                                                
22 Reed, The War in Eastern Europe, 21. 




Tellingly, these two soldiers were neither refugees nor natives of Greek Macedonia, 
but hailed from Sparta, in the southern part of pre-1912 Greece.  They had 
presumably been socialized into the prevailing expansionist ideology of the Greek 
nation-state since childhood.  While they might thems lves have seen combat in the 
Balkan Wars, their homes in Sparta were otherwise unaffected by war.  These 
circumstances may account for the contrast in mentalities between them and the other 
respondents, whose life under a nation-state was new a d whose homes and 
livelihoods had suffered directly from the recent Balkan Wars. 
Bulgaria finally cast its lot with the Central Powers in September 1915.  It 
assisted Germany and Austria-Hungary in the latter’s third (and successful) attempt to 
overrun Serbia.  Bulgaria was promised territorial rewards in Macedonia, part of 
Thrace belonging to the Ottoman Empire, and the Romanian-ruled region of 
Dobrudja if Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente.24  The annals of the 
secondary school [realno uchilishte] in Razlog (in Bulgarian Macedonia) record a 
scene on September 23, 1915 that appears to recall the popular outbursts of patriotism 
observed at the start of the war in Germany, Austria-Hungary, France and Britain.  “A 
general military mobilization is declared and the aft rnoon activities are cut short, as 
the students have demonstrated around the town, singing patriotic songs,” it reads. 25  
Yet other entries in the annals suggest that such demonstrations (in any case 
infrequent) and the attendant interruptions of class in truction, far from being 
spontaneous, were largely organized by the authorities.  Roughly two months later, on 
news of the Bulgaro-German conquest of Bitolia (a town in geographic Macedonia 
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belonging to Serbia since 1913), the chronicle report d that “students were brought to 
a Te Deum to mark the occasion of the liberation of Bitolia and the unification of the 
Bulgarian people.”26  When the Central Powers captured Bucharest towards the end 
of 1916, the regional school inspector decreed that afternoon classes again be 
cancelled so that “appropriate speeches” could be delivered to the students by school 
principles and teachers on the Bulgarian heritage in Dobrudja, the region Bulgaria 
expected to annex from Romania.27   
Despite authorities’ prodding to demonstrate and listen to patriotic speeches, 
civilians in Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia did not typically regard Bulgaria’s entry into 
another war as an event to celebrate.  For Krum Hristov and his neighbors in the town 
of Gorna Djumaia, a new war meant a devastating interruption of their attempts to 
“create a healthy foundation for their new life” tha  came just as the “wounds… 
began to heal” from the Balkan Wars. 
Unfortunately, this period [of healing] did not last for long.  For most of those 
already settled in the town and for refugees recovering from the blow [of war], it 
continued for one and a half to two years.  Bulgaria’s intervention in the First World 
War came at a moment when they still had not gotten back up on their feet [oshte ne 
biaha stûpili zdravo na krakata si].  The men were mobilized, so only the aged, 
women, and children remained at home.  Without [the men] the town and the 
unproductive surrounding region for obvious reasons were left poor economically, 
and we were brought to a terrible scarcity.  There was not enough of anything.  We 
didn’t have bread, we didn’t have salt, we resorted to using wood kindling to provide 
light.  On top of everything malaria ran rife.  In the little town as far as I remember 
there was only one doctor and in the first years only e pharmacy … there was no 
quinine, and the mothers were giving the children a potion of wormwood.28 
 
Hristov’s account of the period makes no mention of enthusiasm among the residents 
for the war, even at Bulgaria’s initial victories.  The men are not said to have 
volunteered or even to have answered the call of duty – they simply “were 
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mobilized,” a fact that Hristov connects only with negative consequences.  Hristov’s 
family in particular was among the refugees who had fled from Greek Macedonia 
during the Second Balkan War.  Yet he does not allude to any kind of hope on their 
part for the prospect of the reunification of all of geographic Macedonia under 
Bulgarian rule.  Like women in Serbian Macedonia whose men were mobilized into 
combat service in 1914, women in Bulgarian Macedonia also struggled to take on 
added burdens under the most adverse conditions:   
Under these circumstances lasting memories were deposit d of indescribable poverty, 
of hungry days, of cold winters – when we, the women and children, denuded the 
woods on the hillocks surrounding the town in order to keep warm.  And if there was 
anything that still sustained life and helped to make  living, this was the admirable 
courage of the wives, mothers, and sisters and their resourcefulness in the struggle 
with hunger, disease, and poverty and the continual readiness of people to help each 
other, which brought together people who had not knwn each other until then in the 
general efforts to withstand the misery.29 
 
As the Bulgarian, German and Austro-Hungarian armies overran Serbia in the 
autumn of 1915, France and Britain diverted troops from their failing expedition at 
Gallipoli to Greek Macedonia in order to move northward and come to the aid of the 
beleaguered Serbian army.  These troops arrived too la e to make a difference in the 
Serbian campaign.  They retreated back into Greece, wh re they established 
encampments in and around Salonika and soon thereaft r in western Greek 
Macedonia around the town of Florina.30  All of this occurred over the formal public 
protest of the Greek government, whose King Constantine hoped to preserve Greece’s 
neutrality in the war.  The political split in Greece between the supporters of King 
Constantine and those of Prime Minister Venizelos, who favored joining the Entente, 
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now intensified.  As the king continued to insist on neutrality, Venizelos resigned in 
protest.31   
Wanting to tread carefully in order to avoid provoking Greece into joining the 
Entente, Germany initially restrained its army and that of its Bulgarian ally from 
crossing the Greek border in pursuit of the Entente troops who had retreated behind it.  
However, Bulgaria’s leaders had not given up on their ambitions for Greece’s portion 
of Macedonia.  They also worried about the threat to Bulgaria’s security of a growing 
Anglo-French military presence directly to their south.32  Over the summer of 1916, 
Bulgaria’s government persuaded its German ally to join it in putting military 
pressure on the Entente forces across the Greek border.33  On August 17 they attacked 
Greek western Macedonia around Florina – effectively controlled by the French and 
only nominally under Greek sovereignty at this point.  They were soon repulsed and 
lost ground to the French and reorganized Serbian forces there.  The Central Powers 
meanwhile obtained tacit permission from Greece’s King Constantine to occupy the 
eastern part of Greek Macedonia, until then still under effective Greek government 
control, while they assured Greece of its continued formal sovereignty over the area.34  
The vast majority of Greek troops then stationed in eastern Macedonia duly 
surrendered without resistance to the Bulgarian and German forces who entered.  
Constantine considered the permission he gave the logical extension of his neutrality 
policy – after all, he had effectively allowed the Entente to occupy central and 
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western Greek Macedonia a year earlier.35  Yet to some, Constantine’s policy 
amounted to a capitulation to Bulgaria, Greece’s rival.  The king’s concession 
prompted Venizelos, who had resigned as prime minister twice since the beginning of 
the war in protest at the king’s refusal, to act.  He set up a breakaway government 
based in central and western Greek Macedonia under the sponsorship of the Entente 
forces stationed there.36   
Both of these incursions by the Central Powers into western and eastern Greek 
Macedonia coincided with a rash of further attempts by men hailing from geographic 
Macedonia to escape conscription into the Bulgarian army or to desert, continuing the 
pattern observed earlier for the Serbian army.  OneGerman foreign ministry official 
felt that the demoralization within the Bulgarian infantry accounted for the Central 
Powers’ setback against French forces in western Greek Macedonia in November 
1916.  He singled out “almost an entire Bulgaro-Macedonian brigade” as the worst 
offender, as it “just defected to the enemy in the attack.”37  In January 1917, the 
Bulgarian commander in chief wondered what to do about the growing problem of 
deserters who “pretend that they are Greek citizens.”  Should they be prosecuted?  
The most recent case, 29 deserters from around the town of Nevrokop in Bulgarian 
Macedonia, prompted him to raise the question.  By claiming that they were Greek 
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citizens, the deserters hoped they could be exempt from Bulgarian army conscription.  
Their hopes, for the time being, were well-founded.  The Greek government had 
already lodged protests on behalf of some of them.38  Wanting Greece to stay neutral 
rather than join the war against them, the Bulgarian government decided for the 
moment to halt the punishment of anyone refusing cons ription on these grounds.39  
An Ottoman officer was sent the following April to the part of Greek eastern 
Macedonia occupied by his Bulgarian allies to recruit local Muslims into the Ottoman 
army.  To his dismay, he found that “many” of the Muslims also “refused to serve on 
the grounds that they are Greek citizens,” a fact that the local Bulgarian commander 
relayed back to Bulgarian headquarters. 40  Bulgaria’s military leadership again felt 
powerless to force the issue lest they provoke Greece.  Its headquarters in Kiustendil 
ordered that “only willing Turks are to be sent to service in the Turkish army.”41  As 
direct Greek involvement in the war looked increasingly likely, draft evasion from 
Greek Macedonia also became a problem for the Greek army.  The Greek prefect of 
Kozani in western Greek Macedonia reported in February 1916 in a coded letter to 
the Foreign Ministry in Athens that 930 new conscripts from his area had paid men 
(likely workers) in the Athenian port of Piraeus to help them escape by ship to 
America.42 
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A Different Kind of War 
As already noted, the First World War in Macedonia i volved lengthy periods 
of static warfare similar to those seen on the Western Front.43  Also in contrast to the 
Balkan Wars, Western and Central European troops (Germans on the Bulgarian side 
and French and British on the Greek and Serbian side) affected locals’ everyday 
experiences at least as markedly as did the Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek military 
forces.  For civilians in the vicinity of the fighting, their experiences resembled those 
on other European fronts in important ways.  The length of the conflict and the 
prolonged preparations on each side for a decisive breakthrough encouraged a war of 
attrition that mobilized all resources behind the lin s.  Military forces and their 
governments viewed the local infrastructure and agricultural or mineral production, as 
well as the local population itself, as resources to be controlled and harnessed as 
much as possible for the war effort.  Characteristic of the armies’ imposition of 
control not only over the area of the immediate frontlines but also the vast hinterlands 
around them was an order given by Bulgaria’s commander in chief, General Nikola 
Zhekov soon after his country’s 1915 invasion of Serbian Macedonia: “the entire 
territory of the state [i.e., Bulgaria], together with the newly-occupied lands, is 
considered a theater of war and military activities.”44  А civil servant installed by 
Bulgaria in newly-conquered Serbian Macedonian territory understood the 
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responsibility entrusted to him as “order, peace and everything focused on one goal: 
to win the war.”45 
The armies’ determination to mobilize local resources in Macedonia imposed 
itself on the civilian population there in several ways.  Locals’ efforts to advance 
education, discussed in the previous chapter, were dis upted as military units often 
commandeered school buildings in the vicinity of the front.  Outside of the large 
towns of geographic Macedonia, school buildings were often the only sizable or 
modern buildings – again, a reflection of the high priority accorded to them 
historically in local public investment.  This made th m the natural locations of local 
headquarters, soldiers’ quarters, and occasionally prisons.  Interruptions and 
sometimes cancellations of the school year ensued on both sides of the front lines.46   
Local civilians were also frequently pressed into labor in the service of the 
occupying armies.  According to a man from Kavalla in eastern Greek Macedonia, 
“the forced labor began immediately” after the Central Powers occupied his city in 
1916.  “Every day they indiscriminately rounded up a large number of men,” he 
recalled in 1918, “and they forced them to carry weapons and materials which were 
used to fortify various parts of Kavalla.”47  One group of villagers from around the 
town of Doxato in the same occupied region, signing their names in Greek, asked 
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Bulgarian military authorities to intervene against abuses by “Turkish” (Ottoman) 
soldiers stationed nearby.  They complained that the Ottoman soldiers were making 
them perform forced labor, which they should not have to do “since we are already 
performing labor for the Bulgarian army.”48  According to an old man from the 
village Kioup Kioi, the Central Powers occupying forces considered the males a 
political threat because of their Greek identity and thus deported most of them to the 
interior of Bulgaria.  But they also took the opportunity to use the remaining residents 
– old men, women, and girls – for forced labor.49 
Great Power and Balkan governments also took control of l cal agricultural 
production in Macedonia.  They viewed the local crops and livestock as crucial for 
the large armies they had to sustain on the Macedonian front and as useful for 
alleviating food and other shortages at home.  The initial orders issued by the 
Bulgarian army command for its 1916 advance (with permission of then-neutral 
Greece) into Greek eastern Macedonia specified that loc l products needed by the 
troops “must be bought with cash; nothing should be requisitioned.”50  However, the 
Bulgarian command later contrived partially to circumvent this restraint by decreeing 
the depreciated Bulgarian lev to be equal in value to the stronger Greek drachma.51  
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Purchases by the military were to follow this new regulation, and all those (including 
civilians) who violated it were subject to indictment and trial for “enemy activities.”52  
As suggested by the specific threat of punishment that went along with the decree, 
this policy amounted in practice to a forced overvaluation of Bulgarian currency to 
facilitate requisitioning.  Five days after the decree’s issuance, the Bulgarian 
authorities dismissed members of a village committee from their positions for 
attempting to defy it and duly put them on trial for “enemy activities.”  The 
committee members, who had refused to take Bulgarian leva from army purchasers, 
reportedly threw the leva back in their faces and cried, “not even corn can we eat with 
such money.”53  Meanwhile, the German military representative in Sofia criticized the 
Bulgarian Central Committee for Social Welfare for its restraint in procuring 
resources from the population in occupied areas, urging “radical measures” and 
hinting that generals in the field were already beginning to ignore such restraints.54  
Another German military representative welcomed the c ange, two months later, 
when that civilian-led committee was replaced by a Directorate of Social and 
Economic Welfare under the Ministry of War because it  “more military character” 
would allow it to take more decisive action and because it was empowered to set 
prices for goods needed by the military.  He did acknowledge, however, that this 
rationing and the envisioned export of grain to the Central Powers would strike the 
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population (in Bulgaria-proper as well as the occupied areas) as unjust.  He warned 
that the head of the new Directorate would need to navigate carefully “to steer clear 
of this dangerous reef” of potential popular discontent.55   
Although the impact of food rationing and requisitions caused hardship 
throughout Bulgaria, it struck the civilian population of the newly-occupied regions 
earlier and more severely.  Only seven months afterCentral Powers forces occupied 
eastern Greek Macedonia with the permission of the king of Greece, Bulgaria’s 
commander in chief received reports that the population in that region, “especially the 
Greek [population] in Kavalla, is dying of hunger.”  The cause of this starvation, 
according to the reports, was the refusal of the Bulgarian commander in the area, 
General Burnov, to allow the distribution of food to the hungry population.56   
The French military authorities occupying central and western Greek 
Macedonia appear to have been more scrupulous than their Central Powers 
counterparts in seeking to compensate local residents monetarily for requisitioned 
products.  In 1917, the French commander in the Prefecture of Kozani provided to the 
provisional Greek authority there a list of villages whose mayors should present 
themselves as soon as possible in order to accept compensation for animals taken 
from their municipalities for use by the military.57  A month later, the French 
commander followed up with a second such list, as myors of some towns and 
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villages whose livestock had been requisitioned had yet to come forward.58  The 
French army’s intentions to pay residents for requisitioned livestock were thus 
apparently sincere.  Nonetheless, the extent of requisitions and the preemptive 
manner in which they were carried out (with compensation promised rather than 
delivered at the time) would have disrupted affected civilian livelihoods significantly.  
The French army, according to its own count, still owed compensation to residents of 
the prefecture for over 12,000 requisitioned cows and buffalo, 2,200 horses and 
mules, and 2,700 sheep.  Residents in the village of Emporion (a little over 1,000 
residents) awaited compensation for over 1,700 cows or buffalo.  The French owed 
compensation for almost 3,900 cows or buffalo taken from Kailaria, a small town of 
around 4,000 residents.59  Promising reimbursement for requisitions, even when 
payments belatedly were made, could not provide adequat  compensation for the 
losses.  If enough of a stockbreeder’s animals were tak n, he would have trouble 
replenishing his stock and thus continuing his trade.  Farmers also depended on 
animals to plow and fertilize their fields.  Sums of cash provided as compensation, in 
an economy of scarcity, would be inflationary.  Some of these problems were 
registered in a Greek government complaint at the end of the war about the effects of 
Bulgarian requisitioning activities.60 
The armies’ involvement with local agriculture included not only widespread 
requisitioning of crops, but also efforts to control he choice of crops and even to 
                                                
58 DARM, Fond 994, kutija 1, 192-193 (French Commandant of Kozani to Prefect of Kozani, Jun. 5, 
1917). 
59 Ibid. 
60 TsDA, Fond 176k opis 22 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs – materials of the Political Directorate) a.e. 
31 (French inquiry into damages from requisitioned livestock), 14, 14g (Greek Governor-General of 





modernize their cultivation in order to make agriculture more productive.  Some 
apparently idealistic German and French officials serving on the Macedonian front 
fancied themselves agents of modernization and civilization, though their immediate 
mission was to extract agricultural produce for the war effort.  One of these figures 
was German Captain L. Engelhardt.  In June 1916, Engelhardt sent back to the 
Prussian Ministry of Agriculture, State Property and Forestry a sweeping assessment 
of agriculture and prospects for its modernization in the part of Macedonia his army 
jointly occupied with the Bulgarians.  On the one hand, he praised the recent Ottoman 
legacy of large çiftlik landholdings there, which “bear comparison with German noble 
estates.”  He pointed out that these had encouraged early adoption of industrial 
agricultural machinery, continuing with large purchases from England made on the 
eve of the outbreak of the Balkan Wars.  By comparison, the decentralized land 
distribution of the pre-1912 Bulgarian state had hindered its agricultural development 
from the time of its autonomy from the Ottoman Empire in 1878.61  Because large 
Muslim landowners had fled in the wake of the Balkan Wars, however, “this land, 
which undoubtedly belongs to the most fertile in Europe, lies today absolutely 
devastated.”   
Nevertheless, due to its more progressive recent legacy of agricultural 
development, Engelhardt had “come to believe that Mcedonia is the land from which 
to start my current task.  First and foremost Macedonia must be opened for modern 
                                                
61 Document No. 26, report from Captain L. Engelhardt to the Agricultural Information Service for 
Military Industry in the Royal Prussian Ministry ofAgriculture, State Property, and Forestry, Jun. 6, 
1916, in Ts. Todorova, ed. and trans., Bûlgariia v Pûrvata svetovna voina, 81-82.  This aspect of 
Captain Engelhardt’s analysis – namely, that post-independence Balkan states’ agricultural 
productivity stagnated compared to productivity under the Ottoman Empire – echoes the economic 
analysis of Michael Palairet in The Balkan Economies c. 1800-1914: Evolution withou Development 




agricultural machinery and for rational care and exploitation of the land.”  From 
there, he believed, “a purely Bulgarian propaganda for increasing agricultural 
production could spread to the rest of the country [Bulgaria].”  Again because of the 
apparently more promising history of openness to foreign technology in Macedonia, 
Engelhardt believed that such “purely Bulgarian propaganda” could take root if 
“Germans, working in the background,” could harness the leadership of local 
organizations such as the “Macedonian Committee” to this purpose.  Such a strategy 
would work to win over the “suspicious nature” of most residents of pre-1912 
Bulgaria, who distrusted improvements introduced by foreigners.62   
The German and Bulgarian governments began to put elements of 
Engelhardt’s vision into practice almost immediately.  The Prussian Ministry of 
Agriculture sponsored an Agricultural Society in Berlin whose goal was “the 
development of uncultivated lands in our allies Bulgaria and Turkey.”  This 
organization worked in turn through a subsidiary it established in Bulgaria called the 
Bulgarian Joint Stock Company for Agricultural Development in the Kingdom of 
Bulgaria.  Working “in agreement with the Bulgarian government,” the joint stock 
company had the “task to lease large areas mainly in Macedonia and to sow them 
with cereals, barley and oilseed crops,” with a view toward generating the eventual 
capacity to export.  By October, 1916, 3,000 hectars in different locations within 
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Macedonia were under lease and cultivation through this scheme, “which should 
create a basis for all subsequent work.”63 
Yet Engelhardt revealed that he also had postwar German interests at heart in 
opening Macedonia’s land to “rational care and exploitation.”  He acknowledged the 
objection of a local agronomist that it would be difficult to implement such sweeping 
changes while “the true leaders of agriculture [i.e. adult men] are at the front.”  
Nevertheless, Engelhardt explained to his superior in Berlin, it was “worth taking the 
preparatory steps” now before the war ended.  “[T]he richness and potential of the 
Macedonian soil is known throughout the world and our current enemies surely are 
only awaiting the moment” when they could re-enter and exploit this potential 
themselves, he warned.  The Italians and Belgians, he pointed out, “had erected large 
facilities a little before the war in order to exploit the rich fishing resources in the 
Macedonian lakes.”  Germany thus needed to seize the moment for herself.  “Today 
only we are in the country… and [we are] without an enemy in the press, as at the 
moment the strict newspaper censorship summarily suppresses any criticism against 
us; this, however, will not remain so forever!”  Engelhardt’s sanguine embrace of the 
opportunity provided by censorship policies hinted that there indeed existed some 
incipient opposition in Vardar Macedonia to the German domination of Macedonia’s 
resources he clearly envisioned.64  As noted earlier, another German official also 
believed that the local population would object to he export of grain to Germany 
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while it was strictly rationed at home.65  Wartime censorship would also have 
suppressed public expressions of such discontent.  But the German minister 
plenipotentiary in Sofia did register explicit objections on the part of Macedonians 
serving in the Bulgarian administration to the planned German takeover of mines 
located in western Bulgaria.  “At the last moment the Macedonians suddenly 
protested” the transfer of the mines to German control.  They warned that the 
agreement between the Bulgarian and German governments to transfer the mines 
“would be seen among wide sections of the people as a fraudulent transaction and as 
economic exploitation,” according to the German official.66  
A French representative based in Salonika saw the Ent nte presence in the 
region of Macedonia in broadly analogous terms.  His pamphlet of 1918 entitled 
L’œuvre civilisatrice de l’armée française en Macédoine (The Civilizing Work of the 
French Army in Macedonia) nonetheless made the association of Macedonia with a 
potentially colonial territory more explicit:  
A few years ago, the impression of all travelers who ventured into the interior of 
Macedonia – almost as little known in the West as some African regions – could be 
summed up in one word: insecurity.  Insecurity of the person and insecurity of 
property.  A system of ownership that resulted in in umerable vexations, that dried 
up any activity on the part of the worker, that succeeded in making a country which 
had been and will again become very rich one of the most desolate of Europe. 67 
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And although war inevitably brought “harsh necessitie ” and “terrible scourges,” it 
also could be a force of creativity and renewal when placed “in the hands of some 
peoples” (namely, the French).  As evidence of the French army’s civilizing work in 
Macedonia, the writer discussed the extensive road-buil ing project undertaken by 
the Allies.  The road network built under the French and British, he reported, totaled 
1,300 kilometers and would finally “permit the complete exploitation of [the region’s] 
resources.”68  Similarly, he proudly described projects that dramatically increased the 
supply of potable drinking water (canals and an entir  aqueduct were built), increased 
the productivity of local salt and lignite mines, eliminated malarial mosquitoes and 
swamps, and increased agricultural production to the benefit of producers in addition 
to the armies whom they supplied.   
Mark Mazower, in his study of Salonika, has also noted the sense among the 
French and British stationed in and around the city that they were engaged in a 
project of “civilizing Macedonia.” 69  Many of its residents did indeed profit from the 
increased business generated by the large influx of soldiers who used the city and its 
environs as their base.  But Salonika and its immediat  surroundings were 
exceptional.  Mazower does not mention the heavy toll taken on many other civilians 
elsewhere by the armies’ interventions.  Whatever th ir beneficial or “civilizing” 
side-effects, after all, the primary purpose of such interventions was the successful 
prosecution of the war.  Local residents on both sides of the Entente-Central Powers 
front resented the heavy requisitions and restrictions imposed on them by the armies 
in particular.  Roughly six months after Central Powers forces entered Serbian 
                                                
68 Thomas, L’œuvre civilisatrice, 7, 8. 




Macedonia, the commander of a combined Bulgarian-German division stationed in 
the district of Gevgeli issued a set of regulations for the area “in order for strict 
control to be exercised over the inhabitants of the region at the disposal of the 
soldiers.”  The first of the orders required that “every resident who wants to go from 
one place to another must, before he departs, present himself to the local command in 
order to be given a permit, which permit he must present as certification to the 
command at the point where he is going; if there is no command there, then to the 
mayor of the village.”  The next rule required those who wanted to go to work in their 
fields to pick up another kind of permit at four o’cl ck each morning from the local 
commander or mayor and return it at eight in the evning.  Permission to travel to the 
nearby market town of Strumitsa was only given on Mondays, and only if 
accompanied by a person trusted by the command.70  A stricter follow-up regulation 
forbade residents outright from circulating outside th ir villages after eight in the 
evening, and forbade all travel outside a certain region (including to Strumitsa) unless 
a special application was delivered to and approved by the reserve corps stationed 
there.71  The hardships these particular regulations caused were registered not even 
two weeks later in an urgently worded complaint submitted by several residents of the 
village of Bogdantsi:   
The situation in which we have been placed is beyond deplorable.  In the last twenty 
days or so, without distinction we here the Bulgarians, whom the Germans regard 
equally with the Grecoman families, are not allowed to go to Strumitsa or to other 
villages in the area.  As a consequence, we are left to sustain our lives only with corn 
flour, which is issued to us by the district committee of public foresight [okoliiskiia 
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komitet na obshtestvenata predvidlivost]72 in Smokvitsa, on which alone and with 
nothing else it is not possible to live.  We are simply starving at present.  If, going 
forward, the Germans do not permit us to go to Strumitsa and elsewhere, we will no 
doubt simply have to starve and die…. To what should we attribute this arresting of 
us, letting us circulate only in the village and in the field?!  Our sons, brothers, and 
fathers are soldiers in our Army, and they await from us suitable financial help.  For 
now, we are beyond even slaves!  The state forgets us in its release of aid to the 
military families; the local authorities – the command in the village – do not give us 
travel permits for Strumitsa or elsewhere; there is not a thing in the village to be 
eaten, other than bitter corn bread; thus it remains for us to die.  If Divine Providence 
has ordained it thus and our state does not look upn s as its children and as a part of 
the whole, then that’s another question.  As we her are born Bulgarians and as such 
we die for the interests [interesite] of the Kingdom of Bulgaria, we beg your 
intercession, Commander Sir, for us to be permitted to go to the centers where we can 
supply ourselves with food and products. 73 
 
In typical fashion, these local civilians did not draw a meaningful distinction between 
the “Central European” and “Balkan” causes of their maltreatment.  They implicated 
both Germans (through their enforcement of oppressiv  measures) and Bulgarians 
(through the state’s callous neglect).  Their expressions of Bulgarian identity served 
primarily to shame the Bulgarian “state.”  They expressed no hostility toward the 
“Grecoman” families in their community, but referred to them merely in order to 
point out that their own Bulgarian loyalty did not seem to count for much.  They 
expressed their bond to the Bulgarian state not as an unquestioning devotion, but as a 
kind of bargain that the state was violating.  They would die for what they rather 
cynically called the “interests” of the state, as indeed their male relatives at the front 
were doing, but the state must also meet its obligations towards its people. 
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Though dramatically worded, the fears expressed in the villagers’ petition 
were not unfounded.  Their district governor sent a ote in support of the petitioners, 
reporting that farm work had “come to a standstill,” as farmers had to wait until nine 
or ten o’clock each morning to get the daily permits to go to their fields.  Worse still, 
“rarely does one find a family that at lunch or dinner can put enough food on the 
table.”  Because of the monotonous diet of cornbread, “mortality, most of all among 
the children, is increasing by the day.”74  Correspondence higher up the military 
bureaucracy indicated that the matter remained unresolv d over a month after the 
initial orders were issued.75  The threat of hunger also appeared on the other sid  of 
the front, controlled by Entente forces.  A 1916 French-language telegram from the 
Greek mayor of Kastoria to the Greek prefect of Kozani (the chief Greek liaison with 
French forces in that area) expressed “pure and heartfelt thanks” on behalf of the 
population in his town and its environs for “being saved from death forced by 
famine” and “relieved of pain” by a delivery of supplies.  The mayor flattered the 
Greek prefect by “recogniz[ing] you as [the population’s] savior and protector in 
imploring you not to cease caring for it.” 76  But the area had been under continuous 
Entente control led by the French, of course raising the question of why its population 
had been in danger of “death forced by famine” in the first place.  
As before, this new set of trying wartime conditions generally did not induce 
ordinary residents of geographic Macedonia to commit violence, either against 
authorities or against their own neighbors of different ethnicities.  Doing so would 
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have further jeopardized their priorities of communal and economic stability, which 
were already threatened by the war.  To the extent that residents dared resist 
authorities, the mostly passive defiance was usually confined to their efforts, 
discussed above, to evade military conscription and thus avoid risk to their lives.  
Also acting to preserve their lives and livelihoods to the extent possible, ethnic 
Greeks living in eastern Greek Macedonia quickly fel into line after the Bulgarian 
army once again occupied their localities in the First World War.   
When the Bulgarian army entered eastern Greek Macedonia in the autumn of 
1916 along with troops in lesser numbers from its allies among the Central Powers, it 
did so with permission from the then-neutral Greek government.  The Central Powers 
guaranteed Greece’s continued formal sovereignty over the area.  They claimed 
temporary control only because of the military need to contain the threat posed by the 
Entente in central and western Greek Macedonia.  In eastern Greek Macedonia, the 
Bulgarian military leadership set up an authority called the Drama Regional Military 
Inspectorate, “which consists of the territory in the friendly Greek state to the east of 
the River Struma occupied by our army and those of our allies.”77  The regulations 
establishing the Inspectorate specified that its chief administrator would be a 
Bulgarian general.  Two assistants, a German officer and a Greek government civil 
servant respectively, were to serve as “advisory voices.”  Local Greek police were 
ordered to continue to perform their duties alongside the Bulgarian military police, 
but were made subordinate to the latter.  In fact, although local Greek civil authorities 
would “continue to function,” they were to be “subordinate to the head of the 
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Inspectorate in every respect.  He has the right, as appropriate, to dismiss officials and 
to appoint others in their place.”  The civil servants were obligated to implement all 
orders in support of the occupying army’s provisioning and activities.  Finally, they 
did “not have the right to communicate with other Greek authorities, which are 
outside of the area of the Inspectorate.  In cases of need, this will occur through the 
head of the Inspectorate.” 78 The Bulgarian army and its allies thus established a 
collaborationist local officialdom whose role was simply to carry out the orders of the 
occupying authority in eastern Greek Macedonia.  Many local Greeks in fact proved 
willing to fill positions in the civil service throughout the duration of the occupation 
under these restrictive conditions.79  This remained the case even after Greece ended 
its neutrality and declared war on Bulgaria and the rest of the Central Powers in July 
1917.  Nevertheless, as Germany’s foreign secretary observed, Bulgarian leaders now 
resolved more systematically to “replace Greek officials in Eastern Macedonia with 
Bulgarian ones.”80   
While many of these Greek civil servants probably considered themselves 
lucky simply to keep their jobs and continue to earn salaries under the circumstances, 
at least some attempted to use their circumscribed ol s to alleviate the impact of the 
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occupation on other local residents.81  Such efforts were more likely to succeed in 
cases that implicated non-Bulgarian military personnel in abuses, as when the Greek 
Mayor of Drama interceded successfully with the Inspectorate on behalf of a Greek 
monastery whose abbot complained of harassment by Otoman soldiers.82  Nor did 
other, more ordinary, ethnic Greek civilians try to resist the Bulgarian-led Central 
Powers occupying regime at risk to their lives or livelihoods.  As with the case of the 
monastery, when a group of petitioning villagers who signed their names in Greek 
begged Bulgarian authorities to put a stop to abuses by Muslim irregulars, they sought 
on the contrary to come to better terms with the occupying forces.  Here they asked 
for Bulgarian units to be stationed near their villages in order to provide security.83  
Ethnic Greek merchants and craftsmen in Drama were also quite willing to do 
business with the incoming Central Powers forces, including the Bulgarian army.  
Soon after the establishment of the Inspectorate, on  Greek firm even sold 
commemorative portraits of the Bulgarian Tsar and Bulgarian and German generals 
to the occupying forces, along with glasses onto which they were to be afixed.  A 
partnership between a Bulgarian and a Greek also sod Bulgarian, German, and 
Austro-Hungarian flags.84   
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The Bureaucratic Turn in Wartime Violence 
The conditions of prolonged, static warfare that arose on the Macedonian 
Front (better known as the Salonika Front) resulted in one other major difference in 
local experiences from the Balkan Wars and from the interlude of peace that 
followed.  Just as the belligerent governments and armies harnessed local production 
and infrastructure, they also came to treat the population in the vicinity of the 
hostilities as assets (and often liabilities) to be managed in support of their war effort 
and possibly their post-war aims.  The previous chapter showed how, during the 
period between the Balkan Wars and the First World War, Balkan state leaders began 
to contemplate a bureaucratic framework for the forced deportation en masse of 
ethnic groups they viewed as potentially disloyal.  They did not carry out such 
schemes at that time, but they did begin to intern or deport selected individuals whose 
loyalty they considered questionable.  The Great War allowed this bureaucratic 
violence directed at noncombatants to go ahead on a more comprehensive basis in the 
vicinity of the Macedonian front lines (and, as will be noted later, in other European 
theaters as well.)  These measures proceeded despite the aforementioned lack of 
civilian resistance against the occupation authorities even if they represented a rival 
ethnic group. 
The turning point came with the transition shortly after the onset of hostilities 
from a war of mobility to one of static frontlines and a war of attrition.  An episode 
recalled by Ivan Tenchev Gelebeshev illustrates a moment in this transition between 
the earlier, terroristic sort of violence and the more systematic, bureaucratically 




forces readily practiced both kinds of violence alongside their Balkan counterparts.  
In March 1916, Gelebeshev’s village found itself between the front lines of opposing 
French and Bulgarian forces and was taking artillery, machine gun, and rifle fire from 
both sides.  One day two French cavalrymen fell dead outside the village – an event 
Gelebeshev implies was the result of military fire, not from the villagers.  At two the 
next morning a large group of French troops entered th  village and began to burn the 
houses.  Those villagers who were able to escape, including Gelebeshev, went north 
to a village just behind Central Powers lines.  TheFr nch fired on the fleeing 
villagers, wounding several of them.  When Gelebeshev and his fellow villagers 
arrived behind the Central Powers lines, German soldiers apprehended them and 
immediately tried to confiscate the livestock they brought with them.  Only the timely 
intervention of a nearby Bulgarian officer stopped them.  As Gelebeshev later found 
out, the French took those villagers who could not escape behind their own lines to 
the south.  They court-marshaled three of his acquaintances and sent them to exile in 
Morocco.  One died in Morocco from hunger and torture.  The other two eventually 
returned, but not until 1921.85   
Also recalling the actions of Balkan armies from the Balkan Wars, British and 
French forces put to flight tens of thousands of loca  inhabitants in the autumn of 
1915 through on-the-spot violence and intimidation while the frontlines were still 
mobile.  They pushed north into Serbian (Vardar) Macedonia from their new base in 
Greece in attempting to help the Serbian army repel the Bulgarian-German-Austro-
Hungarian invasion.  After Bulgarian forces quickly regained the ground they had 
temporarily lost to the Entente and the front stabilized, these refugees streamed back 
                                                




into their now-devastated home villages and towns.  They lacked clothes, shelter, and 
food supplies.  This created a serious dilemma for General Todorov, the Bulgarian 
commander in the area.  He observed that the dire conditions of the population were 
“[g]ood soil for the spread of diseases.”  It would be “impossible to prevent contact 
between this population and the army units.  The state, in order to save the army, will 
be forced to supply the starving population with food, but this is almost impossible 
under the current conditions,” the general warned hadquarters.  “This is why it 
would be good to consider whether it would not be more advantageous, more useful, 
and more practical for all of this population to be evacuated temporarily to the 
interior,” he suggested.  There it could be fed more easily and “would not pose a 
constant hazard to the army.”86  Bulgaria’s Army Chief of Staff, General Zhostov, 
endorsed General Todorov’s recommendation.  He ordered General Todorov to send 
the “[f]amilies who lack food supplies” to Veles, a town located further away from 
the front, where they could be supplied with food.87  Zhostov did not specify how 
many of the families he imagined “lack[ed] food supplies.”  General Todorov had 
made it clear, however, that they amounted to “some tens of thousands” of people.88   
Yet the Army Chief of Staff was weighing more than how to provide for this 
hapless population.  Simultaneously he envisaged how t ey could be put to use for 
the war effort.  “The men from these families who are capable of work are to be 
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organized in commands and sent to work on the Shtip-Radovish road,” he ordered.89  
As later correspondence makes clear, the order was carried out, but the civilians could 
not be supported in Veles, even with their adult men working on the Shtip-Radovish 
road.  They were then sent on to Skopje, which could not support them either.  They 
were moved en masse yet again to Sofia, where they were put to work in factories.  
Yet Army Headquarters in Bulgaria did not want them there and raised the possibility 
of returning them back to Vardar Macedonia (Bulgarian-occupied Serbian 
Macedonia).  The chief Bulgarian official in Skopje insisted that there was no way to 
support them there either.90  Again, this episode relatively soon after the formation of 
the Macedonian Front of the First World War illustrates a transition to a more 
bureaucratic approach by armies in dealing with local civilians.  In practice, as in the 
above case, this approach could produce its own sort of chaos and violence.  But the 
decisions were discussed, made, and implemented by different levels of the military 
bureaucracy.  By this bureaucratization of violence, th  Bulgarian army officials 
purposefully planned (and clearly mishandled) the mass removal of tens of thousands 
of people from their local communities.   
In the aforementioned case, concern about civilians’ national identities played 
no role in General Todorov’s idea to remove the local population in question.  He 
viewed them simply as a burden that would hamper the effectiveness of his army’s 
campaign.  This more benign motivation for “evacuation” of populations near 
frontline areas was not uncommon, especially on the part of the Central Powers forces 
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on the Macedonian Front.  Nevertheless, bureaucratically organized mass removals of 
noncombatants from their homes even on this more practical basis often caused harsh 
consequences for the affected groups to which the authorities were not especially 
sensitive.  Resentment could be seen in a petition o authorities by residents of the 
frontline town of Gevgeli who were evacuated to the village of Smokvitsa (as noted 
above, a place where even the local residents were facing acute hardships): 
Deported to the village Smokvitsa by the military authorities, without any kind of 
work, we spent the summer making do with that food which was given to us by the 
Committee of Public Foresight with the hope that soon we would return to our homes 
– however, we remained deceived in our hope [obache ostanahme izlûgani v 
nadezhdata si].  After a short time the autumn will set in, with ts cold spells, and we 
with our children will have to put up with its rigors among the corridors and haylofts 
of the village houses.  In this situation with the shortage of food that we have, lacking 
the possibility to improve it as we do not have anykind of income, we will be fated 
to suffer and be invaded by various diseases.91 
 
The petitioners, town dwellers who were in any case not accustomed to village life, 
requested to be allowed to move to the town of Skopje where they hoped to find 
employment.  They went straight to the point, detailing the sufferings they were 
forced to endure by the war and “the military authorities.”  Nowhere in the petition 
did they attempt to flatter those authorities by alluding to the nobility of the cause for 
which their well-being was being sacrificed.   
Noncombatant residents evacuated from front line areas by the Bulgarian 
military were generally given little reason for confidence in the attentiveness of 
Bulgarian authorities or of their Central Power allies to meeting their daily needs.  
Time and again the evacuees faced similar conditions of inadequate food and shelter, 
disease, repeated forced relocation, and lack of employ ent in the locations to which 
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they were moved.92  Meanwhile, Bulgarian and German forces that set up 
encampments in and around the evacuated home municipalit es frequently scavenged 
properties there for army needs.  They dismantled houses and other buildings for 
material to use in defensive works, plundered livestock and furniture, and denuded 
trees and vineyards.93  One Bulgarian district governor asked in vain to get the head 
of the military occupation authority to stop German forces from using evacuated 
houses “because the villagers will find only ashes when they return.”94   
But reasons of expediency were not the only factors motivating the Central 
Powers and Entente forces in their behavior toward civilians in geographic 
Macedonia.  The largely unjustified suspicions on the part of Balkan state authorities 
that large segments of the population in Macedonia were potentially disloyal, 
discussed in Chapter 4, intensified during the war.  The European allies on each side 
shared in these suspicions.  When Bulgaria entered he war against Serbia, soldiers in 
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still-neutral Greece reportedly rounded up eight “Bulgarian” men from two villages in 
Greek Macedonia and took them to the town of Drama with the apparent intention of 
killing them, according to a relative of two of the captives.  The relative attributed the 
incident to “the general persecution which the Greek authorities have visited on the 
defenseless Bulgarian population in Greek Macedonia si ce mobilization was 
declared in Bulgaria.” 95  The French army controlling western Greek Macedonia in 
March 1917 ordered the disarmament of the local population.96  French army 
investigations revealed the following August that “ number of individuals in the 
region are still keeping weapons.”  The local French chief of security issued a new 
order.  After a three-day deadline for residents to turn over any weapons they still 
held, “any person found in possession of weapons, regardless of whether or not he is 
the owner, [would] immediately be executed by firing squad.”  The French official 
also ordered the Greek prefect in the region to distribute the statement widely “so that 
no one can now plead ignorance of the regulations in force.”  His statement also 
emphasized that “extremely stringent sanctions have been taken recently against gun 
owners.”97  These new, stricter French orders were issued aftr Greece had abandoned 
its neutrality and officially become France’s ally.   
French commanders feared subversion by local supporters of the Greek king 
who had favored continued neutrality and resented th  Entente presence on Greek 
soil.  The French naval attaché and chief of French i telligence in Greece, 
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Commandant Maximilien Henri de Roquefeuil, suspected th  existence of a network 
of Greek spies and wanted them arrested and interned o  an island.98  But acts of 
outright sabotage were rare.  Instead, something as simple as a local complaint about 
the Entente presence could trigger suspicions on the part of the French.  A French 
general ordered the abbot of a Greek monastery imprisoned for complaining that 
French forces had allegedly stolen livestock but also for expressing views in favor of 
the king and critical of the pro-Entente politician, Venizelos.99  On the other side of 
the front lines, where in August 1916 Central Powers fo ces occupied eastern Greek 
Macedonia, they anticipated sabotage from the local population and authorities 
despite proceeding with the permission of the Greek government.  The initial orders 
accompanying the operation commanded troops “to forbid movement of people 
around our location as well as any kind of correspondence from the local authorities 
and population [and] to take measures to protect against spies.”100  When the Central 
Powers forces suffered a defeat at Monastir at the hands of French, Serbian, and 
Russian forces later that year, a German general at the scene blamed Bulgarian 
military leadership for “occupying itself primarily with accusing Greek nationals of 
espionage and arresting them instead of directing its troops.”101 
This climate of pervasive distrust, along with the high wartime stakes, 
encouraged both Central Powers and Entente forces to xpand to a mass scale the 
deportations of civilians suspected of questionable loyalty begun by Greece and 
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Bulgaria during the interlude after the Balkan Wars.  Greek deportations of suspect 
civilians continued to occur on an individual basis.  However, wartime encouraged 
the broadening of criteria for suspicion and saw more frequent deportations.  By the 
end of 1918, Greece’s Minister of Interior was telegraphing orders for the transfer 
from Crete to the island of Skopelos of 8,500 intere s from Greek Macedonia.102  
The French military now joined Greek authorities in Macedonia and initiated its own 
share of internments and exiles of suspect local civilians both before and after 
Greece’s entrance into the war on the Entente side. Those affected criticized such 
French activities in contemporary complaints and subsequent memoirs.103  A group of 
concentration camp inmates in France from Greek Macedonia emphasized not only 
the perceived injustice of their deportation but also its apparently extra-legal nature in 
their complaint to the French ministry of interior:  
We have been deported from Macedonia, exiled from our native land, far away from 
our homes by order of the Commanding General of the Armies of the East as 
dangerous to the safety of these armies.  Our guests made us leave our country for 
reasons more or less trivial…. None us of has undergone during the course of [the 
war’s] existence a conviction of any kind, no one has appeared before a court martial 
despite the accusation that hung over us.104 
 
The French commander of all of the Entente armies on the Macedonian front, General 
Maurice Sarrail, described the central role he played in the deportations in his 
memoir.  He also revealed how he contrived to dodge the complications arising from 
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what he considered to be overly legalistic criticisms of the internments similar to the 
ones expressed in the complaint cited above: 
Since operations began [in Macedonia] I had sent to France a series of suspects, 
convicts, and undesirables.  Greeks from Athens, from Salonika, and from France 
sought to have them return to Greece without worrying about their past, arguing 
sometimes about the illegality of the arrests, sometimes about the facts of the alleged 
crime, etc.  I could not remain helpless before such proceedings, before the appeals to 
all the nationalities, before all the laws… with the perilous conditions in which the 
army found itself, it was not possible to let myself go to these discussions from a 
bygone era.  I could not monitor the individual cases that were raised in Paris.  I did 
not want the coercive methods so dear to the Greeks, Turks, or Germans; still less did 
I want executions for offenses not legally proven.  I decided therefore upon the 
creation in Mytilene of a concentration camp to which inmates would be sent by 
administrative action.105 
 
Bulgaria and her German allies no longer confined themselves to operating on 
a case-by-case basis when deporting civilians once Gre ce formally entered the war 
on the Entente side.  They began to intern large numbers of people at once based on 
their membership in a suspect ethnic category.  In 1919, an Inter-Allied Commission 
composed of representatives of victorious Entente countries surveyed the eastern 
section of Greek Macedonia that Central Powers forces had occupied.  It concluded 
that Bulgarian authorities had deported no less than 42,000 civilian inhabitants from 
their homes in eastern Greek Macedonia to exile in various locations within the old 
borders of Bulgaria.106  The commission reported that 12,000 out of those 42,000 
perished in exile, indicating a death rate of betwen a quarter and a third.  Relief 
workers of the American Red Cross independently estimated the same high death rate 
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among deportees, although they estimated much higher absolute numbers of roughly 
200,000 total deportees.107   
The summary of a typical deportation process given n the 1919 Inter-Allied 
Commission report reads like an eerie harbinger of abuses in the Second World War.  
Deportees were assembled at train stations and “crammed in groups of fifty or sixty 
into cattle or merchandise wagons” to be taken first to the town of Shumen in 
northeastern Bulgaria.  The train journey lasted five to six days in an “asphyxiating 
atmosphere.”  At Shumen, deportees were taken to a “‘lager’, a concentration camp” 
outside the town.  There they were made to labor twelve to fifteen hours a day laying 
railroad track.  At night, the deportees were “crammed into huts hollowed out from 
mud,” and “slept on the beaten earth without the least bit of bedding.”  The huts 
flooded when it rained.108 
German supervisors often staffed these forced labor camps alongside their 
Bulgarian comrades in arms.  Internees did not meaningfully distinguish local Balkan 
brutality from German brutality in their recollections.  As one resident of Kavalla, 
Athanasios Kaïrezis, summed it up, “Because we did not know the language the boss, 
German or Bulgarian, made his demands more or less with one simple message: do 
the work this way or the other – if you could not cmprehend immediately, kicking 
and beating followed.”109  Another internee even remarked that more than the 
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Bulgarians and Turks, “the German officers most of all showed unimaginable 
cruelty.”110 
That Western and Central European military personnel were involved in mass 
deportations in the Balkans should come as no surpri e in light of the similar actions 
they undertook in other theaters once the front stabilized.  The pattern could be 
observed first in German army actions in Belgium.  As Larry Zuckerman has shown, 
once the Western front became a stalemate in the autumn of 1914, most of Belgium 
became an occupation zone whose inhabitants German authorities perceived both as 
untrustworthy potential resistors and as a valuable pool of labor for a lengthy war of 
attrition.  German authorities forcibly deported tens of thousands of Belgians by train 
to prison and forced labor camps inside Germany, from which many did not return 
alive.111  The French army’s deportations of civilians from the Macedonian front 
likewise formed only a part of a wider wartime French policy identified by Jean-
Claude Farcy of interning civilians broadly considered “undesirables,” “suspects,” 
and in particular “suspects on the national level.”112  The latter category referred to 
people who came under suspicion because of their nationality or presumed national 
identity.  Concentration camps set up in France itself housed not only enemy aliens 
but also nationals of neutral and allied countries and even at times French citizens.  
More scholarship has begun to consider the First World War as a watershed event in 
Europe for the use of bureaucratically conducted violence targeting entire categories 
of noncombatants (in addition to the traditional con eption of the conflict as a modern 
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total war that mobilized civilians on a large scale.)113  War-torn Macedonia was 
simultaneously involved in that landmark shift in forms of violence that would mark 
the rest of the twentieth century. 
As seen in Chapter 1, women in prewar Ottoman Macedonia generally 
avoided the suspicions of authorities because of their presumed political inactivity.  
This circumscribed understanding of women’s roles among authorities persisted 
through the First World War.  A Bulgarian officer’s eaction to the efforts by Elli 
Adosidou (wife of Greece’s governor-general in Salonika) to call attention to the dire 
conditions of returning internees at the end of the war was typical.  In his report to 
Bulgaria’s army headquarters, the officer dismissed Adosidou’s complaints as 
“nothing more or less than a female commotion [edna zhenska alarma]” and “female 
ruckus [zhenski giuriultii].” 114  On the other hand, the assumption among officials of 
female political passivity also meant that deportations of women on the basis of their 
suspected disloyalty were rare.  An important exception was Bulgaria’s wartime 
policy of deporting or interning those considered enemy aliens (citizens of pre-1912 
Serbia and of Romania) living in Vardar Macedonia, which generally included 
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members of both sexes.115  Still, women generally found it easy to stay in their homes 
if they petitioned the authorities and had not specifically been found to be engaging in 
suspicious activities.  In one such petition, a Serbian woman highlighted her 
harmlessness in “beg[ging] … from the lips of my two little children” to be allowed 
to stay in Skopje.  Upon the Bulgarian invasion in 1915 she and her children had 
initially escaped to her home town of Mitrovica before returning to Skopje.  Her 
husband, a Serbian civil servant, had gone south with Entente forces and not 
returned.116  Despite the woman’s earlier flight and her husband’s position on the 
other side of the front lines, the Chief of Staff of Bulgaria’s Macedonian Military 
Inspection Region gave his permission for the woman and her children to stay in 
Skopje.117   
Nonetheless, the mass deportations of adult males to work camps also brought 
misery to the portion of the civilian population allowed to stay in their homes, 
disproportionately women and children.  Their hardship  generally surpassed even 
those of people in Vardar and Pirin Macedonia, noted earlier, whose male relatives 
had been conscripted into the Serbian and Bulgarina rmies.  In the summer of 1917, 
Bulgarian Chief of General Staff Zhekov frantically ordered his subordinate in the 
                                                
115 Reference to a Bulgarian regulation ordering the “return” of Serbian nationals to their places of 
origin in Serbia is made in TsVA Fond 1546 opis 2 a.e. 24, 134-135 (petition on behalf of Avram 
Albala and two of his employees to Governor of the Macedonian Military Inspection Region, Feb. 1, 
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Macedonian Military Inspection Region to prefects of Ohrid, Bitolia, and Kavadartsi, Nov. 11, 1916); 
13 (order from Chief of Staff of the Macedonian Military Inspection Region to prefects of Ohrid, 
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Macedonian Military Inspection Region, Feb. 5, 1916). 
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Drama region to “rein in the internments to a signif cant degree, so that the male 
population is no longer sent to Bulgaria indiscriminately.”  The mass internments 
were compounding the problem of food shortages in the area, as “many families have 
been left without working hands or support because of the internment of the male 
population.”  Zhekov now wanted “an account to be given of the untrustworthiness of 
the person [to be deported] and his past.”118  Nonetheless, deportations continued on a 
mass scale, at times if only ostensibly to remove populations from areas near the 
combat zones.  In May, 1918, the Bulgarian Chief of Staff ordered all of the 11,658 
residents of the town of Serres to be “moved” elsewhere in occupied eastern 
Macedonia, as the town was being shelled by enemy artillery.119  As his subordinate 
in charge of carrying out the order complained, the fact that the populations both in 
Serres and in the areas designated to receive the evacu es were already starving 
spelled terrible consequences for the operation.120   
In a limited number of cases in 1918, women heard that their male relatives 
were actually faring better in their exile in Bulgaria.  A few of the men appear to have 
avoided assignment to one of the harsh concentration camps and wrote gratefully 
about being allowed to live relatively comfortably in Bulgarian cities.  One internee 
wrote about working in a German factory in Pleven and sked the Bulgarian foreign 
ministry to allow his wife and children to join him from their home in Kavalla, 
                                                
118 TsVA, Fond 1545 opis 2 a.e. 1, 50 (Army Chief of Staff Zhekov to the Commander of the 2nd
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“where they have no one to take care of them.”121  Female relatives of such men also 
petitioned the Bulgarian authorities to join their kin in Bulgaria in order to save their 
own lives.  Bulgarian authorities assiduously assembl d correspondence related to 
these clearly exceptional cases later on and underli ed passages especially flattering 
to them in red pencil, perhaps in order to furnish a  evidence to mitigate Entente 
charges of maltreatment of internees in Bulgaria.122  At the same time, the 
correspondence revealed the desperate situation of civilians remaining in Bulgarian-
occupied eastern Macedonia.  In a typical petition, a woman from the Aegean 
Macedonian city of Drama requested permission to join her husband in exile in the 
northern Bulgarian city of Ruse.  “[A]t first we were able to support ourselves with 
what we had left,” she explained, “but now it has all run out and all we have is misery 
and hunger.”123 
 
The Persisting Weakness of Balkan States 
Their increasingly bureaucratic measures to repress or relocate noncombatants 
during the First World War might seem to suggest tha e Balkan armies and states 
had overcome their previously weak control over the means of violence.  In the case 
of the Bulgarian state, that impression appears to be supported at first glance by the 
fact that paramilitaries of VMRO were now formally integrated into both the ranks 
                                                
121 TsDA Fond 176k opis 4a a.e. 27, 277 (petition from Georgi Pandremenos to Bulgarian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Mar. 5, 1918). 
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and officer corps of the Bulgarian army during the First World War.124  The loosely 
organized “partisan detachments” and even the Macedonian-Adrianopolitan 
Volunteer Corps that had been formed during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 as 
extensions of Bulgaria’s regular army structure were gone.  In their place was now 
simply another Bulgarian army division, the 11th Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Infantry 
Division, one of several divisions recruited according to region and trained and 
organized in a uniform manner.  Macedonian revolutinary leaders such as Todor 
Aleksandrov and Aleksandûr Protogerov served as Bulgarian generals, the latter 
eventually named as head of Bulgaria’s Central Committee on Economic Welfare and 
Public Foresight.  Still, Germany’s naval attaché in Sofia, Captain Hans-Jürgen von 
Arnim, remained unconvinced of the seamlessness with which formerly unruly 
paramilitaries had been integrated into the legitima e functions of the Bulgarian state.  
He found a meeting of VMRO luminaries now serving i the 11th Infantry Division 
with Kaiser Wilhelm in the Bulgarian-occupied Serbian city of Niš particularly 
incongruous: 
The somewhat adventurous nature of this kind of army, composed primarily of 
bandits [banditi], quite naturally aroused the interest of His Majesty the Kaiser and 
caused him to conduct a conversation with its leaders and individuals; a truly bizarre 
event in this war so rich with paradoxes – to see th  German Kaiser in amicable 
conversation with people like Aleksandrov and Protoger v, whose patriotism as 
Macedonians really stands beyond doubt, but who as men of action and propaganda 
have not refrained either in this war, still less in the previous wars, from actions that 
European sensibilities have generally avoided.125 
 
                                                
124 For an overview, see James Frusetta, “Bulgaria’s Macedonia: Nation-Building and State-Building, 
Centralization and Autonomy in Pirin Macedonia, 1903-1952” (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 
2006), 154-157. 
125 Document No. 4, report from German naval attaché in Sofia, Captain Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, to 
secretary of state of the German Imperial Naval Office Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Berlin, Jan. 23, 
1916, in Ts. Todorova, ed. and trans., Bûlgariia v Pûrvata svetovna voina, 50.  The Bulgarian 
translator of this document advises that the term banditi should be understood to mean chetnitsi, which 
conveys the more straightforward sense of irregular fighters.  The context, however, suggests that von 




Von Arnim’s skepticism was justified.  The fuller integration of men with 
paramilitary background into Bulgarian state structures did not translate overall into 
stronger state control over their actions.  In many respects, the opposite was the case, 
as the increased formal role now accorded to former leaders of VMRO gave them 
greater institutional power to undermine the central st te’s direct control when it 
suited their purposes.  A frustrated Bulgarian government police inspector, for 
example, complained in the spring of 1916 about the de facto stranglehold the 
“organization” (VMRO) and its allies in parts of the Bulgarian military had on the 
administration in Vardar Macedonia.  The inspector onsidered this a particular 
problem “because whatever crimes may be committed, th ir discovery and 
punishment, which is the job of the state’s judicial-police organs, is frustrated by the 
bosses in the area and the influence of Aleksandrov and Protogerov among the 
military authorities, for whom their word is law.”  Under those conditions murders 
were occurring, the inspector complained, of whomever the “organization” wanted to 
clean out, but under the false pretext that the victims were sûrbomani and in order to 
intimidate the rest of the population.126  
A veteran of VMRO, Todor Pop Antov, agreed that forme  members of his 
paramilitary organization wielded enormous influenc in the 1915-1918 Bulgarian 
administration of Vardar Macedonia: “Such official positions, like mine, in many 
towns in Macedonia were given to former revolutionary ctivists, such as Argir 
Manasiev in Gevgelija, Petar Acev in Prilep, and others,” he explained.  Antov 
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revealed that his own installation as district chief and chairman of the district 
requisition commission in the town of Kavadarci came at the “invitation of 
representatives of the VMRO emigration.”  His informal VMRO network, rather than 
the Bulgarian official state hierarchy, was responsible for his appointment.127  A 
German officer in Sofia similarly observed that “[t]oday, almost all employees in 
Macedonia have been appointed in accordance with the proposals of the 
[Macedonian] organization, and only the governor and district prefects are chosen by 
the government from the ranks of officialdom in Old Bulgaria.”128 
As had long been the case, central state authorities also typically continued to 
lack sufficient power to rein in the corrupt activity of more conventional low-level 
armed functionaries.  Ordinary soldiers, no doubt themselves dealing with meager 
supplies at the front, added to civilians’ already heavy burden of formal requisitioning 
by engaging in opportunistic plunder.  In what Antov called “a typical case of 
requisitioning, or better to say robbery,” three Bulgarian soldiers took livestock from 
an illiterate peasant from the village of Galishta near Kavadarci and handed him a 
piece of paper, presumably a receipt.  Antov, the local requisitioning official, 
discovered that the paper, missing any legible name or date, simply contained the 
hastily scribbled words “I took two oxen.”129   
Far from consolidating state power, then, the political tensions and economic 
scarcity unleashed by the First World War only exacrbated the tenuousness of 
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Balkan states’ monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in a region where 
such control had traditionally been weak.  Both the Gr ek state and Entente forces felt 
insecure throughout the war about their monopoly over armed force in Greek 
territory.  As noted earlier, the French command in particular registered acute concern 
about the failure of residents of western and southern Greek Macedonia to relinquish 
weapons when ordered to do so in 1917.  Throughout Greece, the bitter rift (known as 
the “national schism”) between King Constantine andthe Liberal politician 
Eleftherios Venizelos over whether Greece should stay neutral or enter on the side of 
the Entente led to the effective division of the state between October 1916 and June 
1917 into two entities.  Venizelos led a Provisional Government from Salonika, while 
the king remained in power in Athens until forced to abdicate by the Entente, 
allowing Venizelos once again to become prime minister of the whole country.130  
Venizelos’s 1916 revolt was initiated by a mutiny among elements of the Greek army 
stationed in Salonika who had become disgusted by the king’s refusal to join the war 
against Bulgaria.131  Jacques Ancel, who served in French army headquarters in 
Salonika, observed that the roughly 1,400 Greek men who joined the mutiny and 
volunteered to fight for the Entente were overwhelmingly not from the area; they 
were instead either refugees from Asia Minor, Balkan Wars veterans from pre-1912 
Greece, or gendarmes from Crete.132  When Venizelos took control in Salonika with 
the sponsorship of the Entente, his supporter Colonel Emmanuel Zymbrakakis 
undertook to recruit more soldiers locally to fight alongside the Entente, but found his 
new quasi-state authority challenged as well.  The French commander of Entente 
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forces, General Sarrail, took note of Zymbrakakis’ limited success.  “One must not 
hope too much,” he wrote.  “The mobilization is downright unpopular.  I quote one of 
my telegrams on the district of Soubotsko, where 39 men out of 1,439 responded to 
the call.”  Sarrail noted that “royalist propaganda” w s strong among Greek officers 
in the area and “obstruct[ed] any mobilization operation.”133  Many local Greek and 
Jewish young men from Salonika attempted to flee th city on boats rather than be 
subject to the draft, although they were apprehended.134 
The general breakdown of Bulgarian military authority on the other side of the 
Macedonian front became even more acute towards the end of the war.  As noted 
earlier, lack of enthusiasm about the war and active attempts to evade military service 
were common among inhabitants throughout geographic Macedonia from the start of 
the war.  Increasingly, this war weariness affected sol iers from throughout 
Bulgaria.135  Inadequate food and clothing, compounded by awareness of even more 
serious shortages affecting families at home, aroused soldiers’ discontent.  Awareness 
of the Russian upheaval in 1917 also served to radicalize soldiers.  A Bulgarian army 
commander in occupied eastern Greek Macedonia reported in July of that year that 
“certain extremist groups are arriving or have already arrived in order to promote 
among the soldiers the idea of forming soldiers’ committees in the units similar to 
those in Russia with the goal of sooner imposing the conclusion of peace.”  The 
commander ordered the arrest of any such agitators, but also ordered other 
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commanders under him to raise their soldiers’ morale “through speeches, lectures, 
and all means that can reinforce the feeling among the soldiers of duty to the 
fatherland and prevent them from deviating from the correct path.”136   
Such efforts to reinstate authority in the army hadlittle effect.  By August 
1918, the German general commanding the mostly Bulgarian-staffed 11th German 
Army and 1st Bulgarian Army in Vardar Macedonia reported that “[c]ases are 
increasing where soldiers – partly with weapons and even in groups led by sergeants 
– desert to the rear.”  In two days, fifty soldiers had deserted from a single regiment, 
the general noted by way of example.  “I cannot get away from the impression that 
the officers are not in control,” the general concluded.137  The flood of mutinies and 
armed desertions as the Bulgarian army suffered its final defeat in September 1918 
culminated in a full-scale soldiers’ rebellion led by Agrarian and other leftist political 
leaders.  The government only managed to quell the reb llion, known as the Radomir 
Uprising, just before its participants reached the capital and at the expense of King 
Ferdinand’s flight and abdication in favor of his son, Boris III.138   
* * * 
For residents throughout geographic Macedonia, the First World War was 
thus a disastrous experience.  Unlike in much of the rest of Europe, where the public 
initially regarded the prospect of war with enthusiasm, the catastrophic nature of the 
war had actually been broadly anticipated by Macedonia’s residents, who had so 
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recently felt the harsh consequences of the Balkan W rs of 1912-1913.  They thus 
displayed little enthusiasm for the war at its outset, and even less by its close.  
Whereas desertions and mutinies began to plague armi s on most fronts of the war by 
its end, these were common from the beginning among men throughout the region of 
Macedonia when Balkan governments attempted to recruit them into their armies.  
The desertions reflected the persistent tendency of most inhabitants of Macedonia to 
prioritize economic well-being and security over national objectives.  The First World 
War also exposed the continuing limitations in the ability of Balkan governments to 
monopolize the means of violence in their territories as a Weberian credential for a 
modern state, while otherwise legitimizing violence in defense of the modern nation.  
The tighter integration of veterans of paramilitary o ganizations into conventional 
state structures, especially into the Bulgarian army and administration where former 
paramilitary chiefs took on prominent leadership roles, only gave them greater know-
how and means to contest central state control.  Thus a major consequence of the war 
for the civilian population of geographic Macedonia w s to weaken rather than 
strengthen their confidence in the capacity to provide local security of any state 
claiming to serve their national identity. 
Because of recent experiences from the Balkan Wars, local noncombatants 
now understood that governments of the Balkan states were prepared to plan and 
organize their mass removal from their ancestral communities if such a course of 
action seemed expedient for military or political goals.  Upon the stabilization of the 
Macedonian front, Balkan armies in conjunction with their European allies proceeded 




period of comparatively spontaneous violence that more closely resembled that of the 
Balkan Wars.  This shift occurred in parallel with similar developments elsewhere in 
Europe, which also turned on the stabilization of the front and the transition from the 
expectation of a mobile, short-lived conflict to one of attrition involving the strategic 
management of material resources and human populations.  Locals’ often intimate 
interactions with Central and Western European military personnel during the First 
World War, though in some cases prompting benefits such as the draining of malarial 
swamps, usually only added palpably to their troubles.  They saw few differences 
between villages burned by Balkan or other European forces, between administrative 
deportations ordered by Balkan or other European authorities, or between beatings 





Conclusion:  Postwar Case Studies and Wider Consequences 
 
 The Balkan Peninsula is well known for its ethnic diversity.  But as this 
primarily social history of the war years of 1912-1918 has argued, ethnic diversity 
and even local disagreements over national identity that existed in the embattled 
Balkan region of Macedonia did not result in fratricidal violence there.  Rather than 
turn on one another, geographic Macedonia’s inhabitants concerned themselves 
primarily with priorities that they considered more important than their national 
identities.  And this was the case even during a set of wars that seemed to be driven 
by national rivalries.  The large amount of brutal violence that occurred, much of 
which targeted civilian populations, was instead largely the work of national armies 
and paramilitary forces closely associated with them.  Nor were the changing forms 
of abuses carried out by Balkan armed forces from the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 
through the First World War phenomena that can be ascribed uniquely to the Balkans.  
They were on the contrary practices that Balkan armed forces shared with their 
contemporaries in Western and Central Europe and even practiced in concert with 
them during the warfare of 1915 to 1918 on the Macedonian front.  These violent 
wartime measures bequeathed immediate and longer-term consequences on those 
who had lived between the frequently shifting military lines and national borders in 
geographic Macedonia.  These consequences are vividly illustrated in the postwar 





Macedonia in Miniature: Banitsa and Dutli, 1919 
In January 1919, inhabitants of two Bulgarian-speaking villages in Greek 
Macedonia, Banitsa and Dutli, sent an impassioned petition to the Greek government 
which they prepared with the aid of a Greek lawyer.  In it they protested an order for 
them to “abandon our hearths and depart for Bulgaria because in 1913 we supposedly 
abandoned our land and therefore are dangerous to public security.”  Their petition 
presents a vivid example of how Orthodox Christians throughout the region of 
Macedonia had responded to the travails of living amid the shifting front lines during 
the wars of the previous six years.  The villagers tried to make the case that the Greek 
order for their deportation fundamentally misread their intentions.  “Whoever wanted 
to detect an inherent danger to the security of the State in the fact that we speak under 
the sky of our Fatherland a foreign language [Bulgarian],” the petitioners insisted, 
“we could only be permitted to describe him as ignora t of the history of nations and 
as detrimental to this very security and this state of Greece.”  The order for the 
villagers’ deportation would place in question the “just boast” that Greece’s rulers 
were at that moment making to the peace conference in Paris “that the Greek race is 
the torchbearer of civilization in the east.”  The petitioners conceded that they had 
temporarily left their homes during the wars and hasince returned – a common 
phenomenon, as the preceding chapters have shown.  But they objected to the Greek 
authorities’ claim that they represented any kind of anger to Greece.  “We have 
returned to our homeland not as spies or troublemakrs or bandits,” but “to work and 
to live by our honest perspiration.”  “Clear proof of this,” they wrote, “is that all of us 




plowing and transportation and other agricultural riches and we think of these as 
factors in the economic prosperity of our Prefecture.”   
The villagers’ petition also reveals their awareness that their peaceful, law-
abiding intentions simply stated would not by themslves convince the authorities to 
let them stay in their homes.  As far as the Greek state was concerned, the inhabitants 
of Banitsa and Dutli had much to account for.  Most conspicuously, they spoke 
primarily Bulgarian, not Greek, and they had in 1913 left Greece and lived in 
Bulgaria.  The villagers’ petition was punctuated with sub-headings designed to 
explain these facts: “Why we speak Bulgarian”; “Why did we abandon our villages?”; 
“Why did we return to our homes?”; “Are we dangerous?”  Their explanations, some 
of them implausible, expressed two things clearly: the desperate desire of the 
villagers to remain in their homes and their willingness to do whatever it took to 
convince the authorities that, despite their past, they were in fact authentic Greeks and 
would be loyal members of the Greek nation.   
The petitioners indeed embraced an ethnic conception of the Greek nation that 
stressed its primordial, enduring, and immutable nature: 
We cannot but declare with all of the strength of our lungs that we are Hellenes both 
by descent and nationality.  We have Greek conscience a d proclaim that we do not 
descend from the barbarian hordes of the Volga, but are born of Greek ancestors 
dwelling in these villages of ours from ages immemorial….  Our churches, our 
tombs, our fountains, and their inscribed marble carved stones are as authentic 
witnesses, and the ruins from them were adorned for all time by the art of Pheidias 
and the language of Pericles and the Olympic Gods.1 
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Having implicitly cast the Bulgarian nation as descending from “barbarian hordes,” 
the petitioners then offered a patently far-fetched account of why they spoke 
Bulgarian: 
It is known to all how the Bulgarian Propaganda acting in Macedonia to Bulgarianize 
it from 1851 and afterward with the schism of the Exarchate, the handbook of the 
Komitadzides and other means succeeded through fire and blood to instill the voice of 
Krum in the lands of our fathers. 2  Yet the historical background of this and of the 
annals of those black pages written of Macedonia which the Volumes of a Library 
cannot suffice to contain escape the narrow confines of the present petition; we 
confine ourselves merely to say that if we lost our mother language [Greek], the 
rulers of the old regime in Greece are at fault as well as the paralyzing Turkish 
domination and all others responsible for protecting it. 
 
“Bulgarian Propaganda” notwithstanding, the notion that the villagers “lost” their 
mother language in the space of a few decades and were forced to speak Bulgarian, 
all the while living under Ottoman rule, was fanciful.  But in fact this story replicated 
commonly circulating Greek and Serb nationalist explanations of the existence of so 
many Bulgarian-speakers in Macedonia, which inhabitants of Macedonia frequently 
heard from Greek and Serbian officers who tried to force locals to stop speaking 
Bulgarian when they occupied the region after the First Balkan War.3  By repeating 
this dubious historical explanation in their petition, the inhabitants of Banitsa and 
Dutli signaled their fluency with Greek national ideology and their willingness to 
conform to it.4   
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The petitioners also suppressed or altered aspects of their recent past that 
would not have reflected well upon their Greek national credentials.  For example, 
they did not mention their longstanding status as members of the Bulgarian-oriented 
Exarchate church in an area where other villages had mixed populations of exarchists 
and patriarchists, a fact that is confirmed both by Bulgarian consular sources from the 
late Ottoman period and by Greek administrative sources dating from after the Balkan 
Wars.5  Banitsa also had the distinction of being the location where Gotse Delchev, 
founder of VMRO, was temporarily taking shelter when Ottoman troops surrounded 
him and his armed band soon before the Ilinden insurrection in 1903.  Two days 
before Delchev had picked up a gun and a uniform he had hidden in Dutli.  Ottoman 
forces set fire to Banitsa after finding and killing him there.6  The past presence of 
this prominent paramilitary figure of VMRO with its Bulgarian ties would have been 
viewed by the Greek government as marks against the two villages.  But it is likely 
that the armed bands active in the area exerted intimidation more than winning 
acceptance among the villagers.7  The residents of Banitsa and Dutli in any case made 
no mention of Delchev in their 1919 petition, but highlighted their suffering and 
enduring “under the bloodthirsty sword of Taska andSandanski,” two other 
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prominent VMRO leaders.8  Although the Greek army most likely drove the villagers 
to flee for their lives to Bulgaria during or after the Balkan Wars as it had done with 
so many others in that area, the petitioners told a story calculated to appease the 
Greek government.9  In explaining “[w]hy … we abandoned our villages[,]” the 
petitioners claimed that during the war “the Bulgarian army violently carried us away 
to Nevrokopion.”  Then, in an account now familiar from others described in the 
preceding chapters, they complained of the suspicion they encountered on both sides 
when they attempted to return to their homes: 
Just as the Bulgarian authorities did, so did the Greek [authorities] forbid our 
repatriation, and those of us who attempted to return either were killed at the border 
posts or were arrested and characterized as spies and interned and imprisoned.  It is 
not true that we consented to stay far from our homes, our hearths, our former 
properties and the tombs of our ancestors or to lead the life of tramps and beggars in 
the tents of the homeless. 
 
The petitioners also charged the Bulgarian army with “plunder[ing] and despoil[ing]” 
their properties both in their villages and in the city of Serres during the World War I 
occupation.10  Indeed, the Bulgarian commanding general in the area, in a 1918 report 
to his war ministry, had acknowledged having received complaints from inhabitants 
of Dutli of looting carried out by his forces.11  In highlighting these facts, the villagers 
tried to put further distance between themselves and any perceived allegiance to 
Bulgaria. 
                                                
8 GLA, Archive of Philippos Dragoumis, 11.3 (petition from the residents of Banitsa and Dutli, Serres 
region, to the Governor-General of Eastern Macedonia at the Ministry of Interior and the Military 
Governor and Divisional Commander of Serres, Jan. 25, 1919). 
9 A Greek administrative report from soon after the Second Balkan War indeed notes laconically that 
Banitsa and Dutli “were burned and the inhabitants have left”; IAM, GDM, file 55, 36, 38 (Serres 
province school inspector, reports on Banitsa and Dutli for school year 1913-1914). 
10 GLA, Archive of Philippos Dragoumis, 11.3 (petition from the residents of Banitsa and Dutli, Serres 
region, to the Governor-General of Eastern Macedonia at the Ministry of Interior and the Military 
Governor and Divisional Commander of Serres, Jan. 25, 1919). 
11 TsDA, Fond 176k opis 22 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs – materials of the Political Directorate) a.e. 
31 (French inquiry into damages from requisitioned livestock), 5 (Commander of 8th Tundja Division 




Finally, the inhabitants of Banitsa and Dutli declared their willingness to pay 
the ultimate price in order to be given the chance to stay in their homes.  “Let us be 
tried,” they implored: 
If it is found that we fell into error, we would acquiesce to be tried and give word 
before the authorities of our Country….  No criminal acts, nor political offenses nor 
racial conflicts can be charged to any of us… but even if this were true it would not 
justify the displacement of all with their families, inasmuch as this decision would 
resemble the arbitrary order to uproot the vines of all the land because some 
drunkards are to be found in our society.  We firmly i plore, if you render an unjust 
guilty verdict against us we bow our head and prefer death or our expatriation to 
Bulgaria, but do not execute our children, do not become guilty of the deaths of 
innocent beings before God because we would forgive you but God judges the works 
of each and the History of our Country will always remember onto the ages this 
injustice against us and this Nation. 
 
Placing their fate in the hands of Greek courts, they framed a prospective verdict 
against them as an injustice to the Greek nation.  The petitioners hoped to reach a 
kind of bargain with the state that so many others th oughout Macedonia had 
attempted to achieve since 1913 when the nation-states of Serbia, Bulgaria, and 
Greece replaced Ottoman rule.  In order to continue living in their ancestral homes, 
the inhabitants of Banitsa and Dutli accepted the necessity of signaling their complete 
identification with the Greek nation, even if in fact they had affiliated themselves 
with Bulgarian institutions in the past.  After having fled their homes (or having been 
kidnapped by the Bulgarian army as they claimed), they had returned “as patriotic 
Greeks to give our children to Greece, to the Greek t acher, to the Greek Army, and 
in order to die by the graves of our ancestors and so that we can be memorialized by 
priests of our Orthodox Church whose holy books to this day we never stopped caring 
for and reading even under the harshest persecutions of the [Bulgarian] Komitadjis, 




inscriptions and their Greek words and letters, to which a simple visit to our churches 
can bear witness.”   
No record survives to indicate whether the villagers got the day in court that 
they asked for.  Although the specific reasons are unknown, the inhabitants of Banitsa 
all subsequently left for Bulgaria, while most of those in Dutli remained.12  The 
villagers of Banitsa and Dutli appeared to have fabric ted some of their past in hopes 
of appeasing the Greek authorities, but the priority of their native village and their 
lack of sympathy for paramilitary and state-led violence in the region seemed 
genuine.  It represented in miniature the outlook of inhabitants of geographic 
Macedonia as war engulfed their region from 1912 to 1918.   
 
Wider Consequences of Living between the Lines 
Anastasia Karakasidou has argued that a nation-state’s persistent repression of 
ethnic minority culture in the Macedonian territories it incorporated between 1912-
1918 helped, however harshly, to forge “passages to nati nhood” for its polyglot 
Orthodox Christian inhabitants.13  The preceding study of wartime Macedonia 
partially confirms her model of national enculturation, but only by a war-weary, 
roundabout route.  Inhabitants of former Ottoman Macedonia, whether they ended up 
in Bulgaria, Greece, or Serbia, generally proved willing to travel along such state-led 
“passages to nationhood” precisely because clinging to any national identity they may 
have developed before the Balkan Wars was for them a lower priority in comparison 
                                                
12 Tasos Kostopoulos, Polemos kai ethnokatharsi:i xechasmeni plevra mias dekaetous ethnikis 
exormisis (1912-1922) (Athens: Vivliorama, 2007), 87. 
13 Anastasia Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationh od in Greek 




to remaining and prospering in their ancestral local communities.  Furthermore, they 
were generally keen to avoid violent confrontations with either their neighbors or 
state authorities despite the brutal but changing forms of violence they encountered 
during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the First World War.     
Although it is of course perilous to generalize about the priorities of whole 
societies, certain common tendencies do emerge out of this study of Orthodox 
Christians in wartime Macedonia.  Communities in Macedonia typically exhibited a 
strong desire to maintain and if possible improve their economic standards of living 
through the political changes portended by the wars.  They sought to protect and 
expand their holdings of land and property, to reviv  its productivity when damaged 
by war, and to look for new economic opportunities occasioned by the results of the 
wars.  In connection with these priorities, communities typically saw the education of 
their children as a crucial vehicle for the improvement of their economic and social 
status.  This motivation led communities to embrace outside financial support for 
local education.  The outside funders in question were usually nationalist 
organizations or nationalizing governments who viewed education in large part as a 
way to instill national allegiance in the younger gnerations.  But these outsiders were 
often frustrated by the indifference of pupils and their families to the national goals of 
the education that they furnished.   
Although inhabitants of Macedonia faced rapid and fluctuating changes in 
which government ruled them between 1912 and 1918, they were drawn politically to 
promises that these governments made of ending tyrann , providing security, and 




limited specific understanding of those ideals, they oped for the best in a series of 
governments that all advertised their governing principles using optimistic language.  
More concretely, diverse groups of Orthodox Christians, whatever imperial or 
national polity ruled them, typically aimed to tip he balance of political power in 
favor of their locality or region over the central government.14 
On the most basic level, inhabitants of Macedonia exhibited remarkably 
strong attachments to their homes and local places of origin, attachments that were 
put to the most severe tests between 1912 and 1918. Time and again this conclusion 
is confirmed in the behavior and statements of people from the region.  Emigration to 
join supposed ethnic kin under a united national state in which they had never set foot 
usually appeared as the worst possible option, one to b taken only in desperation or 
by force.15  When civilians fled during wars in fear for their lives from conquering 
armed forces who considered them ethnic enemies, many attempted to return and 
rebuild burned and looted properties, hoping that repression would cease along with 
formal wartime hostilities.  When repression of ethnic minorities continued during 
peacetime in the form of harsh pressures to assimilate into the dominant national 
community, residents of newly conquered territories usually proved willing to do 
what it took to assimilate.  This could include learning new languages, switching 
                                                
14 James Frusetta’s study, “Bulgaria’s Macedonia: Nation-Building and State-Building, Centralization 
and Autonomy in Pirin Macedonia, 1903-1952” (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 2006), highlights 
this typical preference for decentralized government in the Pirin region of Macedonia that was 
permanently incorporated into Bulgaria after the Second Balkan War. 
15 This kind of strong attachment to the homeland and extreme reluctance to leave it is also seen in the 
cases of Greek Orthodox populations of pre-1912 Bulgaria and post-World War I Greco-Turkish 
population exchanges.  The point is made forcefully in Dragostinova, Between Two Motherlands, and 
in Bruce Clark, Twice a Stranger: The Mass Expulsions that Forged Mo ern Greece and Turkey 




church affiliation, temporarily splitting the family as other members were forcibly 
deported, even refuting accusations of treason in court, in order to stay in their homes.   
But staying in one’s home was simply not an option for many inhabitants of 
Macedonia even after hostilities had come to a close.  The practice of deporting large 
numbers of people because of their status as national mi orities did not stop with the 
First World War’s end in 1918, either in Macedonia or elsewhere.  Instead, such 
activities only gained momentum and increased international acceptance as a 
legitimate and even relatively humane alternative to potential future national 
conflicts, especially if transfers could be carried out according to an agreement 
between governments to carry out a “population exchange.”  Hence the 1919 
Convention for Voluntary Emigration of Minorities signed by Greece and Bulgaria 
and the 1923 Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations 
signed by Greece and Turkey, both sponsored by the League of Nations, were hailed 
as models by political leaders and diplomats in the Balkans and in the West, their 
considerable human costs all but ignored.16  The 1919 petition from the villagers of 
Banitsa and Dutli to the Greek government testifies eloquently to local inhabitants’ 
implicit rejection of the logic of international agreements facilitating population 
exchange even after six years of forced population m vements.  What mattered most 
to inhabitants of the region of Macedonia during wartime thus puts the question of 
national identity in qualified proportion.  Although people had come to identify in 
varying degrees with national communities and sometimes viewed national ideologies 
                                                
16 On the context of the Bulgarian-Greek agreement and its context, see Dragostinova, Between Two 
Motherlands, 117-156.  On the Greco-Turkish agreement, see Renée Hirschon, ed., Crossing the 
Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey 




with indifference, they were in any case typically more preoccupied with their higher 
priorities of economic well-being, education, and political representation in the 
communities where they had always lived. 
Even as various armies fought wars in Macedonia driven n large part by the 
competing national claims of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia over the territory, residents 
of Macedonia themselves typically refrained from violence against their neighbors, 
despite local disputes that existed among them.  On the contrary, the violence of 
incoming national armies, paramilitary groups, and national administrations 
threatened to destabilize ethnically diverse local communities by targeting unwanted 
minorities.  Members of those communities could often be seen making pragmatic 
efforts to preserve stability and trust and at times even challenging the locally 
destabilizing policies.  The region’s various groups of Orthodox Christians did 
generally look with hope in 1912 at the Christian-majority armies of Bulgaria, 
Greece, and Serbia, who promised them liberation frm the Ottoman rule that at the 
time appeared increasingly undesirable for Ottoman Christians.  But afterwards, war-
weary residents of what had once been Ottoman Macedonia evinced little if any 
enthusiasm upon the subsequent outbreak of the Second Balkan War in 1913 or 
during the First World War. 
Like their Muslim counterparts before them, many Orthodox Christian 
residents of geographic Macedonia now became the victims of war crimes.  Who, 
after all, committed all those acts of extortion, torture, murder, rape, arson, 
internment, and forced expulsion seen in the preceding chapters?  As this study has 




belligerent states of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and the Ottoman Empire, joined in 
World War I by Central and West European armies, most prominently from France 
and Germany.  Culprits included not only members of armies but also especially 
during intermittent periods of international peace lower-level state authorities, the 
gendarmerie and police forces of the Balkan countries.   
Also prominent in committing wartime abuses were irgular fighters.  
Although these paramilitary organizations relied crucially on funding, arms, 
leadership, and men from Bulgaria, Greece, or Serbia, they also recruited inhabitants 
of Macedonia itself into their memberships over time.  One group in particular, 
VMRO, even based its ethos upon organizing “internally,” that is within Macedonia, 
though it too relied on crucial support in leadership, men, and material from émigrés 
and others living in Bulgaria.  Men from all of these paramilitary organizations took 
part in operations alongside the national armies of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia and 
in abuses against noncombatants.  To the extent that residents of Macedonia 
participated in the wartime violence as members of paramilitary groups, their 
involvement stemmed from a combination of stimuli.  The paramilitaries’ typically 
higher-than-average levels of education and urban experience worked to alienate 
them socially from the peasant communities where they usually committed their 
crimes (rarely if ever their own native localities.)  Such a social profile also facilitated 
their exchange of ideas with nationalist volunteers from the neighboring Ottoman 
successor states, whose own socialization had led them o accept as given the 
necessity of violent “struggle” and even sacrifice of the innocent for a greater national 




This dissertation has focused on the social dimensions of the fateful war years 
in Macedonia, while bearing in mind the military and diplomatic background.  Its 
findings suggest that the First World War in Macedonia was indeed not merely a 
sequel to the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.  The Balkan W rs, with their rapidly 
shifting front lines, had witnessed relatively spontaneous tactics of terror against 
civilians perceived to be unfriendly.  Individual military and paramilitary units made 
snap decisions to burn houses, murder, and rape.  Although no statistics are available 
on the incidence of rape during the Balkan Wars, accounts of them in contemporary 
sources are common enough, even if not ubiquitous.  No direct testimony has 
surfaced from the perpetrators that gives an account of their motives in raping women 
during these conflicts.  But the indirect evidence adduced in Chapter 3 suggests that, 
as in other cases when rapes occurred as a form of wartime violence, perpetrators 
perceived rape as a way of humiliating the other side by highlighting the inability of 
enemy societies’ men to protect their female members.  The general understanding of 
women as politically passive objects undoubtedly contributed to their victimization in 
rapes during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.  The terror-inducing methods that armed 
forces used against civilians during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 resembled those of 
nineteenth century wars in the area, but they were not exclusively Balkan.  As noted 
earlier, they also occurred elsewhere in Europe from the Napoleonic Wars to the early 
campaigns of the First World War, which were also marked by mobile front lines. 
By contrast with the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, military abuses in Macedonia 
during the course of the First World War shifted towards a novel, more distinctly 




populations that came to mark broader European wartime violence in the twentieth 
century.  Alongside taking control of agricultural produce and raw materials, 
governments began to treat groups of people as possible resources or as potential 
liabilities whose strategic management would be crucial to the successful prosecution 
of the war.  Authorities operating in Macedonia – not only Balkan but also German 
and French – organized mass deportations of categories f civilians deemed suspect, 
as well as large-scale evacuations of civilians from frontline areas. Tens of thousands 
of deportees were sent to forced labor camps where t y faced harsh living conditions 
and high mortality rates.  Testimonies and memoirs of people who endured these 
policies quite rightly did not distinguish in any meaningful way between the Balkan, 
Western, or Central European origins or styles of their mistreatment.  Women’s 
exclusion from the sphere of politics actually helped them to some extent in avoiding 
deportations and mass internments.  Deportations and internments driven by ethno-
political agenda almost always exempted women during this period, apparently 
because to authorities women were not potential political actors and by extension 
were unlikely to pose a political problem even if they were ethnic minorities.17 
The Balkans were therefore matching the modern forms of violence practiced 
in the rest of Europe as they evolved.  Armies from throughout the Continent 
committed violence against civilians.  They also generally underwent the same kind 
of transformation during the First World War.  The cases of German abuses in 
                                                
17 A loose parallel can be seen in the differential treatment accorded to German women and men in 
Britain during World War I.  Whereas the enemy alien men were typically interned in camps, women 
were exempt but sometimes “repatriated” by force, pr sumably via neutral countries. See Panikos 
Panayi, “An Intolerant Act by an Intolerant Society: The Internment of Germans in Britain During the 
First World War,” in The Internment of Aliens in Twentieth Century Britain, ed. David Cesarani and 




Belgium and Austro-Hungarian abuses in Serbia again provide examples by way of 
comparison.  The beginning of the war in both cases featured spontaneous acts of 
violence against civilians perceived to be unfriendly that among other things sent 
many of them fleeing in terror from the armies, a situation not unlike that seen in 
Macedonia during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and during the initial days of the 
First World War campaigns in Macedonia.  But after G rmany and Austria-Hungary 
established more stable occupation zones in Belgium and in Serbia respectively, they 
began also to organize deportations of tens of thousands of civilians they deemed 
suspect to camps in the interior of their countries, as happened after the stabilization 
of the Macedonian front.18  Despite such parallels, most authors commenting on the 
novelty in Europe of First World War forms of violence against civilians have not 
noted that the important shift generally occurred sometime into the course of the war 
and not immediately at its outset.  They have thus missed identifying a central cause 
of that shift, namely the transformation from a war of mobility to a war of long-term 
attrition.19  The rapidly changing forms of military abuse bespeak a dark side to the 
modern integration of the Balkans with the rest of Europe, while also calling into 
question persistent notions of a uniquely “Balkan” brand of violence.   
                                                
18 On German actions in Belgium, see Larry Zuckerman, The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of 
World War I (New York: New York University Press, 2004).  On Austro-Hungarian actions in Serbia, 
see Gumz, Resurrection and Collapse of Empire.  Dragan Živojinović, “Serbia and Montenegro: the 
Home Front, 1914-1918,” in East Central European Society in World War I, ed. Béla K. Király and 
Nándor F. Dreisziger (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1985), 252, cites a total of 180,000 Serb 
civilians interned in Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Bulgaria during the war. 
19 Gumz, Resurrection and Collapse of Empire, 89-104, does at least implicitly recognize that tis shift 
to mass internment of civilians in Habsburg-occupied S rbia occurred well after the start of the war 
once the Austro-Hungarian forces could implement an occupation regime.  He explains the policies 
primarily as flowing from the “bureaucratic-absolutist” outlook of the Habsburg army leadership, but 
in doing so seems to downplay the importance of the more general situation, faced by several other 
armies during World War I, of occupying a territory behind immobile front lines during a war of 




If there was anything about wartime violence in geographic Macedonia that 
marked it out as distinctly “Balkan,” it was the prominence of paramilitary forces that 
flourished in chronically weak states, rather than the forms of abuses committed by 
either regular or irregular forces.  As the period f llowing the Balkan Wars of 1912-
1913 showed, this problem continued when similarly weak successor states replaced 
Ottoman rule in Macedonia and paramilitary forces and low-level state employees 
continued to prey upon civilians.  The First World War did witness the tighter 
integration of men who had been members of irregular armed organizations, VMRO 
and the Supreme Committee, into the regular Bulgarian army.  This development, 
along with the more bureaucratic regulation of army actions towards civilians and the 
know-how introduced into the region by close collaboration with more advanced 
states such as France, Britain, and Germany might at first glance appear to have 
augured greater consolidation of authority by Balkan central governments.  On the 
contrary, these developments exacerbated the the state’s inability to monopolize 
violence, as men from paramilitary backgrounds acquired more formal training, 
experience in military leadership and in local government, and thus ability to contest 
the central government’s control. 
Inhabitants on all sides of the redrawn international borders between Greece, 
Bulgaria, and Serbia within geographic Macedonia in 1919 thus entered what became 
known as the interwar decades with profound ambivalence regarding the capabilities 
of any nation-state with centralizing pretensions either to exercise a monopoly of the 
use of force or to serve the needs of its citizens.  The end of the First World War and 




Supreme Committee for the autonomy of geographic Maedonia, rather than its 
partition or incorporation into Greece, Bulgaria, or the newly formed Kingdom of the 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.  These included memoranda and even unsuccessful 
attempts to secure separate Macedonian representation at the Paris Peace Conference 
and later the League of Nations.  For its part, the Gr ek government at the time 
continued to view calls for autonomy as a façade behind which lay the revisionist 
agenda of the Bulgarian government.20  Historians from today’s Republic of 
Macedonia and from Bulgaria have tended to see these appeals as straightforwardly 
Macedonian or Bulgarian national manifestations.21     
Yet the autonomist demands after 1918 also undoubtedly r flected broader 
popular sentiments across geographic Macedonia of longstanding distrust of 
centralized national authority, a distrust intensified by the fact that harsh military 
occupations had constituted their most direct experiences of that authority.  Not long 
before the Bulgarian army was forced to withdraw from Serbian (Vardar) Macedonia 
in 1918, for example, a Bulgarian officer of Macedonian background, Angel Petrov, 
faced a court martial by his military command.  The investigation found that he had 
“agitated among the population in the towns of Kavadartsi and Negotin in Vardar for 
them to enter the ranks of the existing Macedonian party which has as its goal to 
detach Macedonia from Bulgaria and make Macedonia a sep rate, autonomous state.”  
                                                
20 IAM, GDM, file 82.1, 54-56 (Memorandum from Col. Mazarakis-Ainian, Chief of Greek Military 
mission to Sofia, to President of the Greek Minister al Council and Ministries of Defense and Foreign 
Affairs, Army General Headquarters, and General Government of Macedonia, Dec. 23, 1918). 
21 A Macedonian example is Petar Stojanov, Makedonija vo vremeto na Balkanskite i Prvata svetska 
vojna (1912-1918) (Skopje: Institut za nacionalna istorija, 1969), 403-410.  A Bulgarian one is Dimitûr 
Tiulekov, Obrecheno rodoliubie: VMRO v Pirinsko 1919-1934 (Blagoevgrad: Universitetsko 
izdatelstvo “Neofit Rilski”, 2001); the Bulgarian government did endorse some of these appeals as a 
second-best option for the unification of the “Macedonian Bulgarians,” having understood that their 




The investigator reported that Petrov had indeed succeeded in “turning the local 
population against the Bulgarian officers and soldiers by telling them that Bulgarian 
officers were robbing and torturing them and that he, as a Macedonian, was the only 
defender of the population from Bulgarian officers and soldiers.”  Petrov was 
convicted and imprisoned for his actions.22   
On the Greek side of the border, the state also continued to undermine the 
fragile trust of its new citizens after the war, as attested by Ilias Vasiliadis, a teacher 
from pre-1912 Greece working in the village of Zagoritsani near Kastoria.  Vasiliadis 
reported in January 1919 to his superior in the education ministry that the internment 
of seven villagers “as suspicious for the security of our country” was completely 
unfounded.  The seven men had had the misfortune of living in Bulgaria, the Ottoman 
Empire, and Romania before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and were mobilized 
into the Bulgarian army against their will.  Vasiliadis warned that “as a teacher 
preparing future generations, if the truth is obscured and instead injustice triumphs, it 
will make my work here very difficult.”23  Such heightened distrust between states 
and their newly incorporated citizens in geographic Macedonia strongly suggests that 
citizens traveling along any “passages to nationhood” as identified by Karakasidou 
were not making a straightforward journey.  On the contrary, the Balkan Wars of 
1912-1913 and the First World War created detours and even setbacks, deepening the 
population’s wariness of national projects defined by central governments even as 
                                                
22 TsDA, Fond 1k opis 3 (records of the Union of the Macedonian-Adrianopolitan volunteer 
associations, 1912-1952)  a.e. 39 , 1 (Decree of the field investigator for the 3rd brigade of the 3rd 
Balkan Division on the indictment of Angel Petrov, head of security at the rear of the 11th army, for 
agitating people in Kavadartsi and Negotin in favor of autonomy of Macedonia, May 30, 1918). 
23 Državen Arhiv na Republika Makedonija [State Archive of the Republic of Macedonia] (DARM), 
Skopje, Macedonia, Fond 994 [Archival Materials on the Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia Between 
the Two World Wars] kutija 1, 243-244 (Ilias Vassiliadis, teacher in Zagoritsani, to school inspector in 




they tried to find a practical accommodation with them.  This legacy of the wars helps 
to put into context subsequent events in geographic Macedonia in which the reach of 
the central state was challenged.  The VMRO reconstituted itself during the interwar 
period to cause problems for the Yugoslav state and more serious ones for the 
Bulgarian state.  In Pirin Macedonia, its Bulgarian organization became a law unto 
itself.24  Greek Macedonia later became the scene of Greece’s most persistent conflict 
and breakdown of central state authority during the country’s Civil War from 1946 to 
1949.25 
The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the First World War were of course far 
from the last time that Macedonia and the wider region of the Balkans became the 
scene of mass violence.  Although the wars of 1912-1918 would not have qualified as 
civil wars, at least some of the subsequent Balkan conflicts undoubtedly would.26  In 
showing that inhabitants of geographic Macedonia by nd large refrained from taking 
part in nationally motivated violence against other members of their local 
communities even in the midst of wars with distinct a ional significance, this study 
also raises a further question.  To what extent and why did neighbor then turn against 
neighbor with more frequency in subsequent conflicts such as the Second World War, 
the Greek Civil War, and the wars surrounding Yugoslavia’s dissolution?27  Perhaps 
                                                
24 On interwar Yugoslavia, see Vladan Jovanović, Jugoslovenska država i Južna Srbija 1918-1929. 
Makedonija, Sandžak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SHS (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 
2002).  On the Pirin Macedonia region of Bulgaria, see Frusetta, “Bulgaria’s Macedonia.” 
25 See John S. Koliopoulos, Plundered Loyalties: World War II and Civil War in Greek West 
Macedonia (New York: New York University Press, 1999). 
26 Stanley G. Payne, Civil War in Europe, 1905-1949 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2011) provides a useful analysis of the phenomenon of modern civil wars, as distinct from “foreign 
war between two different polities.”  He justifiably omits the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the First 
World War from his discussions of cases of civil war.  See ibid., 1, 23-24. 
27 A recent survey by Mark Biondich, The Balkans: Revolution, War, and Political Violenc since 




in the intervening years national governments made more progress in convincing the 
inhabitants of their Macedonian territories of the supreme importance of the nation 
and of the threat posed by rival nations.  Those inhabitants might then have become 
more willing to accept the necessity of fratricidal violence.  But during the second 
decade of the twentieth century, Macedonia’s inhabitants, whether nationally 
affiliated or nationally indifferent, generally acted as though they had more important 
priorities when they found themselves caught between th  shifting military lines. 
                                                                                                                                 
that intimate violence between members of local communities did occur with more frequency in the 
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